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Abstract
The start-up of the Iberian Electricity Market introduced a set of new mechanisms in the Spanish
electricity sector that forced the agents participating in the market to change their management
policies. This situation created a great opportunity for studying the bidding strategies of the gener-
ation companies in this new framework. This thesis focuses on the short-term bidding strategies of
a price-taker generation company that bids daily in the Iberian Electricity Market. We will center
our bidding strategies on the day-ahead market because 80% of the electricity that is consumed
daily in Spain is negotiated there and also because it is the market where the new mechanisms are
integrated.
The liberalization of the electricity markets opens the classical problems of energy management to
new optimization approaches. Specifically, because of the uncertainty that the market produces in
the prices, the stochastic programming techniques have become the most natural way to deal with
these problems. Notice that, in deregulated electricity markets the price is hourly fixed through
a market clearing procedure, so when the agent must bid its energy it is unaware of the price at
which it will be paid. This uncertainty makes it essential to use some statistic techniques in order
to obtain the information coming from the markets and to introduce it in the optimization models
in a suitable way. In this aspect, one of the main contributions of this thesis has been the study
the Spanish electricity price time series and its modeling by means of factor models.
In this thesis, the new mechanism introduced by the Iberian Market that affects the physical
operation of the units is described. In particular, it considers in great detail the inclusion of
the physical futures contracts and the bilateral contracts into the day-ahead market bid of the
generation companies. The rules of the market operator have been explicitly taken into account
within the mathematical models, along with all the classical operational constraints that affect the
thermal and combined cycle units. The expression of the optimal bidding functions are derived
and proved. Therefore, the models built in this thesis provide the generation company with the
economic dispatch of the committed futures and bilateral contracts, the unit commitment of the
units and the optimal bidding strategies for the generation company.
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Once these main objectives were fulfilled, we improved the previous models with an approach to
the modeling of the influence that the sequence of very short markets have on optimal day-ahead
bidding. These markets are cleared just before and during the day in which the electricity will
be consumed and the opportunity to obtain benefits from them changes the optimal day-ahead
bidding strategies of the generation company, as it will be shown in this thesis.
The entire models presented in this work have been tested using real data from a generation
company and Spanish electricity prices. Suitable results have been obtained and discussed.
Resumen
La puesta en marcha del Mercado Ibe´rico de la Electricidad introdujo en el sector ele´ctrico espan˜ol
una serie de nuevos mecanismos de participacio´n que han forzado a los agentes a renovar sus
pol´ıticas de gestio´n. De esta nueva situacio´n surge la oportunidad de estudiar nuevas estrategias de
oferta para las compan˜´ıas de generacio´n. Esta tesis se enmarca en las estrategias de oferta a corto
plazo para compan˜´ıas de generacio´n price-taker que participen diariamente en el Mercado Ibe´rico
de la Electricidad. Estas estrategias se centraran en el mercado diario ya que es donde se negocia
un 80% de la electricidad consumida diariamente en Espan˜a y es donde se integran gran parte del
resto de los mecanismos de participacio´n.
La liberalizacio´n de los mercados ele´ctricos permiten aplicar nuevas te´cnicas de optimizacio´n a
los problemas cla´sicos de gestio´n de la energ´ıa. En concreto, dada la incertidumbre en el precio
existente en el mercado, las te´cnicas de programacio´n estoca´stica se convierten en la forma ma´s
natural para abordar estos problemas. En los mercados ele´ctricos el precio se fija horariamente
como resultado de un proceso de casacio´n, es decir, cuando el agente debe efectuar sus ofertas
desconoce el precio al que la energ´ıa le sera´ pagada. Esta incertidumbre hace imprescindible el
uso de te´cnicas estad´ısticas para obtener informacio´n del mercado e introducirla en los modelos de
optimizacio´n. En este aspecto, una de las contribuciones de esta tesis es el estudio del precio de la
electricidad en Espan˜a y su modelado mediante modelos factoriales.
Se describen los nuevos mecanismos presentes en el Mercado Ibe´rico de la Electricidad que afectan
directamente a la produccio´n f´ısica de las unidades. En particular, se incluye una modelizacio´n
detallada de los contratos de futuros f´ısicos y bilaterales y su inclusio´n en la oferta enviada al
mercado diario por las compan˜´ıas de generacio´n. En los modelos presentados se tiene en cuenta
expl´ıcitamente las reglas del mercado as´ı como las cla´sicas restricciones de operacio´n de las unidades,
tanto te´rmicas como de ciclo combinado. La expresio´n de la funcio´n de oferta o´ptima se deriva y
se demuestra.
Por lo tanto, los modelos construidos son una herramienta para decidir la asignacio´n de unidades,
la generacio´n de los contratos de futuros f´ısicos y bilaterales a trave´s de ellas y la oferta o´ptima de
ix
xuna compan˜´ıa de generacio´n.
Una vez alcanzados estos objetivos, se presenta una mejora del modelo con la inclusio´n de la
secuencia de mercados de muy corto plazo. El objetivo es modelar la influencia que esta tiene en la
oferta al mercado diario. Estos mercados se casan justo antes y durante el d´ıa en el que la energ´ıa
va a ser consumida y se vera´ co´mo la posibilidad de aumentar los beneficios participando en ellos
afecta a las estrategias de oferta o´ptima del mercado diario.
Los modelos presentados en este trabajo se han probado con datos reales procedentes del Mercado
Ibe´rico de la Electricidad y de una compan˜´ıa de generacio´n que opera en e´l. Los resultados obtenidos
son adecuados y se discuten a lo largo del documento.
Resum
La posada en marxa del Mercat Ibe`ric de l’Electricitat va introduir al sector ele`ctric espanyol un
seguit de nous mecanismes de participacio´ que han forc¸at els agents a renovar les seves pol´ıtiques
de gestio´. D’aquesta nova situacio´ sorgeix l’oportunitat d’estudiar noves estrate`gies d’oferta a curt
termini per a companyies de generacio´ price-taker que participin dia`riament al Mercat Ibe`ric de
l’Electricitat. Aquestes estrate`gies se centraran al mercat diari, ja que e´s aqu´ı on es negocia un
80% de l’electricitat que es consumeix dia`riament a Espanya i on s’integren gran part de la resta
de mecanismes de participacio´.
La liberalitzacio´ dels mercats ele`ctrics obre a noves te`cniques d’optimitzacio´ els problemes cla`ssics
de gestio´ de l’energia. En particular, atesa la incertesa que l’existe`ncia del mercat ocasiona als
preus, les te`cniques de programacio´ estoca`stiques es converteixen en la forma me´s natural per
abordar aquests problemes. Als mercats ele`ctrics el preu es fixa hora`riament com a resultat d’un
proce´s de casacio´ , e´s a dir que quan l’agent ha d’efectuar la seva oferta desconeix el preu al qual
li vindra` remunerada l’energia. Aquesta incertesa fa imprescindible l’u´s de te`cniques estad´ıstiques
per obtenir informacio´ del mercat i introduir-la als models d’optimitzacio´. En aquest aspecte, una
de les contribucions d’aquesta tesi e´s l’estudi dels preus del mercat de l’electricitat a Espanya i el
seu modelat mitjanc¸ant models factorials.
D’altra banda, s’hi es descriuen els nous mecanismes presents al Mercat Ibe`ric de l’Electricitat que
afecten directament la produccio´ f´ısica de les unitats. En particular, s’inclou el modelat detallat
dels contractes de futurs f´ısics i bilaterals i de la seva inclusio´ a l’oferta del mercat diari per part de
les companyies de generacio´. Als models presentats, es tenen en compte expl´ıcitament les regles del
mercat, aix´ı com les cla`ssiques restriccions d’operacio´ de les unitats, tant te`rmiques com de cicle
combinat. A me´s, es deriva i es demostra l’expressio´ de la funcio´ d’oferta.
Per tant, els models constru¨ıts so´n una eina per decidir l’assignacio´ de les unitats, la generacio´ dels
contractes de futurs f´ısics i bilaterals a trave´s seu i l’oferta o`ptima d’una companyia de generacio´.
Un cop s’han cobert aquests objectius, es presenta una millora dels models mitjanc¸ant la inclusio´
de la sequ¨e`ncia de mercats de molt curt termini per tal de modelar la influe`ncia que tenen en
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l’oferta al mercat diari. Aquests mercats es casen just abans i durant el dia en que` l’energia ha de
ser consumida, i aixo` permetra` veure com la possibilitat d’augmentar els beneficis participant-hi
afecta directament les estrate`gies d’oferta o`ptima del mercat diari.
Els models presentats en aquest treball han estat provats amb dades reals provinents del Mercat
Ibe`ric de l’Electricitat i d’una companyia de generacio´ que hi opera. Els resultats obtinguts so´n
adequats i es discuteixen al llarg del document.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The liberalization of the electricity sector led to a new situation in the decision-making processes
of the generation companies (GenCo). In this new framework, the agents’ objective is to maximize
their expected profits by considering all the mechanisms in which they could participate. Specifi-
cally, in June 2005 the White Paper on Regulatory Framework Reform for Electric Generation in
Spain (Perez-Arriaga., 2005) was published and May 2006 saw the publication of the agreement
between Spain and Portugal for the creation of a joint electricity market, an agreement which es-
tablishes the basis for the Iberian Electricity Market (MIBEL)that started up in June 2007. This
new situation was a perfect opportunity to study all the new mechanisms that were created within
this new electricity market and the new problems that a Spanish generation company will have to
face.
In this new framework, the Spanish generation companies have to change their bidding strategies in
order to take advantage of the opportunities that the Iberian Electricity Market provides. Specifi-
cally, the creation of the derivatives market (DM) opens a new range of products that could help
to hedge the risk produced by the uncertainty in electricity prices.
Historically, electricity generation management has been considered within the context of various
planning horizons. Long-term planning (more than one year) includes strategic decisions for the
GenCo, such as new investments or expansion plans. Medium-term planning (from one week to
one year) focuses on the management of some limited resources(such as hydro generation) and
the negotiation of bilateral and derivatives contracts. Finally, short-term decisions are the unit
commitment of the units, the economic dispatch and, in the new market framework, the bidding to
day-ahead or intraday markets. This short-term planning from the point of view of the generation
companies is the objective of this thesis. Our study of electricity generation management will be
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focused company’s pool of thermal units; however, all the models presented here could be expanded
to include other kinds of generation units such as hydro or wind power units.
It must also be emphasized that, although the thesis is contextualized in the MIBEL, all models
and results presented here can be easily applied and adapted to other electricity market situations,
both those that are beginning to restructure themselves anew and to classical markets that have
some mechanisms that are equivalent to the ones introduced in our models.
Other important key points coming from the liberalization of the electricity market is the price
risk, i.e. the uncertainty in the price at which the generated electricity will be paid. This price is
fixed in the market clearing process that occurs after the GenCos decide their bid strategy, that
is to say: their generation level and price bid. Aside from some other medium-term decision for
hedging the risk, the GenCo must take into account this uncertainty in its short-term planning.
This is a great opportunity for the stochastic programming techniques to be used on the classical
optimization problems for electricity generation management.
1.2 Objectives
The main goals of this thesis are as follows:
(i) To study in depth the new market regulations and the implications for generation companies’
short-term management strategies. This objective includes the study of the derivatives market
regulation and its products, the day-ahead and the secondary markets rules and the regulation
on the bidding process and physical generation management in the MIBEL framework.
(ii) To develop new approximations to forecast modeling for Spanish market prices and include
them into the optimization models.
(iii) To propose a model for the inclusion of physical derivatives products into the day-ahead
market bidding strategies of a price-taker GenCo.
(iv) To propose a model for the inclusion of bilateral contracts into the short-term generation
strategies of a price-taker GenCo. These mechanisms could include classical bilateral contracts
or the new organized markets of bilateral contracts.
(v) To propose a model which integrates the short-term sequence of markets, intraday markets
and ancillary services, into the day-ahead market bidding strategies of a price-taker GenCo.
1.3 Contents
After defining the fundamental concepts for the bidding strategies in Chapter 2, we start off by
proposing a model that introduces futures contracts into the bidding strategies, because it applies
to one of the most significant changes caused by the Iberian Electricity Market in the Spanish
electricity sector: the start-up of the derivatives market. Once we have modeled these physical
derivatives products, we expand the model by including the bilateral contracts. But if we look at
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these two approaches from a global point of view, the futures contract model presented in Chapter
4 can be seen as a particular case of the model presented in Chapter 5. Therefore, the contents
of this thesis should be observed as the evolution of the work during the thesis process. The only
exception to this temporal order are the last two models presented in Chapter 7. Those models
were the first approaches which included the bidding function in the management of some of the
new market mechanisms. It can be observed within the mathematical model that the Chapter 7
models were constructed prior to some of the previous models.
The case studies of the thesis are solved with real data from the Iberian Electricity Market and
from a GenCo that participates daily in the electricity market.
The chapters structure is as follows:
1 Introduction
This chapter outlines the motivations of the study, its objectives and, a summary of the contents.
2 Background
This chapter introduces all the basic concepts needed to contextualize the thesis framework. It
presents the Iberian Electricity Market, its history and main characteristics. Also, the most im-
portant mechanisms included in the models defined later are described and illustrated. A brief
introduction to stochastic programming techniques is also presented, along with a definition of
two-stage and multistage stochastic problems. Finally, the concepts and instruments that will be
expanded on in the subsequent models are explained such as, for example, the optimal bidding
curve and the matched energy.
3 Day-Ahead Market Price Scenarios
This chapter includes a study of the market price. A descriptive study of the prices from 2007
to 2010 is presented, emphasizing the main characteristics of the market price time series. Aside
from other more simple approaches, an ARIMA model is adjusted and its results are used in some
subsequent models. Finally, the most relevant result of the statistical study of the market price
scenario is presented, a new approach by means of a factor model is adjusted and its results are
compared with the ARIMA model.
4 DAMB: Futures Contracts
Chapter 4 presents the first stochastic programming model of this work. The economic dispatch of
physical futures contracts is included in the short-term management of the thermal units. The result
is a two-stage mixed-integer stochastic programming model for the short-term thermal optimal
bidding problem that maximizes the expected benefits of the day-ahead market for a price-taker
GenCo. The chapter ends with a case study based on real units participating in the Spanish
electricity market.
5 DAMB: Futures and Bilateral Contracts
This chapter describes the extension of the model presented in the previous Chapter 4 with the
inclusion of the bilateral contracts. In order to to maximize the benefits arising from the day-
ahead market while satisfying thermal operational constraints, the optimal solution of the model
determines the unit commitment of the thermal units, the optimal instrumental price bidding
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strategy for the generation company and the economic dispatch of the committed futures and
bilateral contracts for each hour. The proposed model is tested with a case study defined by real
data from a Spanish GenCo.
6 DAMB: Multimarket Problem
The model developed in Chapter 5 is extended here to include the sequence of short-term markets
into the day-ahead market bidding problem, i.e. to take into account all the very short-term
markets existing in the Iberian Electricity Market in the day-ahead strategies. A brief study of the
secondary markets prices is made and both the reserve and the first intraday market are modeled
together with economic dispatch of the futures and bilateral contracts, as a multistage stochastic
programming problem. Again, the proposed model is tested with a case study based on real units
participating in the Spanish electricity market.
7 DAMB: Other Extensions
This chapter is based on a joint work with M.J. Rider, which to some extend represents two
extensions of the core model developed in Chapters 4 to 6. The first one describes the inclusion
of combined cycle units and the definition of its optimal bid strategies. The second one models
the inclusion of the opportunities coming from the virtual power plants auctions into the bidding
strategies of a price-taker GenCo. The case study is made with real data from a Spanish GenCo.
8 Conclusions
General conclusions and further research are discussed, along with the scientific production gener-
ated by this thesis.
Appendix
The data for the case studies is presented in the appendix and we provide a glossary where the
symbols and abbreviations used in this thesis are described. Moreover, the application of some
of the techniques presented in this thesis to the Italian Electricity Market are included as an
appendix.
CHAPTER 2
Background
Introduction
This chapter contains the basis for the work done in this thesis, there are described the main
concepts and theoretical aspects in which the work of the thesis is based on. In Section 2.1, the
electricity market under study, the Iberian Electricity Market, is described in detail. Also the
market mechanism in which the generation companies can participate are studied and presented.
Section 2.2 gives a brief introduction to the stochastic programming techniques and the different
horizon approaches presented in this work. Finally, in Section 2.3 the day-ahead market bidding
(DAMB) problem and all the concepts that will be extended in the subsequent chapters are pre-
sented.
2.1 Iberian Energy Market
In this section the Iberian Energy Market is presented. A brief history of its start-up process and
its institutions is described and the main relevant parts and products that will be included in later
models are introduced.
2.1.1 History and Structure
The organization of the electricity markets is a consequence of the historical organization of the
sector and the nature of the commodity. Electricity cannot be stored and this fact forces situ-
ations and rules that distinguish it from other commodities markets. The liberalization process
performed over the last decade in Europe has structured the sector in a way that follows these
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natural and historic characteristics. There are three vertical activities: the generation, distribution
and commercialization of electricity.
The electricity distribution is based on a physical network that transports the electricity from the
place where it is produced to the place where it will be consumed. This network needs a huge
investment in its creation, maintenance and operation and this fact causes the monopoly to be
the most efficient option for this activity. Those natural monopolies have been regulated in the
reorganization process in order to open the activity to other companies by means of the payment
of a regulated tariff.
The generation and commercialization of energy have been liberalized, the introduction of the mar-
ket and the improvement in competition lead to more efficient management and better exploitation
of the natural resources. Generation is linked to a wholesaler market, where the producers sell the
energy and the buyers’ agents purchase it for the buyers’ own consumption or to commercialize it
for final consumers. Commercialization applies to the retailer market and is therefore out of the
scope of this thesis.
On the mainland of Spain, in November 1997, Electric Sector Law 54/1997 was published; it defines
the Spanish Electricity Market and related institutions. The Spanish Electricity Market started
up in January 1998. This reform of the Spanish electric sector has the typical triple objective: to
guarantee the supply of electricity, to guarantee the quality of this supply and to guarantee this
process at a lower cost. It establishes a fully competitive framework for the generation of electricity
while at the same time it defines a transient process for the liberalization of retail supply.
In the Spanish Electricity Market, the market mechanisms are centralized and managed by an entity
known as market operator (MO). To play this role, a new institution was created: the Compan˜ia
Operadora del Mercado Espan˜ol de la Electricidad. This institution is in charge of the set of short-
term market mechanisms through which the great part of the physical transactions take place. On
the other hand, to guarantee the that electricity is supplied with quality, security and reliability it
was necessary to create an institution that is independent from any agent that participates in the
electricity market and, also, from the MO. This entity is the independent system operator (ISO)
and it was created within the Spanish Electricity Market redefining the role played by a preexisting
entity, the Red Ele´ctrica de Espan˜a (REE). REE is the owner of the high-voltage transmission
network and has been the system operator since 1984. In this situation, the coordination between
the MO and the ISO became essential in order to guarantee that the market transactions are
physically feasible and fulfill the security criteria. The Spanish Electricity Market included a day-
ahead market and a set of balancing and adjustment markets. Out of the market there were still
the classical bilateral contracts.
As the introduction of competition and the deregulation process did not behave as expected, the
Spanish Electricity Market was improved in 2007 with the start-up of the Iberian Electricity Market
(MIBEL). The MIBEL joins the Spanish and Portuguese electricity system and it complements the
previous mechanisms of the Spanish Electricity Market with a derivatives market and other new
market mechanisms. This derivatives market has its own MO called Operador do Mercado Iberico
de Energia - Po´lo Portugueˆs (OMIP, 2008) and the old Spanish market operator is renamed as
Operador del Mercado Iberico de Energia - Polo Espan˜ol (OMEL, 2010) and it is still in charge of
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the spot markets.
The mechanisms (Figure 2.1) in which the agents could participate in the MIBEL are:
• Bilateral contracts (BC), which could be classical bilateral trading between agents without the
implication of any institution or other auctions in organized markets such as virtual capacity
auction (mandatory for the dominant agents) or distribution auctions.
• Derivatives market (DM), where long term commitments for generating and buying energy
are made. In this market there is either a physical or financial settlement.
• Day-ahead market (DAM), which allows the agents to execute the BCs and also allows the
integration of open long-term positions with physical settlement.
• Intraday markets (IM), which are open to all agents that have participated in the DAM or
who have signed BCs.
• Ancillary services auctions, which guarantee the security and reliability of the system.
The management of the day-ahead and intraday markets are entrusted to OMEL, which is also
responsible for communicating payment obligations. The ancillary services are managed by REE
which is also responsible for the real time management.
Figure 2.2 illustrates the sequence of spot market mechanisms and it indicates where the medium-
term positions are integrated. The first node represents the GenCo agents and all the medium term
products that are integrated at the GenCo DAM bids: virtual power plant options, derivatives
physical products, distribution contracts and, international connection rights. The agents could
participate in the spot market through seven sessions represented by the subsequent nodes. The
first and main one is the day-ahead market which is followed by the technical restrictions resolution.
After those first mechanisms there is the ancillary services market, also called reserve, where the
ramp up and down capacity of the units is bid. Just before and during the day of study there are
the six intraday sessions distributed along the 24 hours of the settlement day. Finally, real time
management is the last short-term mechanism where the GenCo can participate.
Since the start up of the market in 1998, generation investments have led to an evolution in the
market from a model with two generation companies with have an 80% generation market quote
to a framework where the greatest quota of a participant is 22%. At the end of 2009, the number
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Figure 2.2: Sequence of spot market mechanisms.
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of participants in the market is 1169: 918 producers (621 special regime producers: renewable
energies, waste and cogeneration), 192 distributors or suppliers and 59 other kinds of agents. The
total installed capacity of the system at December 2009 was 93729 MW.
2.1.2 Bilateral Contracts
In June 2007, not only the MIBEL was launched but also some new rules of the electrical energy
production market operation for the day-ahead and intraday market were introduced. These new
rules defined mechanisms to encourage competition in the production market: new kinds of bilateral
contracts besides the classical ones and virtual power plant (VPP) capacity auctions.
From our GenCo point of view, the BCs are agreements between the company and a qualified
consumer to provide a given amount of electricity at a stipulated price during a delivery period.
The characteristics of the BC (energy, price and delivery period) are negotiated among the MIBEL
agents, either in nonorganized or organized markets. For a GenCo, these BCs usually represent a
scheduled load curve, chargeable at a fixed price that has to be optimally dispatched among the
GenCo’s units. In nonorganized BC markets, i.e. the classical BCs existing before the reorganiza-
tion, the producers and consumers agree on the amount, price, and period of the energy delivered.
This agreement is set during a private negotiation. The new mechanisms that appear with the
creation of the MIBEL are two organized BC markets: the CESUR and VPP auctions (see CESUR
(2010) and CNE (2010), respectively).
The CESUR are electricity auctions for the supply at regulated prices. They are new mechanisms
for buying energy destined to final consumers that have recourse to a regulated tariff. The objectives
of these auctions are, on the one hand, to encourage liquidity of long- and medium-term markets
and, on the other hand, to stabilize the cost of energy for the final consumers, avoiding the volatility
of the DAM prices. The CESUR auctions settle the BCs signed by generation and distribution
companies to supply power at regulated prices. These regulated prices are the prices at which the
distribution auction generic unit is used by the GenCo to integrate the energy matched by the
CESUR auction into the energy production system. By law, a GenCo holding such a BC must use
this generic unit to submit an accepting-price purchase bid to the DAM for the entire amount of
the contract and, therefore, there is no room for optimization.
The virtual power plant auctions are sales of electricity capacity which, rather than physical divest-
ments, are virtual divestments by one or more dominant firms in a market. Instead of selling the
physical power plant, the firm retains management and control of the plant, but offers contracts
that are intended to replicate the output of the plant. These kinds of auctions are also launched
in order to stimulate liquidity in forward electricity markets and to increase the proportion of elec-
tricity that is purchased through BCs. Specifically, the MIBEL imposed on Endesa and Iberdrola
(the two dominant utility companies in the Spanish electricity market in 2006) to hold a series
of five auctions offering VPP capacity to any agent member of the market. In 2006, the total
installed capacity of both the companies was around 47 GW, and the total installed capacity of
the Spanish electricity system was 78.3 GW. Figure 2.3 shows the volumes to be auctioned by
Endesa and Iberdrola; it can be observed that the greatest volumes of auctioned VPP capacity
were reached from April to September 2008, with a total amount of 2000 MW. The last settlement
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Figure 2.3: Five VPP capacity auctions in the Spanish peninsular electricity market.
dates for delivering energy bought at the last VPP auction is March 2010. Nowadays, the National
Committee of Energy is making an evaluation of the real impact of the VPP auctions on market
liquidity and competition. This evaluation is made through the MIBEL agents and it will be used
for deciding if it is convenient to start another set of VPP auctions and if it is necessary to make
some changes that improve their operation.
All these described BCs are settled before the DAM and the resulting dispatch must be commu-
nicated (nominated using the MIBEL’s terminology) to the system and market operator before
the closure of the DAM. There are other kind of BCs, called after the DAM, related to the VPP
auctions that will be described below.
Thus, in the MIBEL, VPP capacity indicates that the buyer of this product will have the capacity
to generate MWh at his disposal. The buyer can exercise the right to produce against an exercise
price, set in advance, by paying an option premium. Hence, although Endesa and Iberdrola still
own the power plants, part of their production capacity will be at the disposal of the buyers of
VPP. There will be base-load and peak-load contracts with different strike prices that are defined
a month before the auction. In each case, contracts with the duration of 3, 6, and 12 months will
be offered.
The energy resulting from the exercise of the VPP options can be used by the buyers both as a
contribution for covering the national and international BCs before the DAM as well as to sell it
directly through bids to the DAM. In this latter case, the unmatched VPP energy, if any, can be
sold through national BCs after the DAM. These new BCs after the DAM are negotiated between
the agents prior to DAM gate closure, and must not be confused with other subsequent markets
such as the ancillary services or balancing markets.
In 2009, in the Spanish section of the MIBEL, 34.7% of the system demand was traded through
BCs. This includes the executed VPP rights and the classical BCs.
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2.1.3 Derivatives Market
As we have introduced in Section 2.1.1, an important agreement between Spanish and Portuguese
government lead to the creation of the MIBEL and the starting up of a regulated derivatives market
managed by the Portuguese section of the MIBEL. The main objective of the participation in this
long term market is to hedge risk. Financial mediators, producers, commercialization agents and
other electrical agents can participate at the derivatives market sessions.
Nowadays, there are three kind of products: futures, forward and swaps. In the case of forward
and swap products, they have been introduced on March 2009 and they are not totaly operative,
specifically they are still out of the organized market but it is planned the negotiation through
the market soon. The forward contracts will be with physical settlement and swaps contracts with
financial.
Thus, the derivative product considered in this thesis is the futures contract (FC) because it was the
kind of contract with physical delivery offered by the derivatives market until last year. Nowadays
FCs are traded at organized derivatives markets in most electricity markets. The agents send their
bids for the FCs to the market operator, OMIP, who does the clearing process.
The main characteristics of a FC are:
• Procurement : futures contracts could have physical or financial settlement. Physical futures
contracts have cash settlement and physical delivery whereas financial ones have cash settle-
ment only. In OMIP, the financial settlement correspond to the difference between the spot
price and the futures reference price. This reference price is the last accepted transaction
price.
• Delivery period : the delivery period defines the duration of the contract. In OMIP the
delivery period could be a year, a quarter, a month or a week.
• Load : futures contracts could be base or peak load. In base load futures contracts the quantity
to procure is constant for all the delivery period intervals. In peak load futures contracts there
is procurement only in peak intervals (from 8 am to 24 pm, Monday to Friday). Nowadays,
in OMIP all FCs are base load.
In the MIBEL derivatives market there are traded in average more than 3000GWh monthly.
2.1.4 Day-Ahead Market
The day-ahead market is the most important part of the electricity market with regard to physical
energy exchanges. The objective of this market is to carry out the energy transactions for the next
day by means of selling and buying offers presented by the market agents. The commitment of the
offers to the market has the following characteristics:
• The agents owning a production unit must present a sell bid with a quantity equal to all the
available energy of the unit, meaning the energy that is not committed to BCs. To avoid this
rule the unit must be declared unavailable to the OM.
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• The external agents, commercialization agents and owners of production units in a special
regime can present offers to sell.
• The distribution, commercialization or external agents and the final consumers participating
in the market can present purchase offers.
• The open positions of physical derivatives products have to be integrated into the sell or
purchase bids at instrumental prices.
• The energy resulting from the distribution auctions has to be integrated into the distribution
companies bids at instrumental prices.
• The execution of the options obtained from the virtual power plants can be integrated into
sell or purchase bids at a free price.
The clearing process is based on the construction of an offer curve and a demand curve for each
hour; their intersection permits the establishment of market equilibrium and the point is determined
by the result of the clearing process.
Specifically, the DAM is made up of twenty-four hourly auctions that are cleared simultaneously.
Both offers from selling agents (i.e. generation companies) and bids from buying agents (i.e. dis-
tribution companies) are submitted to each auction. Each agent can submit several offers but they
are unaware of the offers submitted by the rest of the agents. The offer for each interval and unit
is a 25 piece-wise curve defined by a set of pairs (quantity, price) with non-decreasing price values.
To derive the aggregate offer curve, offers are sorted by increasing prices and their quantities are
accumulated. The clearing-price λ is determined by the intersection of the aggregate supply and
demand curve (Figure 2.4). All the sale (purchase) bids with a lower (greater) bid price are matched
and will be remunerated at the same clearing price λ, irrespective of the original bid price.
In 2009, in the Spanish section of the MIBEL, 76.8% of the system demand was traded on the
DAM. But it must be taken into account that this percentage includes the mandatory bids as well
as the products that must be integrated through the DAM bid (bilateral contracts, derivatives
2.1. IBERIAN ENERGY MARKET 13
GenCo
Int BC
DAM
(Lmax,
Nac BC
Int BC
BC aDAM
BC aDAM
BC aDAM
BC aDAM
BC aDAM
Nac BC
BC aDAM
BC aDAM
BC aDAM
VPP
GPU
Nac BC
BC aDAM
Int BC
Int BC
Distribution
GPU
Other agents units
Comb. Cycle Thermal
UPG VPP Sellers
EN IBD
International sellers
International buyers
Retailers
BC aDAM
Int BC
Int BC
BC aDAM
BC aDAM
Other agents VPP GPU
Other agents dist
GPU
International BC - sell
International BC - buy
National BC before the DAM
National BC after the DAM
BC intra GenCo after the DAM
VPP auction matched energy
Distribution auction matched energy
DAM bids
International BC
Sell unit
International BC
Buy unit
Figure 2.5: The GenCo’s operation problem in the MIBEL’s energy production system throughout the
DAM.
products, etc.). If we extract these products, the percentage could be approximately 40% of the
system demand.
2.1.4.1 Coordination between DAM and VPP Capacity
The exercised energy of the VPP is integrated into the energy production system through the
generic programming unit (GPU). The GPUs (VPP-GPU node in Figure 2.5) are virtual units
that bring more flexibility to the GenCo operations in the MIBEL. With the GPU, the utility can:
• Integrate the exercised VPP energy into the energy production system, both offering this
energy to the pool through sales bids and allocating it among the GenCo’s portfolio of national
and international BCs.
• Act as a purchase agent, both sending purchase bids to the pool and acquiring energy through
national and international BCs.
In summary, Figure 2.5 illustrates the set of BCs and their coordination with the DAM. As we
have explained, BCs can be of two kinds: before the DAM (represented with continuous arcs) and
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after the DAM (dashed arcs). The elements of the MIBEL’s energy production system that are
relevant to the decision-making problem of a BC-owning GenCo are:
• The programming units owned by the GenCo. These units could be either physical (ther-
mal, combined-cycle, etc.) or generic, i.e., virtual units (Distribution GPU, VPP GPU)
through which the GenCo can operate by either selling or buying energy; in other words, by
both bidding to the pool and settling BCs with the other participant in the MIBEL’s energy
production system.
• The DAM to which all the programming units of the GenCo can submit sale bids (physical
production units) or sale/purchase bids (the generic units). The allowed bids are represented
in Figure 2.5 by the thin black arcs.
• There are two kinds of agents that can interact with the GenCo’s programming units: the
international agents and the MIBEL agents. The GenCo can buy/sell energy from/to
the surrounding foreign generation areas –namely, Portugal, Morocco, and France– through
the international BCs settled with its GPU. There are also BCs signed by the GenCo and
the rest of the MIBEL agents that apply to the GPU and the physical production units.
For the BCs after the DAM (dashed lines in Figure 2.5), the dispatch must be nominated following
the publication of the DAM clearing results. After market clearing, the generation program of the
GPU must be allocated among the GenCo’s physical production units and BCs, in such a way that
the net energy balance of the GPU is zero. The existence of BCs after the DAM prevents violation
of the aforementioned netting energy balance condition as a consequence of possible unmatched
sale or purchase bids of a GPU.
2.1.4.2 Coordination between DAM and Derivatives Market
The MIBEL regulation (OMEL, 2007) describes the coordination between the physical futures con-
tracts portfolio and the day-ahead bidding mechanism (Figure 2.6). This coordination is structured
into the following three phases:
1. For every derivatives contract in which the GenCo is interested, the corresponding term
contract unit (UCP in the MIBEL’s notation) has to be defined. A UCP is a virtual unit
which is allowed to be on in the derivatives market. Each UCP is formed by a subset of
the physical units of the GenCo which will generate the energy to cover the corresponding
contract. For each contract, a physical unit can only participate in one virtual UCP.
2. Two days before the delivery date the GenCo receives from the derivatives market operator,
OMIP, the quantity that every UCP has to produce in order to cover the matched FCs. This
information is also sent to the day-ahead market operator, OMEL.
3. OMEL demands that every GenCo commit the quantity designated to FCs through the day-
ahead market bidding of the physical units that form each UCP. This commitment is made
by the so called instrumental price offer, that is, a sale offer with a bid price of 0e/MWh
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Figure 2.6: Representation of the coordination between DAM and DM.
(also called price acceptant). It is noteworthy that this is the main difference between FCs
and BCs because, contrary to the FCs, the energy committed to the BCs must be excluded
from the MIBEL’s day-ahead market bid.
This regulation implies that the GenCo has to determine its unit commitment in order to be able
to cover those obligations and it has to determine its optimal bid by taking into account those
instrumental price offers. Due to the algorithm the market operator uses to clear the DAM, all
instrumental price offers will be matched (i.e. accepted) in the clearing process; that is, this energy
shall be produced and will be remunerated at the spot price.
2.1.5 Intraday Market
The intraday market (IM) is an adjustment market; it allows agents flexibility in optimizing its
operation through a series of auctions with successive time horizons.
The IM takes place just before and during the delivery day; it is composed of 6 consecutive markets,
each on comprising 24 auctions. These auctions work exactly as those of the DAM, with a matching
process that is also identical (Figure 2.4).
The main difference from the DAM is that, in the IM market, all the agents can either send or buy
electricity, that is, they can participate as buyers or sellers of energy. It is important to note that
in a given session and hour, a unit can only submit offers to buy or sell, but not both. However,
at different hours, this role can change.
The agents can participate in the IM if they have participated in the corresponding DAM session
or if they have committed BCs that have been declared to the OS.
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In 2009, in the Spanish section of the MIBEL, 11.50% of the system demand was traded during
the six sessions of the IM.
2.1.6 Adjustment Market Services
There are a series of mechanisms that are necessary for guaranteeing the supply of electricity as
well as maintaining the security and reliability of the system. The different mechanisms of the
adjustment services can be mandatory or facultative and the greater part of them are managed
through auction sessions. The mechanisms that are included in the adjustment services are: the
technical restrictions; the primary, secondary and third regulation service (also known as reserve);
and the real-time management of the system. In this thesis we focus on the secondary regulation
service, henceforth reserve, because it is the only facultative regulation service between the DAM
and IM.
The reserve takes place after the DAM matching process and its objective is to maintain the
equilibrium between generation and demand by correcting the deviations. This service is performed
during two phases: availability and use. In this thesis we focus on the first phase: the offers of
availability. The agents send bids to offer its capability to increase or decrease the matched energy
of the units in the DAM. If a bid is matched in the reserve, then the unit must be available to change
its generation level within a given time interval on during real-time operation. For this reason, the
units that participate in this market must have some specific operational characteristics that allow
them to increase or decrease the generation level within a given time interval.
The adjustment market services do not represent a significant percentage of the system demand,
but they are essential for proper management of the system. From a GenCo’s point of view,
its participation in the reserve will change its short-term operation, because their capacity for
increasing or decreasing production levels will be subjected to ISO requirements.
2.2 Stochastic Programming
In this section we give a brief introduction to stochastic programming and we introduce the related
terminology. A stochastic programming model is basically a mathematical programming model in
which uncertain data is represented by random variables. As this thesis is devoted to application, we
will present the basic class of stochastic programming problems but not the structural properties or
specific solving algorithms. For an in-depth description see, for example, Kall and Wallace (1994),
Prekopa (1995) or Birge and Louveaux (1997).
2.2.1 Two-stage Stochastic Program with Recourse
The basic stochastic problem is the two-stage stochastic program with fixed recourse. The decision
are partitioned into two stages according to the information flow and we therefore refer to them
as first-stage and second-stage decisions. It should be remarked that the partitioning of decisions
do not actually need to reflect the separation of main decisions and recourse actions, but reflect
the timing of the decisions such that first-stage decisions are to be made immediately, whereas
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second-stage decisions can be deferred. The decision-maker wants to minimize direct and expected
future costs. Its general formulation is:
min z = cTx+ Eξ[min q(ω)T y(ω)]
s.t. Ax = b
T (ω)x+Wy(ω) = h(ω)
x ≥ 0
where x are the so-called first-stage decision variables, and c, b, and A are the first-stage vectors
and matrices. In the second stage a number of random events ω ∈ Ω may realize; y(ω) are the
second-stage decision variables for a given realization ω; the second stage data q(ω), h(ω) and,
T (ω) become known. E[ ] denotes the mathematical expectation. W is the recourse matrix, the
assumption of a known fixed recourse matrix is referred to as a problem with fixed recourse. The
dependency of y on ω reflects the fact that the decisions differ for different realizations of the
random variables.
To illustrate the dynamics of the two-stage decision process, consider the following scheme
decide on x −→ observe q, h, T −→ decide on y.
As we have introduced, the first-stage decisions must be made with limited information regarding
the future realization of the random data, and in such a way to minimize direct first-stage costs
and expected second-stage costs.
Stochastic programming is based on the assumption of a known probability distribution of the
random variable. Most of the time the continuos distribution is approximated through a discrete
distribution with finite support. This finite number of possible realizations of the random variable
define the so-called set of scenarios. We assume that the approximation of ξ = (q, h, T ) is given
by a set of scenarios {1, ..., S} that corresponds to the realizations ξs = (qs, hs, T s), s ∈ S and
probabilities P s, s ∈ S. The resulting two-stage program is formulated as:
min z = cTx+
S∑
s=1
P sqsys
s.t. Ax = b
T sx+Wys = hs
x ≥ 0
In this thesis, the random data are the prices λ at which the energy will be paid in the different
markets. These random variables will be modeled through a set of scenarios S with associated spot
prices λs and probabilities P s = P (λs), s ∈ S.
Figure 2.7 represents a set of scenarios for a two-stage stochastic problem. The node represents
the decisions points; the node to right first-stage decisions and those to the left scenario depending
second-stage decisions. As it has been mentioned, it is implicitly assumed a risk neutral decision-
maker, who aims to minimize an expectation based objective. In the case of other preferences or
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other attitude toward risk, the objective function takes a different form.
2.2.2 Multistage Stochastic Program with Recourse
The previous section concerned stochastic problems with two stages, but there are many decisions
that involve a sequence of decisions related with a series of outcomes over time. Those are the
multistage stochastic problems. Multi-stage stochastic programs rely on the same idea as the two-
stage version. Decisions are made without anticipating future realizations of uncertain data, which
forces a partitioning of decisions into stages according to the information flow. We assume that
the overall objective is to minimize expected future costs. See Ro¨misch and Schultz (2001) for an
introduction to multi-stage stochastic mixed-integer linear programming and a number of references
on structural properties.
We suppose a finite horizon with K stages and fixed recourse. The stages represents the time points
where the new information arrives. The general formulation for a multistage stochastic program is:
min z = c1x1 + Eξ[min c2(ω)x2(ω) + ...+ cK(ω)xK(ω)]
s.t. W 1x1 = h1
T 1(ω)x1 +W 2x2(ω) = h2(ω)
. . .
TK−1(ω)xK−1 +WKxK(ω) = hK(ω)
xk ≥ 0, k = 1, . . . ,K
where xk are the variables time depending decision variables. For k ∈ K, ck, hk and bk are the
random vectors and W k is the random matrix, thus the random vector is ξk = {ck, hk, bk,W k}.
The decision process of the decisions and observations of the random data can be summarized in
the scheme:
decide on x −→ . . . −→ observe ck, hk, bk,W k −→ decide on xk −→ . . . −→ decide on xK
In this framework the nonanticipativity control becomes essential. Nonaticipativity implies that the
k stage decisions are made before the realization of the k+1 stage and, obviously, the x decisions are
taken before the realization of the random outcomes. These nonanticipativaty constraints prevent
against the temporary violation of the random constraints at a given stage.
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Figure 2.9: Multistage scenario tree.
There are two methods for including the nonanticipativity in the model, and they are directly
related to scenario formulation. On the one hand, in a similar way as in the two-stage case, the
approximate distribution of the stochastic vector ξk = {ck, hk, bk,W k} is given by the scenario
paths {ξk,s}Kk=1 = {ck,s, hk,s, bk,s,W k,s}, s ∈ S, and the scenario probabilities P s, s ∈ S. In
this case, nonanticipativity must be explicitly introduced by linear constraints that force decision
variables to have the same value if they are based on the same information. This scenario paths
are shown in Figure 2.8, in which the nodes again represent decision-making points. On the other
hand, the scenarios can be clustered into a scenario tree and, a branching occurs when the new
information arrives. Thus, decision variables are aggregated according to the available information,
in other words, decision variables that are based on the same information are replaced by a single
variable and automatically has the same value. In this case, nonanticipativity is introduced implicity
because there is one decision variable per node. Figure 2.9 illustrates this situation, where the nodes
represent decision points.
In this thesis, we use the first option, in which a set of linear constraints control the nonanticipativity
of the decision variables.
2.2.3 The Value of the Stochastic Solution
The value of the stochastic solution (VSS) measures the effect of including stochasticity, in our case
stochastic prices, explicitly into the mathematical program rather than using the expectation of
the random variable and solving a deterministic program.
On the one hand, we define the recourse problem (RP) as:
RP = min
x
Eξz(x, ξ) (2.1)
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where z(x, ξ) is the problem associated with one particular scenario ξ. On the other hand, we
define, first, the expected value problem (EV), which is nothing more than solving the problem by
replacing the random variables with their expected values:
EV = min
x
z(x, ξ) (2.2)
where ξ = E(ξ) denotes the expectation of ξ. We denote x(ξ) as an optimal solution to (2.2), called
the EV solution. Secondly, we introduce the expected result of using the EV solution (EEV):
EEV = Eξ(z(x(ξ), ξ)) (2.3)
which measures how x(ξ) performs, allowing second stage decisions to be chosen optimally as a
function of x(ξ) and ξ. The value of the stochastic solution is then defined as:
V SS = EEV − RP (2.4)
These value allows us to obtain the goodness of the expected solution value when the expected values
are replaced by the random values for the input variables. This indicators are classically defined
for two-stage stochastic problems. There are some authors that have proposed approximations of
these values for multistage problems (Escudero et al. (2007), Schu¨tz and Tomasgard (2009) and,
Vespucci et al. (2011)).
2.3 Day-Ahead Market Bidding Problem
Among the problems that concern the agents that participate in electricity markets, in this thesis
we will deal with the short-term problems of a generation company and its physical trading. We
have implicity assumed a risk-neutral GenCo who wants to maximize its expected benefits.
Regarding risk in the short-term horizon, there are authors who have included it in the optimization
models (see for example Ni et al. (2004)). In this thesis, we have focused on the optimal bidding
model, including the management of some medium-term products. Thus we consider that risk has
been hedged when developing this medium-term products portfolio. There are some authors that
also consider risk as something that must be taken into account on the mid-term horizon jointly
with other mid-term strategies, such as fuel or derivatives contracts (Conejo et al., 2008). For a
state of the art description of risk management for electricity markets see, for example, Dahlgren
et al. (2003) or Liu et al. (2006).
In general, the power systems optimization problems are categorized according to their time horizon.
Long-term problems have a horizon of up to several years; medium-term problems have an horizon
of a few months to a few years and short-term of a day to a week. In a short-term framework there
are also many aspects to deal with. Specifically in this thesis we will present models for solving the
classical problems of thermal unit commitment and economic dispatch related with DAM optimal
bid strategies.
There is also another categorization, this time for GenCos. They could be price-maker or price-
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taker, according to their capacity to change the market price or not through its bid (see Conejo
and Prieto, 2001). We will focus our bidding strategies on a price-taker GenCo.
In this section we present the basis for the problems that are tackled throughout this thesis.
First, a review of the published works that have considered this problem. Second, we present the
characteristic of the GenCo. And finally, the basis of the day-ahead market bidding problem and
the common parts of the models that will be presented in the thesis are described. For the main
characteristics of a thermal unit see Appendix A.
So, in summary, the models presented in this thesis are based on the following assumptions:
Assumption 2.1. The GenCo is a price-taker i.e., the day-ahead clearing price λDt does not depend
on the GenCo’s bidding.
Assumption 2.2. To guarantee the commitment of unit i in the operational programming that
results from the clearing of the DAM, unit i would bid its minimum generation level P i at zero
price (instrumental bid).
2.3.1 Literature Review
Historically, there has been approximations to power system problems under a deterministic point
of view, but they are out of the scope of this thesis. Furthermore, there has been also many approx-
imations with a stochastic programming approach where the random variable were the demand,
unit failures or fuel costs. For instance, Birge et al. (1994) present the first formulation of the
unit commitment problem in terms of stochastic mixed-integer programming. Also Takriti et al.
(2000), Nowak and Ro¨mish (2000) or Nu¨rnberg and Ro¨mish (2002) present stochastic approxima-
tions to short-term power system problems with the demand as uncertainty source. For a survey
on stochastic programming problems in energy see Wallace and Fleten in Ruszczynski and Shapiro
(2003). And for a survey on electricity market modeling see Baillo et al. (2006) or Ventosa et al.
(2005).
The development of stochastic programming electricity models has grown with the deregulation of
the markets, where previous obligations to satisfy the demand were replaced by the opportunity of
power producers to sell their production at the market. Hence, the restructuring of the sector and
the liberalization of the markets has introduced a new important source of stochasticity: market
prices. Nowadays, short-term planning problems deal with DAM physical trading and market price
uncertainty, Conejo and Prieto (2001) present the main changes and the new point of view that
this new framework introduces to the electricity management problems.
As state in the introduction, we deal with two different aspects of the short-term electricity prob-
lems. On the one hand, there is the physical trading represented by the unit commitment and the
economic dispatch problem. And, on the other hand, there is the day-ahead market bidding.
There are many works, both before and after the deregulation process, that present models for the
short-term planning of a GenCo. A review of the literature that deals with the unit commitment
problem can be found in Padhy (2004). Recently, Simoglou et al. (2010) presents a novel modeling
with three different start-up types for a thermal unit, see also this work for an extended review
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in this field. Within the works that deals with competitive electricity markets, Sen et al. (2006)
presents a model which integrates the unit commitment model with financial decision making taking
into account and modeling the electricity demand, the forward and the market prices. An earlier
model by Shrestha et al. (2004) presents a stochastic unit commitment problem with BC which is
solved by maximizing the DAM benefit; in this case the stochasticity in the spot prices is introduced
through a set of scenarios, giving rise to a two-stage stochastic programming problem. In Triki
et al. (2005), the authors presented a mixed-integer stochastic optimization model for scheduling
thermal units, where the production plans were optimized in the presence of stochastic market
clearing prices. Nevertheless, the models in Shrestha et al. (2004), Triki et al. (2005) and Sen et al.
(2006) did not propose any explicit modeling of the optimal bidding.
Several authors have proposed optimal bidding models in the DAM for thermal units, see David
and Wen (2000) for a literature survey of the first works published in this framework. If we focus
on those that also consider the electricity market bidding process under the price-taker assumption,
the authors in Conejo et al. (2002a) presented a mixed integer programming model to optimize the
production scheduling of a single unit with a simple bidding strategy. The approximation of the
step-wise bidding curves by linear functions based on the marginal costs was already considered
in Gountis and Bakirtzis (2004a). In Ni et al. (2004), the concept of price-power function, which
is similar to the matched energy function defined in this thesis, was used to derive the optimal
offer curves of a hydrothermal system under the assumption that the market prices for the day-
ahead and reserve markets behave as a Markov Chain. The mixed-integer stochastic programming
model presented in Nowak et al. (2005) distinguishes between the variables corresponding to the bid
energy and those representing the matched energy, although in a price-maker framework. Fleten
and Kristoffersen (2007) also distinguish between the variables representing the bid energy and
those corresponding to the matched energy in the case of a price-taker GenCo. In particular, it
presents a stochastic programming model to optimize the unit commitment and the day-ahead
bidding of a hydropower producer in the Nord Pool. See also Fleten and Kristoffersen (2007) or
Fleten and Kristoffersen (2008) for an extended review in the literature about bidding strategies
for hydrothermal systems. In another framework, Nabona and Pages (2007) provide a three stage
procedure for building the optimal bid based on the optimal generation quantity and the zero-price
bid. Furthermore, general considerations about the bidding process in electricity markets can also
be found in Anderson and Philpott (2002); Anderson and Xu (2002); Neame et al. (2003).
2.3.2 Day-ahead Incomes Function for a Price-Taker
This thesis focuses on the thermal units of a price-taker generation company, i.e. a GenCo with no
capability of altering market-clearing prices (Conejo and Prieto, 2001). Therefore, the framework
of this kind of GenCo could be equated to a market with perfect competition. Perfect competition
is defined as a market structure in which there are large numbers of both buyers and sellers, all of
them small, so that all of them act as price-takers. And it is known that in a perfectly competitive
market a GenCo would maximize its profits by bidding its true marginal cost function (Gountis
and Bakirtzis, 2004b).
The optimal offer curve for thermal unit i is the offer to the day-ahead market that ensures a
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Figure 2.10: Optimal bid curve.
matched generation pMti with a maximal benefit that is independent of the value of the clearing
price λDt . As stated above, in the case of a price-taker GenCo, the function that meets this
condition is the marginal cost curve. If the cost function of thermal unit i is represented by a
quadratic function, C(p) = cb + clp + cqp2 where cb is the constant operation cost, cl is the linear
cost and cq is the quadratic cost (see Appendix A); then the optimal bid curve for this unit is:
λoti(p
o
ti) =
{
0 if poti ≤ P i
2cqi p
o
ti + c
l
i if P i < p
o
ti ≤ P i
(2.5)
Any offer of the GenCo must consist of pairs (poti, λ
o
ti(p
o
ti)) belonging to the optimal offer curve
(Figure 2.10). By sending this offer to the DAM, the matched generation function pMti corresponding
to any clearing price λDt will be:
pMti (λ
D
t ) =

P i if θti(λDt ) ≤ P i
θti(λDt ) if P i ≤ θti(λDt ) ≤ P i
P i if θti(λDt ) ≥ P i
(2.6)
where
θti(λDt ) =
(
λDt − cli
)
/2cqi . (2.7)
It is easy to see that, for any clearing price λDt , expression (2.6) gives the value that maximizes the
benefit function taking into account the operational limits of the thermal unit:
B(pti) = λDt p
M
ti −
(
cbi + c
l
ip
M
ti + c
q
i (p
M
ti )
2
)
where pMti is the matched energy.
The optimal bid curve problem for a price-taker GenCo is reduced to as many independent stochas-
tic unit commitment problems as there are thermal units offered by the utility. If the optimal unit
commitment shows that a given thermal unit must be on at interval t, then (2.5) represents the
optimal offer curve to be sent to the Day-Ahead Market. The total incomes for all the committed
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units, Iont , will be:
InDt =
∑
∀i∈Iont
λDt p
M
ti
where λDt is the clearing-price and p
M
ti (2.6) is the matched energy that has to be produced by unit
i. Thus, the incomes that a GenCo takes in from the DAM depends on the results of the clearing
process. The offers are called matched if their price is lower or equal to the clearing-price. Only
the matched offers produce benefits.
2.3.3 Matched Energy
The formulation of the models presented in this thesis will include variables representing the value
of the matched energy for the committed thermal unit i on the tth DAM. For the moment, the
matched energy will be loosely defined as the accepted energy in the clearing process; that is, the
energy that the thermal unit i should generate at period t and that will be rewarded at the clearing
price.
This matched energy, which plays a central role in our models, is uniquely determined by the sale
bid and the clearing price. As we have stated, a bid in the MIBEL’s DAM consists of a stepwise
non-decreasing curve defined by up to 25 energy (MWh)-price(e/MWh) blocks. As usual is in this
kind of work (see Gountis and Bakirtzis, 2004a),we will consider a simplified model of the true sale
bid through the so called bid function λbti, not necessarily stepwise:
Definition 2.1 (Bid function). A bid function for the thermal unit i is a non-decreasing function
defined over the interval [0, P i] that gives, for any feasible value of the bid energy pbti, the asked
price per MWh from the day-ahead market:
λbti : [0, P i] −→ <+ ∪ 0
pbti 7−→ λbti(pbti)
For a given bid function λbti the matched energy associated with the clearing price λ
D
t , p
M
ti is defined
through the matched energy function:
Definition 2.2 (Matched energy function). The matched energy associated with the bid function
λbti(p
b
ti) is defined as the maximum bid energy with a price not greater than the clearing price λ
D
t ,
and is represented by the function:
pMti (λ
D
t )
def= max{pbti ∈ [0, P i] | λbti(pbti) ≤ λDt } (2.8)
As we will see, the clearing price λDt is a random variable that will be modeled through a set of
scenarios S with associated spot prices λD,s = {λD,s1 , . . . , λD,sT } and probabilities P s = P (λD,s),
s ∈ S. Each one of these scenarios has, for each period t, a corresponding matched energy that
will be represented in the models by the second stage variable psti. Although our model will be
developed without any assumption on the specific expression of the bid function λbti it is necessary,
for the sake of the model’s consistency, to assume the existence of a bid function with a matched
energy function (2.8) that agrees with the optimal value of variables psti, i.e.:
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Number of variables Number of constraints Time (s) Change
S Nabona Carrion Nabona Carrion Nabona Carrion %
10 3200 3216 7248 7056 0.89 0.73 17.54%
50 10880 10896 32208 32016 8.29 6.46 22.03%
100 20480 20496 63408 63216 23.46 18.46 21.30%
150 30080 30096 94608 94416 41.11 37.76 8.13%
200 39680 39696 121808 121616 61.70 54.54 11.60%
250 49280 49296 157008 156816 106.67 74.79 20.88%
Table 2.1: Comparison between unit commitment formulations.
Assumption 2.3. For any thermal unit i committed at period t there exists a bid function λbti such
that:
pMti (λ
D,s
t )
def= pM,sti = p
s∗
ti ∀s ∈ S (2.9)
with ps∗ti the optimal value of variable p
s
ti
Notice that the existence of such a bid function is not evident, as all scenarios must prove simul-
taneous equality (2.9).
2.3.4 Unit Commitment
The thermal unit commitment problem consists of the scheduling of start-up and shut-downs of
the thermal units. There are many approximations to the modeling of this classical problem in
the literature. During the elaboration of this thesis, the models presented have matured and, as
a result, the same idea may have been modeled in many different ways. The unit commitment of
the thermal units is one of the aspects that has evolved. Our first approximation was presented
by Nabona and Rossell (1999) and has been used in many works. Specifically, two of the models
that will be presented in this thesis included this formulation. When presenting these models,
some reviewers suggested using the formulation presented by Carrio´n and Arroyo (2006) which
reduces significantly the number of binary variables. We have supervised a work where these two
formulations were compared (Nieto and Ruz, 2009). The results prove that the second approach
(Carrio´n and Arroyo, 2006) improves the results in terms of computational time with an average
of 17% (Table 2.1).
2.3.4.1 First Formulation
This formulation of the start-up and shut-down processes follows Nabona and Rossell (1999);
Nabona and Pages (2007). Let uti ∈ {0, 1} be a first-stage binary variable expressing the off-on
operating status of the ith unit over the tth interval (uti = 1 if committed, uti = 0 if uncommitted).
The values of uti and u(t+1)i must obey certain operating rules in order to take into account the
constraints of the minimum in service and idle time.
It is necessary to introduce two extra binary variables eti and ati for each uti. Let eti ∈ {0, 1}
be a start-up indicator for the ith unit. It has a value of one in all intervals t where the ith unit
has changed from u(t−1)i = 0 to uti = 1, and zero elsewhere. Similarly, ati ∈ {0, 1} is a shut-down
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indicator for the ith unit. It should have a value of one in all intervals t where u(t−1)i = 1 to uti = 0,
and zero otherwise.
The following three sets of constraints unambiguously model the commitment variable uti and the
start-up and shut-down variables eti and ati:
uti − u(t−1)i − eti + ati = 0 ∀i ∈ I, ∀t ∈ T (2.10)
eti +
min{t+toni ,|T |}∑
k=t
aki ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ I, ∀t ∈ T (2.11)
ati +
min{t+toffi ,|T |}∑
k=t+1
eki ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ I, ∀t ∈ T (2.12)
2.3.4.2 Second Formulation
This formulation follows the one proposed in Carrio´n and Arroyo (2006) for the unit commitment
of the thermal units.
Let uti be, as in the first formulation, the first-stage binary variable expressing the off-on operating
status of the ith unit. It is again necessary to introduce two extra variables, cuti, c
d
ti, which represent
the startup and shutdown cost, respectively, of unit i in interval t. In contrast to the previous
approximation, this auxiliary variables are continuous not binary, so, the number of integer variables
of the model is reduced as well as the computational cost.
It is also necessary to define two constants: Gi, which will be the number of periods that unit i
must be initially online, due to its minimum up-time constraint; and Hi, which is the number of
periods that unit i must be initially oﬄine, due to its minimum down-time constraint.
The following first two sets of constraints model the start-up and shut-down costs and the next
ones control minimum operation and idle time for each unit:
cuti ≥ coni [uti − u(t−1),i] ∀t ∈ T \ {1}, ∀i ∈ I (2.13)
cdti ≥ coffi [u(t−1),i − uti] ∀t ∈ T \ {1}, ∀i ∈ I (2.14)
Gi∑
j=n
(1− uji) = 0 ∀i ∈ I (2.15)
Hi∑
j=1
uji = 0 ∀i ∈ I (2.16)
t+toni −1∑
n=t
uni ≥ toni [uti − u(t−1),i] ∀t = Gi + 1, . . . , |T | − toni + 1 ∀i ∈ I (2.17)
t+toffi −1∑
n=t
(1− uni) ≥ toffi [u(t−1),i − uti] ∀t = Hi + 1, . . . , |T | − toffi + 1 ∀i ∈ I (2.18)
|T |∑
n=t
(uni − [uti − u(t−1),i]) ≥ 0 ∀t = |T | − toni + 2, . . . , |T | ∀i ∈ I (2.19)
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|T |∑
n=t
(1− uni − [u(t−1),i − uti]) ≥ 0 ∀t = |T | − toffi + 2, . . . , |T | ∀i ∈ I (2.20)
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CHAPTER 3
Uncertainty Modeling
As has been introduced, in liberalized electricity markets, a generation company must build an
hourly bid that is sent to the market operator, who selects the lowest price among the bidding
companies in order to match the pool load. For this reason, GenCos that participate in liberalized
electricity markets around the world need to estimate the prices at which the energy will be paid
in order to decide how to bid and how to schedule their resources for maximizing their profit. The
problem is that the market price is only known once the market has been cleared, so they need to
forecast it.
The correct treatment and introduction of uncertainty into the stochastic models is one of the
most important components of this kind of technique. It will determine whether or not stochastic
techniques are useful, specifically whether or not it is necessary to introduce this randomness into
the model. If not, then a deterministic approach is sufficient.
It is one of the arguments that will determinate if the stochastic techniques are useful or it is
unnecessary to introduce this randomness into the model and a deterministic one is sufficient.
The objective of this chapter is to build a short-term forecast method for the electricity market day-
ahead price in order to include it into an optimization model. Once those forecasts are obtained,
it is essential to create realistic day-ahead market price scenarios in which the generation company
will decide how to optimally operate and to easily update these scenarios over time.
Considering that we will introduce the random data into the model by means of a set of scenarios,
this chapter can be divided into two steps: the uncertainty characterization, i.e, the correct iden-
tification of the random variable that becomes the input data of the model; and the scenario set
construction. In Section 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 we will focus on the random variable and its possible char-
acterization through different techniques. In Section 3.4 some methods described in the literature
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for generating and reducing the set of scenarios are used to build the data that will be included in
the models presented in the next chapters.
This chapter focuses on DAM prices, RM and IM prices are described and studied in Chapter 6.
3.1 DAM Price Characterization
As we have introduced, the start-up of the electric markets changes the uncertainties that the
GenCo has to face. The demand becomes unimportant because the GenCo sends its production
to the market operator through its sell bids and the generation level will be fixed in the clearing
process. Meanwhile, the price at which this production will be paid becomes unknown and must
be forecasted. The more accurate the forecast is, the better the GenCo can control its expected
benefits and its bidding strategies.
In the field of price characterization we have used many of the published methodologies. We
started out using historical data or clustering methods. These methods were very useful for the
first approximations but became poor when a more accurate forecast was needed. At this moment
we adjusted an ARIMA model for the day-ahead price forecast that performed correctly. Later,
we realized that the ARIMA model needed continuous corrections of the estimations over time,
as well as some experience in adjusting and using it correctly, which limits its practical use in an
optimization framework. Thus, focusing on finding an easy method, we built a methodology based
on factor models, widely used in other areas but not in the day-ahead electricity price forecast.
3.1.1 Literature Review
Electricity spot prices exhibit non-constant mean and variance, daily and weekly seasonality, calen-
dar effects on weekends and holidays, high volatility and the presence of outliers. Those character-
istics do not necessarily make it easy for electricity price short-term forecasting. Several approaches
have been proposed in the power system literature which basically can be classified into paramet-
ric/nonparametric, conditional homoscedastic/heteroscedastic and others, ranging from the most
popular ARIMA models belonging to the class of parametric-conditional homoscedastic models
to the most sophisticated ones, as for example wavelet or neural network models. Weron (2006)
classified these methodologies into six classes: production-cost models, equilibrium or game the-
ory approaches, fundamental methods, quantitative models, statistical approaches and artificial
intelligence-based techniques. In this section we point out some of the published works, we focus
on the ones modeling day-ahead electricity prices and, if possible, refer to the Spanish electricity
market prices. See Weron (2006), Misiorek et al. (2006) or Serati et al. (2007) for extended reviews
in this field.
Nonparametric statistic methods, such as clustering or bootstrapping, applied to historical data
were the first and simplest approaches. The advantage of these methods is that they are easy and
computationally cheap to use but, on the other hand, they do not characterize the price distribution
properly. See, for instance, Martinez-Alvarez et al. (2007) for an application of these techniques to
the Spanish market prices.
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The ARIMA models have been widely used in this field. Contreras et al. (2003) use this modeling
technique for forecasting Spanish and Californian day-ahead electricity prices. Later, Conejo et al.
(2005a) compared the ARIMA approach with wavelet transform and ARIMA and concluded this
second approach performs better. In another work, Conejo et al. (2005b) compared ARIMA mod-
els, dynamic regression and transfer function. They concluded that the predictions extrapolated
from dynamic regression and transfer function procedures are better than those obtained from
ARIMA models whereas wavelet models which have results close to ARIMA models and neural
network algorithms do not offer good forecasts. Nogales et al. (2002) and Nogales and Conejo
(2006) presented price forecasting through transfer function and dynamic regression models for
different data sets. However the residuals in some of the analyzed models exhibited non-stationary
conditional variance. To solve this problem, the classical GARCH models and their variants were
used for estimating the conditional heteroscedasticity of the electricity spot prices. Garcia et al.
(2005) estimated an ARMA model with GARCH errors for the Spanish and California Electricity
market, showing that this combined model overcomes the predictions obtained by the classical
ARIMA model. Koopman et al. (2007) gave a more complex version of this model, extending it
to periodic dynamic long memory regression models with GARCH errors also. Last but not least,
Weron and Misiorek (2008) compared some different time series methods for day-ahead forecasting
and concluded that models with system load or air temperature included as an exogenous variable
give better forecasts than pure price models and that semiparametric models perform better in
terms of point and interval confidence forecasts.
From another perspective, Lucia and Schwartz (2002) proposed a one and two-factor mean reverting
model with deterministic seasonality, showing that the seasonal pattern could explain part of the
shape of the observed term structure of futures prices. Kian and Keyhani (2001) presented another
different approach with models that combine time series with stochastic methods and include
information about customer energy consumption, market participant strategies or behaviors, as
well as other information. We can find many other approaches. For instance, Mateo-Gonza´lez
et al. (2005) adjusted non-stationary models based on input-output hidden markov models. There
is also Lora et al. (2007), who presented weighted nearest neighbors techniques and compared them
to ARIMA with wavelet transform and GARCH, concluding that they perform satisfactorily. Both
approaches were analyzed using Spanish electricity market prices.
All these methods consider either one time series or random variables. Another point of view
consists of considering each hour of the day as a time series and treating them separately. For
instance, Garcia-Martos et al. (2007) decompose the hourly time series into 24 time series and
model them separately with time series techniques, obtaining one day-ahead forecast for each time
series. Our proposal is based on this interpretation of the electricity prices not as a single time
series but a set of 24 time series, one for each hour, and aims to exploit the possibilities of factor
models in the day-ahead forecasts. This is similar to Alonso et al. (2008), who apply the factor
models for long term forecasts.
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Figure 3.1: DAM hourly prices.
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Figure 3.2: Daily mean MIBEL’s DAM price.
3.2 Descriptive Statistics
Electricity prices are a sequence of data depending on the time interval where they are determined;
so, a specific hour price depends on the previous hour prices. It is for this reason that the market
price is usually defined and treated as a time series. We will focus on the MIBEL DAM price over
one week. As with most competitive electric market prices, they present the following characteris-
tics: high frequency, non-constant mean and variance, multiple seasonality, calendar effects, high
volatility and high presence of picks.
Figure 3.1 represents the hourly Spanish DAM prices from the start-up of the MIBEL in 2007 up
to December 2009. Historically, Spanish electricity prices showed a high seasonality throughout the
year but this effect is not as evident nowadays. Figure 3.2 represents the daily mean of the hourly
prices, also from 2007 up to 2009. This figure shows that the variation of the mean price is not
directly related with the season of the year. Electricity prices are directly related to the load and
other exogenous factors, as, for instance, oil or gas prices. Thus, this change in the year pattern
could be explained by the changes in daily habits of small consumers (more electricity dependent),
on the changes on industry holidays habits in Spain or on the combustible prices. Nowadays, almost
all the weeks of the year have a similar level of demand.
If we zoom in on a weekly point of view, we can see in Figure 3.3 that the typical behavior of the
day-ahead electricity prices over a week. The working days are all similar in their shape and mean
and the weekend is totaly different.
3.3 Forecasting Models
MIBEL DAM prices are the variable to be forecasted. This is hourly data and the data set used
to prove the following methods corresponds to the days from January 1st, 2007 to December 31st,
2008. This data is available at the OMEL’s site (OMEL, 2010).
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Figure 3.3: One week MIBEL’s DAM price.
3.3.1 ARIMA Model
As we have introduced, our first approximation was through ARIMA models (see, for instance,
Pen˜a et al. (2001)). If we analyze the time series we can observe that there is non-constant mean
and variance and two seasonal components: one order 24, which corresponds to the day effect, and
one order 168, which corresponds to the week effect (see Figure 3.4). In order to adjust the ARIMA
model, we must transform the original time series:
Yt = (1−B168)(1−B) log(λt) (3.1)
where λt is the DAM hourly price. If we differentiate also the order 24, the results in terms of
variance indicate that it is over-differentiated.
Thus, the resulting model for the transformed Spanish electricity price is:
log(λt) v ARIMA(23, 1, 13)(14, 0, 21)24(0, 1, 1)168 (3.2)
Table C.1, Appendix C, exhibits statistically significant parameters of the ARIMA model. Figure
3.5 represents the forecast and the confidence interval for the week of March 24th to 28th, 2008.
In Table 3.1 there is the mean square error of the forecast for each hour. In this model it is not
necessary to distinguish between the hours, but it is indicated in order to facilitate the comparison
with the factor model forecasts to be developed in the next section.
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Figure 3.4: (a) Transformed time series (1−B) log(λt). (b) Autocorrelation function of (1−B) log(λt).
Hour 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
MSE 0.201 0.070 0.111 0.033 0.058 0.032 0.081 0.152 0.122 0.065 0.086 0.043
Hour 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
MSE 0.032 0.027 0.076 0.044 0.036 0.040 0.031 0.096 0.112 0.265 0.111 0.090
Table 3.1: Mean square error of the forecast for each hour with ARIMA model.
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Figure 3.5: One-step-ahead forecast prices with ARIMA model.
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Figure 3.6: (a) Hourly DAM price for the work days of a week. (b)Boxplot of hourly DAM prices.
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3.3.2 Times Series Factor Model
Despite the fact that dynamic and static factor models have been extensively used in many different
frameworks (Stock and Watson (2002), Pen˜a and Poncela (2004) and Pen˜a and Poncela (2006)),
their application to short-term electricity market prices forecasting has not been exploited. Our
approach in this work is to apply the well-known methodology of factor models in order to forecast
electricity market prices over a short-term horizon (24 hours). In this case, the spot prices have
been interpreted not as a single time series but as a set of 24 time series, one for each hour, in
a similar way to Alonso et al. (2008). So we will have a multivariate time series and the factor
model procedure allows us to identify common unobserved factors, which represent the relationship
between the hours of a day. Figure 3.6(a) shows the pattern of a typical set of hourly electricity
prices in Spain. This pattern is directly related to the load of each hour and, as we will see the
factor models permit us to exploit this pattern and reduce the dimensionality of the multivariate
time series. Figure 3.6(b) shows the boxplot of the hourly prices and the hourly differences in level
and price variability can be observed.
The estimation and forecast of price variables using factor analysis can be classified into two overar-
ching groups: static and dynamic. The first uses principal component analysis whereas the second
basically formulates the model into state space and uses the Kalman filter or the expectation-
maximization (EM) algorithm for estimating the parameters and for forecasting the future values
of the variable in question, in our case, the price.
In this work we use the alternative procedure time series factor analysis (TSFA), described in
Gilbert and Meijer (2005). TSFA estimates the measurement model for time series data, with
as few assumptions as possible about the dynamic process which governs the factors. It is an
alternative to static and dynamic factor analysis. On the one hand, the static factor analysis
should not be used with economic time series because the characteristics of the data do not agree
with the assumptions of the method. That is, if we compare TSFA with factor analysis, we can
conclude that with TSFA:
(a) The factor model has a non-trivial mean structure.
(b) The observations are allowed to be dependent over time.
(c) The data does not need to be covariance stationary as long as data with differentiation satisfies
a weak boundedness condition.
TSFA differs from dynamic factor analysis in the sense that TSFA estimates parameters and predicts
factor scores with few assumptions about factor dynamics; in particular, TSFA does not assume
stationary covariance. Dynamic factor analysis assumes a predetermined relationship between
factors in the sense that there is an assumed a priori relationship between the factors at time t
and the factors at time t− 1. If this relationship is misspecified, the factors estimated by dynamic
factor analysis can be biased.
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3.3.2.1 Factor Model Estimation
Let yt be an M -vector of observed time series of length T and k unobserved factors (k << M)
collected in the k-vector ξ. The relationship between the observed time series yt and the ξ factors
is assumed to be linear and described by equation:
yt = αt +Bξt + t (3.3)
where αt is an M -vector of intercepted parameters, possibly time-varying that can be omitted
without losing generality. B is an M × k matrix parameter of loadings, assumed to be time-
invariant, and  is a random M -vector of measurement errors. Notice that this is the standard
factor analysis model with the indicators indexed by time and the intercepts explicitly included.
It is possible that yt has a stationary first difference, defining D as the difference operator, (3.3)
becomes:
Dyt ≡ yt − yt−1 = (αt − αt−1) +B(ξt − ξt−1) + (t − t−1) (3.4)
or:
Dyt = τt +BDξt +Dt (3.5)
which is also an equation with factor structure and the same loadings, so the model can be estimated
with the differenced data. It is assumed that τt is a constant vector.
The following are the sufficient conditions that are assumed in such as that this model leads to
consistent estimators (Gilbert and Meijer, 2005):
T∑
t=1
Dξt
T
p−→ κ, factor mean, exists and is finite
T∑
t=1
(Dξt − κ)(Dξt − κ)′
T
p−→ Φ, factors covariance, exists, is finite and positive definite
T∑
t=1
DtD
′
t
T
p−→ Ω, error covariance, exists, is finite and positive definite
E(Dt|Dξt) = 0
There are no explicit assumptions about the autocorrelation of the differenced data and they allow
serial dependence in the variables. Unit roots violate the assumptions, but then the series can be
differenced and the assumptions then applied to the twice-differenced variable. This process can be
performed until there are no unit roots. Mean and variances are only bounded in order to obtain
a probability limit; they do not have to be constant over time.
The sample mean and covariance of the differenced series Dyt is denoted by Dy and SDy:
Dy ≡ 1
T
T∑
t=1
Dyt
SDy ≡ 1
T
T∑
t=1
(Dyt −Dy)(Dyt −Dy)′
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and from the previous assumptions, it follows that:
Dy
p−→ µ ≡ τ +Bκ
SDy
p−→ Σ ≡ BΦB′ + Ω
It can be shown that consistent estimators result from estimating the parameters by maximum
likelihood and minimizing the function:
L ≡ lg det Σ + tr(Σ−1SDy)
See Gilbert and Meijer (2005) for a more detailed description.
3.3.2.2 Forecasting Model
The factors obtained following the previous procedure have to be implemented into a forecasting
model in order to obtain the price forecasts. Stock and Watson (2002) describe forecasting models
suitable to either dynamic or static factors and to any factor estimation methods. The one-step-
ahead forecasting model is specified and estimated as a linear multiple regression model with the
factors as predictors. It has the following form:
yt+1 = βξˆt + α(L)yt + εt+1 (3.6)
where ξˆt is the estimation of the factors, β is the regression coefficients matrix and εt+1 is the
resulting forecast error. Autoregressive terms are included through the polynomial of non-negative
power of the lag operator L with coefficients α(L). The out-of-the-sample forecasts for yT+1,
conditional on information up to period T, are given by the conditional expectation:
yT+1|T = βˆξˆT + αˆ(L)yT
3.3.3 Factor Model Results
In this approach, we will focus on modeling the working days. As in the case of the ARIMA model,
the original data is transformed and the analysis is perform with the logarithm of the prices. It is
not necessary to difference the data. Following Gilbert and Meijer (2005), the number of factors is
fixed, based on the eigenvalues of the sample correlation matrix of indicators, on the comparative
fix index (CFI) and on the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA). The CFI is a
pseudo R2 and RMSEA is a non-negative value that measures the lack of fit per degree of freedom,
both are based on the χ2 distribution. Table C.2, Appendix C, exhibits the factor loadings and the
main goodness-of-fit measures. In our case the number of significant factors is three, the results
of increasing this number up to four factors does not improve the goodness-of-fit measurements
enough for justifying this new factor. In this table, it is also included the communality, which is
the squared multiple correlation for the variables as dependent, using the factors as predictors.
The loading matrix obtained is represented in Figure 3.7 and its relationship with the prices can
be derived from the pattern observed in Figure 3.6. The behavior of the prices throughout one
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Figure 3.7: Common factors loads.
Hour 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
R2 99.1 95.3 97.1 99.8 99.8 97.6 96.0 99.6 99.7 99.8 96.3 98.3
MSE 0.184 0.085 0.089 0.039 0.055 0.047 0.053 0.203 0.259 0.065 0.061 0.029
Hour 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
R2 99.9 97.7 99.8 99.9 99.9 97.1 99.7 96.6 94.2 99.7 99.7 95.1
MSE 0.037 0.028 0.096 0.064 0.020 0.080 0.069 0.077 0.165 0.227 0.175 0.048
Table 3.2: Summary of the forecast models for each hour with TSFA model.
day has a particular profile, with hours called base hours, in which the price is low and there is
lower variance. There are also hours called peak hours, in which there are higher prices and high
variance. The first factor clearly distinguishes between night and day and it can be observed that
the profile of the daily hour loads (between 8 a.m. and 8 p.m.) is similar to the profile of the prices
during these hours. The second factor gives positive loads to the base hours and the third to the
peak hours.
The forecasting model is based on these factors. The estimation of the 24 regression models is made
with a subset of the available data (see Appendix C Table C.3). The coefficient of determination,
R2, and the MSE of the forecast regression model for each hour are shown in Table 3.2. It can be
observed that these MSE are equivalent to the ones obtained with the ARIMA model. Depending
on the hour, one method or the other performs better; but in general, they are both equivalents.
The estimated model is used to forecast the next 5 days, as was done with the ARIMA model.
In Figure 3.8, the following quantities are plotted: the real price (red line), the forecast price
(black line) and the forecast confidence interval (dashed blue line) for the week May 26th to 30th,
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Figure 3.8: One-step-ahead forecast prices with TSFA model.
2008. It can bee observed that, once again, the results are rather similar to the ones obtained with
the ARIMA model. In summary, the forecast procedure based on time series factor models gives
suitable results. These results are equivalent to the ones obtained through an ARIMA model but
the advantage of the procedure presented in this section lies in its simplicity. The forecast model
is easiest to implement and to interpret than an ARIMA one. To build an ARIMA model for the
electricity prices, a profound knowledge of times series identification is necessary, whereas such
profound knowledge is not necessary for using this presented procedure. This advantage facilitates
the implementation of the models automatically, so that companies can use it regularly.
This methodology depends on the particular behavior of the prices, which on its part depends on
the market rules and on the country where they belong to. In the Appendix D it is developed this
analysis with a set of Italian day-ahead market electricity prices with provides satisfactory forecast
results.
3.4 Scenario Generation
The stochastic model is based on a representation through scenarios of the random variable involved
in the problem (Birge et al., 1994). In our case, the stochastic variable is the day-ahead market
clearing price. So, a set of scenarios for the day-ahead market clearing price will be built from the
forecasting results. Once this set of scenarios is obtained, it is introduced into the optimization
model, where the convergence of the objective function in terms of the number of scenarios is
analyzed. It is out of the scope of this thesis to analyze the scenario generation and reduction
methods existing in the literature. In this section we will present a brief introduction to these
techniques and the algorithms used to obtain the set of scenarios.
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The problem of building the scenario tree has been tackled by many authors (see Kaut and Wallace
(2003) and Dupacova´ et al. (2000) for a survey) and recently new proposals have been analyzed,
most of them focusing on multistage scenario tree generation. These approaches can be classified
into different principles (Heitsch and Ro¨misch, 2009): (i) bound-based constructions, (ii) Monte-
Carlo based schemes, (iii) Quasi Monte-Carlo based discretization methods, (iv) EVPI-based sam-
pling and reduction within decomposition schemes, (v) the moment-matching principle and (vi)
probability metric based approximations (see Heitsch and Ro¨misch (2009) and references within
for a list of references dealing with each one).
The greater part of the models presented in this thesis are two-stage stochastic programs. Thus
the set of scenarios consists of a set of possible values for the forecast variable λst = {λs1, . . . , λsT }
and its corresponding probability P s = P (λs)∀s ∈ S. Notice that the day-ahead market is cleared
once a day; therefore, we have the same information about the first or the last hour of the next
day and we have to forecast them all as a vector, which means that, to obtain the forecast, we do
not include in the model the hour before but the day before. Thus, for these models we will need
a fan to represent the set of possible scenarios for the 24 hours of the day. We will follow the next
steps:
1. Sampling: we use sampling methods in order to obtain a set of scenarios. It is known that
increasing the number of scenarios, the empirical distribution function will approximate the
theoretical one.
2. Reduction: given that the size and computational cost of the stochastic programming models
depends on the number of scenarios, some scenario reduction techniques have to be applied in
order to reduce the generated set of scenarios into one that is smaller but representative one.
We have applied the scenario reduction algorithm explained in Gro¨we-Kuska et al. (2003),
which determines a subset of the initial scenario set and assigns new probabilities to the
preserved scenarios.
The final number of scenarios will be fixed by increasing the number of scenarios until a stable
optimal value of the objective function is obtained. We will consider that at this point the set of
scenarios suitably represents the theoretic random variable.
3.4.1 Set of Scenarios for the ARIMA Model
The sampling step from the ARIMA model described in Section 3.3.1 was done by simulating new
observations of a time series with the parameters obtained from the fitted model. There were 300
scenarios simulated, each one corresponding to the set of 24 hours of one day. All the scenarios were
considered equiprobable. Thereupon, the reduction algorithm is applied in order to obtain subsets
of the simulated set of scenarios and their corresponding probabilities. Figure 3.9 represents some
of the sets of scenarios obtained for Monday March 24th, 2008. These scenarios will be applied in
Chapter 4.
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Figure 3.9: Simulated set of scenarios for the ARIMA model.
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3.4.2 Set of Scenarios for the TSFA Model
In the case of the TSFA model, creating a set of scenarios is not as immediate as in the ARIMA
model. Bootstrap techniques have been applied for estimating uncertainty in order to forecast and
build confidence intervals (Alonso et al., 2008). In this case we use this procedure to obtain a set
of scenarios for our TSFA model. The bootstrap procedure consists of the following steps:
1. The model (3.3) is estimated by means of maximum likelihood and the estimators of the
parameters are obtained.
2. Estimated residuals ˆt = yt − (αˆt + Bˆξˆt) are obtained.
3. A iid resample ˜e,t from Fˆt , for e=1, ..., M is obtained, where Fˆt is the empirical distribution
function.
4. Bootstrap replica of the data y˜t = αˆt + Bˆξˆt + ˜t is built.
5. A sample of the future ε˜t+h are generated by resampling from (Fεˆ1 , ..., Fεˆm), respectively,
where h =1,..., H is the forecasting horizon.
6. Future bootstrap observations are calculated for vector yt using (3.6) y˜t+h = βˆξˆt+αˆ(L)y˜t+h−1+
ε˜t+h where y˜T = yˆT .
7. These steps are repeated as many times as the bootstrap replicas are needed.
This bootstrap procedure was tested using the same week that was used for testing the forecasting
method. Figure 3.10 shows the real price (red line), the forecasted price (blue line) and the
bootstrap replicas. Those replicas are used as scenarios for the optimization models. As in the case
of the ARIMA model, all the scenarios are considered equiprobable. Finally, the scenario reduction
algorithm (Gro¨we-Kuska et al., 2003), is used to build subsets of the initial scenario set and to
assign new probabilities to the preserved scenarios. Some of the subsets built are represented in
Figure 3.11.
3.5 Conclusions
Regarding the aspects of modeling uncertainty, a factor model procedure has been designed for
the Iberian day-ahead market prices. This procedure has been tested in different subsets of prices
giving suitable results equivalent to those obtained through a more classical approach using ARIMA
models. The main advantage of this proposed procedure is its simplicity. The TSFA based forecast
model is easiest to implement and to interpret, but doesn’t lose the capacity for obtaining a suitable
forecast with goodness-of-fit results that are similar to other more complex methods. Mun˜oz et al.
(2010) is based on the work presented in this chapter.
Using this forecasting models, a set of scenarios has been built and reduced using standard tech-
niques in order to include them in the stochastic programming models presented in this thesis.
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Figure 3.10: Simulated data by means of the bootstrap procedure.
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Figure 3.11: Simulated set of scenarios for the TSFA model.
CHAPTER 4
DAMB: Futures Contracts
Introduction
As we have introduced in previous chapters, this thesis focuses on the DAM bidding strategies for a
GenCo. The MIBEL regulation describes the coordination between the physical futures contracts
portfolio and the day-ahead bidding mechanism of the GenCo. That regulation binds the GenCo to
determine its generation scheduling in order to be able to cover those obligations and to determine
its optimal offer, taking into account those futures contracts. These market rules have precipitated
the need for DAM and DM participation to be studied jointly, because the economic dispatch of
these futures markets, along with the units, must change the DAM bid that the GenCo sends to
the market operator. Thus, the main objective of this chapter is to build a stochastic programming
model which includes coordination between physical futures contracts and DAM bidding, following
the MIBEL rules. In other words, we want to see how the inclusion of futures contracts in the model
affects the short-term strategies of the GenCo in the day-ahead market. The work in Corchero and
Heredia (2009) is based on this chapter.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.1 contains a brief literature review about the man-
agement of the futures contracts. In Section 4.2 it is presented the day-ahead and futures income
function. Section 4.3 contains the model for the DAMB problem with futures contracts. Finally,
Section 4.5 contains the computational tests and Section 4.6 discusses the main contributions of
this chapter.
4.1 Literature Review
Some different approaches to the inclusion of futures contracts in the management of a GenCo
can be found in the electricity market literature. Most of the works described forward contracts
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as the contracts with physical settlement and futures contracts as the contracts with financial
settlement. The main theoretical differences between these two kinds of derivatives products is the
level of standardization and the kind of market where they are traded (Hull, 2008). We focus on
the inclusion of physical derivatives products in the short-term management of a GenCo. Other
general considerations about futures contracts can be found in many works, for instance, Hull
(2008), Collins (2002), Neuberger (1999) or Carlton (1984).
Prior to deregulation, Kaye et al. (1990) illustrate how physical and financial contracts can be used
to hedge against the risk of profit volatility allowing for flexible responses to spot price. Once
day-ahead and derivatives markets started-up, Bjorgan et al. (1999) described in a theoretical
framework the integration of futures contracts into the risk management of a GenCo. Also, Chen
et al. (2004) present a bidding decision-making system for a GenCo, taking into account the impacts
of several types of physical and financial contracts; this system is based on a market-oriented unit
commitment model, a probabilistic local marginal price simulator, and a multi-criteria decision
system. Furthermore, Conejo et al. (2008) optimize the forward physical contracts portfolio up
to one year, taking into account the day-ahead bidding; the objective of the study is to protect
against the pool price volatility trough futures contracts. Moreover, on a medium-term horizon,
Guan et al. (2008) optimize the generation asset allocation between different derivatives products
and the spot market, taking into account short-term operating constraints; it considers that the
price of the contracts and forecasts the spot-price is known. From another point of view, Tanlapco
et al. (2002) make a statistical study of the reduction in risk due to forward contracts; it shows
that, for a GenCo, the electricity futures contract is better for hedging price risk than other related
futures such as crude oil or gas futures contracts.
As stated above, we are dealing with a new electricity futures contract situation, due to the MIBEL
definition of physical futures contracts. Hence, to our knowledge, there are no previous works
dealing with the short-term management of the GenCo that include the coordination between
day-ahead bidding strategies and physical futures settlement.
4.2 Basic Concepts
Suppose the GenCo has a futures contracts portfolio F for day d as a result of the derivatives
market clearing process. Those contracts are defined by price and quantity, (λFj , L
F
j ), j ∈ F . The
futures contracts are settled by differences, i.e., each futures contract has daily cash settlements of
the difference between the spot price and the futures settlement price. The incomes function of the
derivatives markets at interval t is:
InFt =
∑
∀j∈F
(λFj − λDt )LFj
where λDt is the clearing day-ahead market price.
The futures contracts included in this study are physical and base load, meaning an agreement to
sell some constant quantity of electricity at some price with physical delivery and cash settlement
within a specific delivery period.
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Figure 4.1: Optimal bid curve with physical futures contracts.
As the MIBEL’s regulation describes, the energy LFj of the physical futures contract j must be
allocated through the units of the GenCo that participate in this contract, i ∈ Ij , and delivered to
the system through the instrumental price bid of each unit. This situation changes the structure of
the optimal bid curve. Let ftij be the generation of thermal i at interval t allocated to the futures
physical contracts j, that is: ∑
i|i∈Ij∩Iont
ftij = LFj ∀t ∈ T, ∀j ∈ F
where Iont is the set of thermal units available at interval t.
And let qti be the instrumental price offer which must not be less than the generation of thermal i
at interval t allocated to the set of physical contracts in which it participates, j ∈ Fi:
qti ≥
∑
j∈Fi
ftij
Following the market rules, each generator sends the amount qti to the day-ahead market through
an instrumental price offer. As we will show in subsequent sections, this leads to the following
redefinition of the optimal offer curve (2.5) (Figure 4.1):
λoti(p
o
ti; qti) =
{
0 if poti ≤ qti
2cqi p
o
ti + c
l
i if qti < p
o
ti ≤ P i
(4.1)
The value of the matched energy depends now on the value of the market clearing price with
respect to the threshold price λ˜oti:
λ˜oti = 2c
q
i qti + c
l
i (4.2)
For any value λDt ≤ λ˜oti, the matched energy is pMti (λDt ) = qti. When λDt > λ˜oti the matched energy
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coincides with expression (2.6), that is:
pMti (λ
D
t ) =
{
qti if λDt ≤ λ˜oti
ρti(λDt ) if λ
D
t > λ˜
o
ti
(4.3)
where
ρti(λDt ) =

P i if θti(λDt ) ≤ P i
θti(λDt ) if P i ≤ θti(λDt ) ≤ P i
P i if θti(λDt ) ≥ P i
(4.4)
and θti(λDt ) =
(
λDt − cli
)
/2cqi , as it is defined in expression (2.7).
Notice that λDt and qti completely determines the amount of matched energy p
M
ti (λ
D
t ) through
expressions (4.2) and (4.3). Using definitions (4.4) and (4.2), this matched generation with futures
can be re-expressed as:
pMti (λ
D
t ) =
{
qti if qti ≥ ρti(λDt )
ρti(λDt ) otherwise
(4.5)
that sets the value of the matched energy as a non-differentiable function of the instrumental price
offer qti, which will be part of the decision variables of the optimization model.
Therefore, in scenario s, with clearing price λD,st , the matched energy is given by the expression:
pM,sti =
{
qti if qti ≥ ρsti
ρsti if otherwise
(4.6)
where
ρsti =

P i if θsti ≤ P i
θsti if P i ≤ θsti ≤ P i
P i if θsti ≥ P i
and θsti =
(
λD,st − cli
)
/2cqi .
The incomes function for the day-ahead market with futures contracts for all the committed units
at interval t, InDFt , must take into account both the new expression of the matched energy (4.3)
and the revenues coming from the futures portfolio:
InDFt =
∑
∀j∈F
(
λFj − λDt
)
LFj +
∑
∀i∈Iont
λDt p
M
ti (4.7)
4.3 Model Description
4.3.1 Variables
For every time period t ∈ T and thermal unit i ∈ I, the first stage variables of the stochastic
programming problem are:
• The unit commitment binary variables: uti, ati, eti
• The instrumental price offer bid variables: qti.
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• The scheduled energy for futures contract j variables: ftij .
and the second stage variables associated with each scenario s ∈ S are:
• Matched energy in the day-ahead market: psti
This model was developed with the first formulation of the unit commitment; thus equations (2.10)-
(2.12) formulate the inclusion of the variables uti, ati and eti into the model.
4.3.2 FCs Covering Constraints
Let qti be the first-stage variable standing for the energy of the instrumental price offer, that is,
the energy bid by unit i to the tth day-ahead market at 0e/MWh. If variable ftij represents the
energy of the jth FC allocated to thermal unit i at period t, then the following constraints must be
satisfied: ∑
i∈Ij
ftij = LFj ∀t ∈ T, ∀j ∈ F (4.8)
qti ≥
∑
∀j∈Fi
ftij ∀i ∈ I, ∀t ∈ T (4.9)
ftij ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I, ∀t ∈ T, ∀j ∈ F (4.10)
P iuti ≤ qti ≤ P iuti ∀i ∈ I, ∀t ∈ T (4.11)
where the known parameters Fi, Ij and LFj are, respectively, the subset of contracts in which unit i
participates, the set of thermal units that participate in contract j (the units in all the UCPs that
participate in contract j) and the energy that has to be settled for contract j. Constraint (4.8)
ensures that the energy of the jth futures contracts LFj will be completely dispatched among all the
committed units of its associated UCPs. Constraints (4.9) formulate the MIBEL’s rule that forces
the energy of the futures contracts to be bid through the instrumental price offer; that is to say,
the variable qti represents the quantity of the instrumental price bid and it must be not less than
the sum of the energy allocated to FCs. The lower bound qti ≥ P iuti prevents committed thermal
units from being matched below their minimum generation limit while the upper bound qti ≤ P iuti
prevents production levels above the operational limit (4.10).
4.3.3 Matched Energy Constraints
The discussion in Sections 2.3.2 and 4.2 established that the offer curve (4.1) is completely deter-
mined by the amount of energy at instrumental price qti. In scenario s, with clearing price λ
D,s
t ,
expression (4.6) sets the value of the matched energy of thermal i at time interval t under scenario
s, but it does not have to be explicitly introduced in the model because, as we will see in Section
4.4.1, the optimal value of the decision variable psti corresponds to p
M,s
ti (λ
D
ti ).
The following two sets of constraints are the operational ones. They control the production of
the unit, i.e., the unit will not produce above or below operational limits, and they define the
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relationship between both sets of variables.
psti ≤ P iuti ∀i ∈ I, ∀t ∈ T, ∀s ∈ S (4.12)
psti ≥ qti ∀i ∈ I, ∀t ∈ T, ∀s ∈ S (4.13)
4.3.4 Objective Function
Let’s consider now that the day-ahead market has been cleared, with a market price λDt . For
all thermal units i at time interval t, the quadratic generation costs associated with the matched
energy (4.5), denoted as pMti for the sake of simplicity, is:
Ct =
∑
∀i∈I
(
cbiuti + c
off
i ati + c
on
i eti + c
l
ip
M
ti + c
q
i (p
M
ti )
2
)
and the overall benefit function is:
B =
∑
∀t∈T
(
InDFt − Ct
)
=
=
∑
∀t∈T
∑
∀j∈F
(
λFj − λDt
)
LFj +
∑
∀i∈I
λDt p
M
ti −
(
cbiuti + c
off
i ati + c
on
i eti + c
l
ip
M
ti + c
q
i (p
M
ti )
2
) =
=
∑
∀t∈T
∑
∀j∈F
(
λFj − λDt
)
LFj −
−
∑
∀i∈I
(
cbiuti + c
off
i ati + c
on
i eti + (c
l
i − λDt )pMti + cqt (pMti )2
))
(4.14)
As it has been shown, λDt and qti completely determine the amount of matched energy p
M
ti . There-
fore, expression (4.14) shows the dependency of the benefit function, both on the market clearing
price λDt and the instrumental price offer qti of the committed units. As we have indicated, the
market price is modeled through a set of scenarios λD,s = {λD,s1 , . . . , λD,sT } with probabilities
P s = P (λD,s) ∀s ∈ S, where S is the number of scenarios. Thus, the expression of the day-ahead
and futures benefit function for scenario s, Bs, is:
Bs =
∑
∀t∈T
∑
∀j∈F
(
λFj − λD,st
)
LFj −
−
∑
∀i∈I
(
cbiuti + c
off
i ati + c
on
i eti + (c
l
i − λDt )pM,sti + cqt (pM,sti )2
))
(4.15)
The expected value of the benefit function B can be expressed as:
EλD [B(u, a, e, p)] =
=
∑
∀t∈T
∑
∀j∈F
(
λFj − λDt
)
LFj − (4.16)
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−
∑
∀t∈T
∑
∀i∈I
[
cbiuti + c
off
i ati + c
on
i eti
]
+ (4.17)
+
∑
∀t∈T
∑
∀i∈I
∑
∀s∈S
P s
[
λD,st p
M,s
ti −
(
clip
M,s
ti + c
q
i (p
M,s
ti )
2
)]
(4.18)
where:
(4.16) is a constant term which would be excluded from the optimization, and corresponds to the
incomes of the FCs, which are settled by differences. Parameter λFj represents the futures
settlement price and λDt =
∑
s∈S P
sλD,st is the mean of the day-ahead market price scenarios.
(4.17) is the on/off fixed cost of the unit commitment of the thermal units. This term is deterministic
and does not depend on the realization of the random variable λDt .
(4.18) represents the expected value of the benefit from the day-ahead market, where P s is the
probability of scenario s. The first term, λD,st p
M,s
ti , computes the incomes from the day-ahead
market based on a value psti of the matched energy, while the term between parentheses
corresponds to the expression of the quadratic generation costs.
All the functions appearing in equations (4.17) and (4.18) are linear, except for the term (4.18),
which is concave quadratic (cqi ≥ 0, see Table A.1).
Terms in (4.16) are constants with respect to the decision variables and therefore the objective
function f(x) to be minimized in our model is:
f(p, q, u, a, e) =
∑
∀i∈I
∑
∀t∈T
(
cont eit + c
off
t ait + c
b
tuit +
∑
s∈S
P s
[
(clt − λD,si )psit + cqt (psti)2
])
(4.19)
4.3.5 Day-Ahead Market Bidding with Futures Contracts Problem
The full model developed in the preceding sections, the so-called DAMB with futures contracts
problem, can be formulated as:
(DAMB-FC)

min f(p, q, f, u, a, e)
s.t.
Eq. (4.8)− (4.11) FC covering
Eq. (4.12)− (4.13) Operational constraints
Eq. (2.10)− (2.12) Unit commitment
(4.20)
This formulation corresponds to an optimization problem with mixed continuous and binary deci-
sion variables, a convex quadratic objective function and a set of linear constraints. In the next
section the properties of the optimal solutions of the (DAMB-FC) problem will be studied.
4.4 Optimal Bid
The preceding model (4.20) is built on Assumption 2.3, which presumes the existence of a bid
function λbti with a matched energy function consistent with the optimal solution of the (DAMB-
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FC) problem, i.e.:
pMti (λ
D,s
t )
def= pM,sti = p
s∗
ti ∀s ∈ S
where pM,sti = max{qti, ρsti}(4.6).
The objective of this section is the development of such a bid function, called the optimal bid
function λb∗ti (p
b
ti). In order to derive this optimal bid function, the properties of the optimal solutions
of Problem (4.20) will be studied in the next section and used to derive the expression of the optimal
matched energy ps∗ti in terms of the instrumental energy bid q
∗
ti.
4.4.1 Optimal Matched Energy
Let x∗′ = [u∗, a∗, e∗, p∗, q∗, f∗]′ represent the optimal solution of the (DAMB-FC) problem. Fixing
the binary variables to its optimal value u∗, a∗ and e∗ in the formulation of the (DAMB-FC)
problem, we obtain the following convex quadratic continuous problem:
(DAMB-FC∗) :
minimize
p,q,f
∑
∀t∈T
∑
∀i∈I∗ont
∑
s∈S
P s
[
(cli − λD,st )psti + cqi (psti)2
]
subject to ∑
i|i∈Ij∩I∗ont
ftij = LFj ∀t ∈ T, ∀j ∈ F
qti ≥
∑
j∈Fi
ftij ∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ I∗ont
psti ≤ P i ∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ I∗ont , ∀s ∈ S
psti ≥ qti ∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ I∗ont , ∀s ∈ S
qti ≥ P i ∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ I∗ont
ftij ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ I∗ont , ∀j ∈ F
with I∗ont := {i ∈ I | u∗ti = 1}, the set of thermal units committed at time t. Obviously, the optimal
solution of this continuous problem should coincide with the optimal value of the continuous vari-
ables of the original (DAMB-FC) problem, p∗, q∗ and f∗. The (DAMB-FC∗) problem is separable
by intervals, being the problem associated with the tth time interval in standard form:
(DAMB-FC∗t ) :
minimize
pt,qt,ft
∑
∀i∈I∗ont
∑
s∈S
P s
[
(cli − λd,st )psti + cqi (psti)2
]
subject to ∑
i|i∈Ij∩I∗ont
ftij − Lj = 0 ∀j ∈ F (pitj) (4.21)
∑
j∈Fi
ftij − qti ≤ 0 ∀i ∈ I∗ont (µ1ti) (4.22)
psti − P i ≤ 0 ∀i ∈ I∗ont , ∀s ∈ S (µ2,sti ) (4.23)
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qti − psti ≤ 0 ∀i ∈ I∗ont , ∀s ∈ S (µ3,sti ) (4.24)
P i − qti ≤ 0 ∀i ∈ I∗ont (µ4ti) (4.25)
− ftij ≤ 0 ∀i ∈ I∗ont , ∀j ∈ F (µ5tij) (4.26)
where pi, µ1, µ2, µ3, µ4 and µ5 represent the Lagrange multiplier associated with each constraint.
Following Luenberger (2004), the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions of the (DAMB-FC∗t ) problem
can be expressed as:
P s
[(
cli − λd,st
)
+ 2cqi p
s∗
ti
]
+ µ2,sti − µ3,sti = 0 ∀i ∈ I∗ont , ∀s ∈ S (4.27)
− µ1ti − µ4ti +
∑
∀s∈S
µ3,sti = 0 ∀i ∈ I∗ont (4.28)
µ1ti + pitj − µ5tij = 0 ∀i ∈ I∗ont , ∀j ∈ Fi (4.29)
µ1ti
∑
j∈Fi
f∗tij − q∗ti
 = 0 ∀i ∈ I∗ont (4.30)
µ2,sti
(
ps∗ti − P i
)
= 0 ∀i ∈ I∗ont , ∀s ∈ S (4.31)
µ4ti (P i − q∗ti) = 0 ∀i ∈ I∗ont (4.32)
µ3,sti (q
∗
ti − ps∗ti ) = 0 ∀i ∈ I∗ont , ∀s ∈ S (4.33)
µ5tijf
∗
tij = 0 ∀i ∈ I∗ont , ∀j ∈ F (4.34)
µ1ti, µ
2,s
ti , µ
4
ti, µ
3,s
ti , µ
5
tij ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I∗ont , ∀j ∈ F, ∀s ∈ S (4.35)
The (DAMB-FC∗t ) problem is convex (c
q
i ≥ 0) and thus the system (4.27)-(4.35) represents the
necessary and sufficient optimality conditions of the (DAMB-FC∗t ) problem and, consequently, of
the (DAMB-FC∗) problem. Therefore the solution set of the preceding KKT system defines the
value of variables psti, qti and ftij over any optimal solution of the (DAMB-FC) problem associated
with I∗ont . The following proposition states this result:
Proposition 4.1. Let x∗′ = [u∗, a∗, e∗, p∗, q∗, f∗]′ be an optimal solution of the (DAMB-FC) prob-
lem. Then, for any x∗ there exists Lagrange multipliers, µ1, µ2, µ3, µ4 and µ5 such that the value
of variables p∗, q∗ and f∗ satisfy the KKT system (4.27)-(4.35). Conversely, for any solution p∗,
q∗ and f∗ of the KKT system (4.27)-(4.35) associated with I∗ont the correspondent solution x
∗ is
optimal for the (DAMB-FC) problem.
The fact that any solution of the (DAMB-FC) problem must satisfy the system (4.27)-(4.35) will
be exploited in the next two lemmas in order to derive the expressions of the optimal matched
energy associated with scenario s:
Lemma 4.1 (Optimal matched energy, quadratic costs). Let x∗ be an optimal solution of the
(DAMB-FC) problem. Then, for any unit i with quadratic a convex generation cost (i.e. cqi > 0)
committed at period t (i.e. i ∈ I∗ont), the optimal value of the matched energy ps∗ti can be expressed
as:
ps∗ti = max{q∗ti, ρsti} (4.36)
56 CHAPTER 4. DAMB: FUTURES CONTRACTS
where ρsti is the constant parameter
ρsti =

P i if θsti ≤ P i
θsti if P i < θ
s
ti < P i
P i if θsti ≥ P i
(4.37)
with
θsti =
(
λD,st − cli
)
/2cqi (4.38)
Proof. As Proposition 4.1 establishes, any optimal solution of the (DAMB-FC) problem must satisfy
the KKT system (4.27)-(4.35). As cqi > 0, equation (4.27) allows variable p
s∗
ti to be expressed as:
ps∗ti =
λD,st − cli
2cqi
+
µ3,sti − µ2,sti
2cqiP s
= θsti +
µ3,sti − µ2,sti
2cqiP s
(4.39)
Equations (4.23)-(4.26) establish that any optimal solution x∗ of the (DAMB-FC) problem must
satisfy that
P i ≤ q∗ti ≤ ps∗ti ≤ P i (4.40)
To derive the relationships (4.36), the solution of the KKT system will be analyzed in the five
cases among which any optimal solution of the (DAMB-FC) problem could be classified according
to (4.40). The rationale of the demonstration is to prove that, in all cases, the expression of the
variable ps∗ti derived from the KKT system (4.27)-(4.35) coincides with (4.36):
(a) P i < q∗ti = p
s∗
ti = P i : This is a trivial case, because, by definition (4.37), ρ
s
ti ≤ P i, and then
ps∗ti = max{q∗ti = P i, ρsti ≤ P i} = P i.
(b) P i ≤ q∗ti < ps∗ti = P i : Condition (4.33) gives µ3,sti = 0. That, together with the non-negativity
of the lagrange multipliers µsti and equation (4.39) sets P i ≤ θsti and, by definition (4.37),
ρsti = P i. Then p
s∗
ti = max{q∗ti < P i, ρsti = P i} = P i.
(c) P i ≤ q∗ti < ps∗ti < P i : In this case, conditions (4.31) and (4.33) give µsti = µ3,sti = 0. That,
together with equation (4.39) gives ps∗ti = θ
s
ti. Then, as it is assumed that P i < p
s∗
ti < P i,
so is θsti and, by definition (4.37), ρ
s
ti = θ
s
ti = p
s∗
ti > q
∗
ti. Therefore p
s∗
ti = max{q∗ti, ρsti = θsti >
q∗ti} = ρsti.
(d) P i < q∗ti = p
s∗
ti < P i : In this case, condition (4.31) forces µ
2,s
ti = 0 which, in combination with
equation (4.39) and condition µ3,sti ≥ 0 gives ps∗ti ≥ θsti. As we are assuming that q∗ti = ps∗ti ,
then q∗ti ≥ θsti also holds. As θsti ≤ ps∗ti < P i, definition (4.37) sets a value of ρsti that will be
either θsti or P i, depending on whether θ
s
ti > P i or θ
s
ti ≤ P i respectively. Nevertheless, in
both cases ρsti ≤ q∗ti, and then ps∗ti = max{q∗ti, ρsti ≤ q∗ti} = q∗ti.
(e) P i = q∗ti = p
s∗
ti < P i : Condition (4.31) sets µ
2,s
ti = 0 which, by taking into account equation
(4.39) and µ3,sti ≥ 0, provides ps∗ti = P i ≥ θsti. Then, by definition (4.37), ρsti = P i, and
ps∗ti = max{q∗ti = P i, ρsti = P i} = P i.
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Lemma 4.2 (Optimal matched energy, linear costs). Let x∗ be an optimal solution of the (DAMB-
FC) problem. Then for any unit i with a linear generation cost (i.e. cqi = 0) committed at period t
(i.e. i ∈ I∗ont), the optimal value of the matched energy ps∗ti can be expressed as:
ps∗ti =
q∗ti if λ
D,s
t ≤ cli
P i if λ
D,s
t > c
l
i
(4.41)
Proof. As Proposition 4.1 sets forth, any optimal solution of the (DAMB-FC) problem must satisfy
the KKT system (4.27)-(4.35). When cqi = 0, equation (4.27) can be expressed as:
µ3,sti − µ2,sti = P s
(
cli − λD,st
)
(4.42)
with P s as the probability of scenario s. There are three possible cases:
(a) λD,st < c
l
i: In this case, equation (4.42) implies that µ
3,s
ti > µ
2,s
ti , which gives rise to two
different situations. In the first one µ3,sti > µ
2,s
ti > 0. That, together with equations (4.31) and
(4.33) gives ps∗ti = q
∗
ti = P i. In the second one µ
3,s
ti > µ
2,s
ti = 0 and the same KKT conditions
force ps∗ti = q
∗
ti ≤ P i.
(b) λD,st > c
l
i: Now equation (4.42) sets µ
2,s
ti > µ
3,s
ti , which again defines only two possibilities. In
the first one the strict inequalities of µ2,sti > µ
3,s
ti > 0 hold and, considering equations (4.31)
and (4.33), set ps∗ti = q
∗
ti = P i. In the second one, µ
2,s
ti > µ
3,s
ti = 0 which, after equations
(4.31) and (4.33), allows the matched energy to be expressed as ps∗ti = P i ≥ q∗ti.
(c) λD,st = c
l
i: In this case equation (4.42) gives µ
3,s
ti = µ
2,s
ti . Two cases must be analyzed here.
In the first one, where µ3,sti = µ
2,s
ti = 0, the KKT system (4.27)-(4.35) doesn’t impose any
condition on the relation between ps∗ti , q
∗
ti and the bound P i. Therefore, for a given optimal
solution x∗ of the (DAMB-FC) problem, any feasible value of the variables ps∗ti and q
∗
ti are
equally optimal, in particular, the value ps∗ti = q
∗
ti. The second case to be analyzed is the case
where µ3,sti and µ
2,s
ti are both strictly positives. Then equation (4.33) gives p
s∗
ti = q
∗
ti.
Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2 establish the expressions of the optimal matched energy variable for any spot
price λD,st at any optimal solution of the (DAMB-FC) problem. The bid strategies consistent with
such a matched energy will be developed in the next section.
4.4.2 Optimal Bid Function
In Section 2.3.3 the concepts of bid and matched energy functions were introduced. The matched
energy function associated with a given bid function λbti was defined as
pMti (λ
D
t )
def= max{pbti ∈ [0, P i] | λbti(pbti) ≤ λDt }
Assumption 2.3 supposes the existence of a bid function, coherent with the (DAMB-FC) problem,
in the sense expressed in the following definition:
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λ b∗ti (pbti)
pM∗ti (λ
D,s
t )
λ bti
Pi
Pi
q∗ti
q∗ti
Pi
Pi p
b
ti
pMti
θ lti
θ kti
θ rti
λ D,kt
λ ti
λ ti
λ D,lt
λ ti
λ tiλ D,rt λ
D,s
t
(a) (b)
Figure 4.2: (a) Optimal bid function λb∗ti (p
b
ti) and (b) associated matched energy function p
M∗
ti (λ
D,s
t ) for
units with quadratic generation costs.
λ b∗ti (pbti)
pM∗ti (λ
D,s
t )λ bti
cli
cliPi
Pi
q∗ti
q∗ti
Pi
Pi
pbti λ D,kt λ D,rt
λ D,st
pMti
(a) (b)
Figure 4.3: (a) Optimal bid function λb∗ti (p
b
ti) and (b) associated matched energy function p
M∗
ti (λ
D,s
t ) for
units with linear generation costs.
Definition 4.1 (Bid functions’s optimality conditions). Let x∗′ = [u∗, a∗, e∗, p∗, q∗, f∗]′ be an op-
timal solution of the (DAMB-FC) problem. The bid function λb∗ti of a thermal unit i committed
at period t (i.e. i ∈ I∗ont) is said to be optimal w.r.t. the (DAMB-FC) problem and solution x∗ if
the value of the matched energy function associated with any scenario’s clearing price λD,st , p
M,s
ti ,
coincide with the optimal matched energy ps∗ti given by expressions (4.36) and (4.41).
The equivalence pM,sti ≡ ps∗ti assures us that, if a GenCo systematically submits optimal bid functions
to the day-ahead market, the expected value of the benefits will be maximized, as long as the actual
behavior of the clearing price λDt has been captured by the set of scenarios S. The next theorem
develops the expression of the optimal bid function associated with the (DAMB-FC) problem:
Theorem 4.1 (Optimal bid function). Let x∗′ = [u∗, a∗, e∗, p∗, q∗, f∗]′ be an optimal solution of
the (DAMB-FC) problem and i any thermal unit committed in period t of the optimal solution (i.e.
i ∈ I∗ont). Then:
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(i) If the generation cost is quadratic convex, the bid function:
λb∗ti (p
b
ti, q
∗
ti) =
0 if pbti ≤ q∗ti2cqi pbti + cli if q∗ti < pbti ≤ P i (4.43)
is optimal w.r.t. the (DAMB-FC) problem and the optimum x∗.
(ii) If the generation cost is linear the bid function:
λb∗ti (p
b
ti, q
∗
ti) =
0 if pbti ≤ q∗ticli if q∗ti < pbti ≤ P i (4.44)
is optimal w.r.t. the (DAMB-FC) problem and the optimum x∗.
Proof. We will consider first part (i) of the theorem. To illustrate the proof, the expression (4.43)
has been represented graphically in Figure 4.2(a). It can be easily verified that the matched energy
function associated with the bid function λb∗ti is (Figure 4.2(b)):
pM∗ti (λ
D
t ) =

q∗ti if λ
D
t ≤ λti
θti(λDt ) if λti < λ
D
t ≤ λti
P i if λDt > λti
(4.45)
where the threshold prices λti and λti are defined as:
λti = 2c
q
i q
∗
ti + c
l
i; λti = 2c
q
iP i + c
l
i
and where θti(λDt ) = (λ
D
t −li)/2cqi .
To prove part (i) of the theorem, it is only necessary to demonstrate that pM∗ti (λ
D,s
t )
def= pM,s∗ti ≡ ps∗ti ,
where ps∗ti is the value of the optimal matched energy at scenario s, given by (4.36). First notice
that, if λDt = λ
D,s
t , the spot price at scenario s, then the matched energy function (4.45) can be
rewritten as:
pM,s∗ti =

q∗ti if λ
D,s
t ≤ λti
θsti if λti < λ
D,s
t ≤ λti
P i if λ
D,s
t > λti
(4.46)
where θsti is the parameter defined in equation (4.38). Now, the equivalence p
M,s∗
ti ≡ ps∗ti =
max{q∗ti, ρsti} can be easily verified for the three cases of expression (4.46) (please, refer to Fig-
ure 4.2(b) for a graphical interpretation of these three cases):
(a) If, for some k ∈ S, λD,kt ≤ λti then θsti ≤ q∗ti and, by definition (4.37), ρkti = max{θkti, P i}, which
will always be less than or equal to q∗ti. Then, we can write that p
M,s∗
ti = q
∗
ti = max{q∗ti, ρkti ≤
q∗ti} = pk∗ti .
(b) If, for some l ∈ S, λti < λD,lt ≤ λti then q∗ti < θlti ≤ P i which, by definition (4.37), gives
ρlti = θ
l
ti and p
M,s∗
ti = θ
l
ti = max{q∗ti, ρlti = θlti > q∗ti} = pl∗ti .
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(c) If, for some r ∈ S, λD,rt > λti then θrti > P i which, together with definition (4.37), sets
ρrti = P i and: p
M,s∗
ti = P i = max{q∗ti, ρrti = P i > q∗ti} = pr∗ti .
To demonstrate the equivalence pM,s∗ti ≡ ps∗ti when cqi = 0 (part (ii) of the theorem), observe that
the optimal matched energy function associated with the optimal bid function λbl∗ti is:
pM∗ti (λ
D
t ) =
q∗ti if λDt ≤ cliP i if λDt > cli (4.47)
which is represented in Figure 4.3(b). Expression (4.47) is equivalent to expression (4.41), and
then, pM,s∗ti ≡ ps∗ti ∀s ∈ S.
Observe that a direct result of Theorem 4.1 is that Assumption 2.3 always holds true for any
(DAMB-FC) problem with an optimal solution.
As mentioned before, the (DAMB-FC) problem assures us that, if the optimal bids (4.43)-(4.44)
are submitted to the day-ahead market, the expected value of the benefit function B (4.16)-(4.18)
will be maximized. There are two important considerations about these optimal bid functions. The
first one is that the optimal bid functions (4.43)-(4.44) represent to some extent a generalization
of the classical self-commitment problem treated by several authors (Conejo et al., 2002b; Gountis
and Bakirtzis, 2004a). Effectively, if the thermal unit i does not contribute to covering futures
contracts at period t (i.e., q∗ti = 0), then the optimal bid function offers the complete production
of the thermal plant pbti at its true marginal cost, 2c
q
i p
b
ti + c
l
i or c
l
i depending on the generation
costs functions. Second, the true bid function required by the market’s operator in the MIBEL is
a stepwise non-decreasing function. The optimal bid function (4.44) satisfies this condition, but
(4.43) is not stepwise. This is an approximation commonly adopted in the literature (see Gountis
and Bakirtzis, 2004a) and does not represent a serious limitation on the practical interest of the
model, because it is always possible to build a posteriori a stepwise approximation of the resulting
optimal bid (4.43).
4.5 Computational Results
In this section the set of computational tests that have been performed in order to validate the
described model and its results are presented. The instances used in the test have 3 futures
contracts, 9 thermal units and 24 hourly intervals.
The model has been implemented in AMPL Fourer et al. (2003) and solved with CPLEX 12.0
(2008) (with default options) using a SunFire V20Z with 8 Gb of RAM memory and two processor
AMD Opteron 252 at 2.46GHz.
4.5.1 Scenario Set
For this model we use the set of scenarios created from the ARIMA model (Section 3.4.1). As we
have introduced, in stochastic programming models, the number of scenarios is a critical decision
and must be fixed for each model. We will deal with this problem by increasing the number of
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|S| c.v. b.v. Constraints CPU(s) E(benefits)(e) ‖xs−x150‖‖x150‖
10 3360 720 10872 13 13508300 0.3350
20 5760 720 20472 55 10852400 0.2997
30 8160 720 30072 112 10939000 0.2913
40 10560 720 39672 216 10810100 0.1821
50 12960 720 49272 444 11071100 0.1764
75 18960 720 73272 2100 10878600 0.0712
100 24960 720 97272 3319 10892800 0.0712
150 36960 720 145272 4244 10848800
|T | = 24; |I| = 9
Table 4.1: Optimization characteristics of the study cases and results for different number of scenarios.
scenarios until the stabilization of the objective function optimal value. The original tree has 300
scenarios that have been reduced to sets of 150, 100, 75, 50, 40, 30, 20 and 10 scenarios. In Table 4.1
the main parameters of each test are summarized: number of scenarios (S), number of continuous
variables (c.v.), number of binary variables (b.v.), number of constraints (Constraints), CPU time
in seconds (CPU(s)), the value of the expected benefits (E(benefits)(e)), and the difference in the
first stage variables value between the reduced set and the one with 150 scenarios, given as a fraction
of unit (‖x
s−x150‖
‖x150‖ where x
s = [q∗, u∗]′ ∀s ∈ S). The value of E(benefits) only considers the benefit
from the day-ahead market (terms (4.18) and (4.17)), ignoring the constant FC income (4.16), and
corresponds to minus the objective function of the (DABFC) problem. It can be observed how the
CPU time increases with the number of scenarios because of the proportional relationship between
them and the number of continuous variables (the number of binary variables is independent of
the number of scenarios) and constraints. It can also be seen the value of the objective function
stabilizes when the number of scenarios grows (Figure 4.4(a)). There is also a convergence to zero
of the difference in the optimal value of the first stage decision variables between each reduced set
and the largest one (Figure 4.4(b)). Both values converge from approximately 75 scenarios and the
computational time is acceptable. Any increase in the number of scenarios from 75 to 100 does not
improve the optimal solution accuracy enough to justify the 50% increase in CPU time. Therefore
75 will be the selected number of scenarios for the computational tests.
4.5.2 Case Study
The first computational tests are performed by changing the quantity of energy allocated to physical
FCs in order to study its influence on the results. The status of the units before the first interval
is fixed as all open, allowing them to be closed or remain opened at hour 1; this is done in order to
give more freedom to the unit commitment.
The quantity allocated to FCs is confidential and therefore there is no real public data for the
units in the study. The set of computational tests presented is based on the percentage of the total
energy generation capacity that the GenCo has allocated to FCs, %P =
∑
∀j∈F L
F
j /
∑
∀i∈I P i. For
this case study, we include the 9 available units distributed in one or more of the 3 UCPs created,
each of them corresponding to one FC. In Table 4.2 the main parameters of the computational test
are summarized for three different values of %P : 5%, 40% and 70%. The computational time for
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Figure 4.4: (a) Expected benefits for each reduced set of scenarios (b) First stage variables convergence
evaluated as ‖x
s−x150‖
‖x150‖ , x
s = [q∗, u∗]′ ∀s ∈ S.
%P E(benefits)
5 23319100 e
40 10878600 e
70 -34164100 e
|T | = 24; |I| = 9; |S| = 75; b.v. = 720; c.v. = 18960
Table 4.2: Dependency of the DAM benefits with the fraction of the total generation capacity allocated to
futures contracts.
the 3 cases is approximately the same but the value of the expected benefits (minus the optimal
value of the objective function) differs. Observe that when %P = 70%, the GenCo experiences a
loss in the DAM, which should be compensated with the FC incomes (4.16). In Table 4.3 there are
the stochastic programming indicators (see Section 7.2) and it is shown the benefits obtained by
using stochastic programming instead of a deterministic approach. Figure 4.5 shows the optimal bid
function for unit 1 at interval 12, λb∗12,1(pb12,1) (Section 4.4, equation (4.43)), where different values of
%P are considered. In the plot we can see the following represented: an adaptation of the optimal
bid function provided by the model to the real bid function that the GenCo has to submit to the
MIBEL day-ahead market operator. This bid function is composed of ten pairs (energy, price)
with increasing prices that can be represented as a stepwise increasing curve, starting at the point
defined by the instrumental price offer (q∗12,1,0). The following steps are constructed by following
Objective function
RP -10878600 e
EEV -10279300 e
VSS 599300 e
Table 4.3: Stochastic programming indicators-comentar.
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Figure 4.5: Optimal offer for unit 1 at hour 12.
the optimal bid function, in a way that the coordinates of the points are (pb12,1, λ
b∗
12,1(p
b
12,1)), with
the values of the bid energy pb12,1 evenly distributed between q
∗
12,1 and P 12. Notice that for the first
case (solid line) the unit has no energy allocated to FCs, so the instrumental offer’s energy is the
minimum operational limit (160MW) because, as the unit is committed, the matched energy has
to be at least this quantity. For the other two cases the energy allocated to FCs is 186MW (dotted
line) and 256MW (dashed line). In the following analysis, the percentage of available energy used
for physical FCs will be fixed at 40%.
Figure 4.6(a) represents variable f∗tij , the optimal economic dispatch of each FC. This representation
shows how the contract is settled among the different units of each UCP. Three kinds of physical
FCs have been considered, 200MWh in a weekly contract, 500MWh in a monthly contract and
500MWh in a yearly contract. It can be observed that every unit of a given UCP contributes to
the corresponding FC in at least one interval. Notice how in the off-peak hours (lower clearing
prices), if possible, each contract is settled by the cheapest unit in the UCP, for example unit 7 in
the yearly contract or unit 6 in the monthly contract. Specifically, as unit 7 cannot generate all
the energy needed for the yearly contract, unit 3 has to contribute whatever is necessary in order
to cover the rest of the contract. For this reason, the weekly contract is not fully covered by unit
3, which is the cheapest one, but by unit 1, since unit 3 is generating for the yearly contract. In
the case of the monthly contract, since the maximum power capacity of unit 6 is insufficient, the
contract must be covered with the help of the next cheapest unit, unit 4. The results of the peak
hours are not as easily interpretable because day-ahead market incomes are greater and its relation
with production costs allows all the units to participate both in FCs and day-ahead bidding.
Figure 4.6(b) shows variable q∗ti, the instrumental price bid, energy for each unit and interval. The
values shown in the ordinate axis are the minimum and maximum power capacity of each unit. This
instrumental price bid can be either the quantity allocated to FCs or the minimum operational limit
of the unit. Figure 4.6(a) also represents the unit commitment because if the unit is not producing
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Figure 4.6: (a) Economic dispatch of each futures contracts f∗itj . (b) Optimal instrumental price bid energy
q∗it for each unit and interval.
the minimum operational limit, it means the unit is off. We can see that unit 5 starts-up at 10 a.m.
and units 2, 8 and 9 start-up after 6 p.m. This behavior is related to the price structure because,
in the MIBEL, the highest prices are at noon and in the evening, the peak hours being after 6 p.m.
Figure 4.7 shows the optimal bid curves for each committed thermal unit at hour 12. The numerical
values shown in the abscissa axis indicate the minimum and maximum power capacity. The first
interval is always the instrumental price bid, which is indicated in parenthesis as (price, quantity).
Units 3, 5 and 9 have linear generation costs and its real bid coincides with the optimal bid function
λb∗ti expressed in equation (4.44). The rest of the units have quadratic generation costs and the
represented function corresponds to the optimal bid functions λb∗ti expressed in equation (4.43) and
which are adapted to the real stepwise bid function built as in Figure 4.5. Notice that there are
some thermal units that have q∗ti greater than the minimum power capacity, specifically units 3, 4,
6 and 7; this is a direct consequence of the units’ participation in the FC being covered.
In summary, these results give the GenCo an optimal bidding strategy which follows the market
operator rules. The main difference from other bidding strategies is that the optimal value of q∗ti
corresponds directly to the optimal zero price bid, that is to say, the first step of the step-wise
bidding curve.
4.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we have developed a mixed-integer stochastic programming model for the short-
term thermal optimal bidding problem in the day-ahead market of a price-taker GenCo which also
operates in the derivatives physical electricity markets. In order to maximize the benefits arising
from the DAM while satisfying thermal operational constraints, the optimal solution of our model
determines the unit commitment of the thermal units, the optimal instrumental price bidding
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Figure 4.7: Bidding curve for each unit at hour 23.
strategy for the generation company and the economic dispatch of the committed futures contracts
for each hour. The model complies with the new regulation of the MIBEL.
It has been shown through Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions that the optimal value of the decision
variables corresponds to the theoretical optimal bidding curve for a price-taker producer.
The computational tests were performed with real data on the thermal units of a price-taker
producer operating in the MIBEL. They have validated the model and they provide suitable results.
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CHAPTER 5
DAMB: Futures and Bilateral Contracts
Introduction
Following the idea of building a model that includes the different mechanisms that could affect
DAM bidding strategies, we expand the model presented in the previous chapter by including
bilateral contracts. Thus, in this chapter we will describe de devolpment of a stochastic mixed-
integer quadratic programming model for a price-taker GenCo with bilateral contract obligations
as well as a physical futures contract portfolio coming from the derivatives market. The purpose
of the model is to find the optimal bidding strategy for the DAM. Although BCs and FCs share
some similarities, it will be shown that their mathematical formulation is different.
This chapter considers the classical BCs, i.e. an agreement between the GenCo and a qualified
client to settle a given quantity of energy at a given price. The new kind of BCs that the MIBEL
offers will be considered in subsequent chapters.
This chapter is organized in a similar way to Chapter 4. Section 5.1 contains a brief literature
review on the bilateral contracts management. In Section 5.2 it is presented the corresponding
income function and in Section 5.3 it is built the model for the DAMB problem with futures and
bilateral contracts. Finally, Section 5.5 contains the computational tests and Section 5.6 discusses
the main contributions of this chapter.
5.1 Literature Review
In previous sections we have provided a review of the published works that deal with DAM bidding
strategies and a review of the main published works involved with futures contracts (see Sections
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2.3.1 and 4.1). Thus, in this section we focus on the works related with bilateral contracts and
DAM bidding strategies.
Bilateral contracts is a classic topic that has been tackled from very different points of view and
there are numerous of works that analyze their characteristics, their definition and the behavior
that a GenCo must have in front of them. For example, Dahlgren et al. (2003) provides a state of
the art on the analysis of different risk-hedging mechanisms, among them BCs.
Usually, the works that study the implication of BCs into the bidding strategies focus on the
medium-term management of the BC pool and not on the economic dispatch of these BCs once
they are committed. For instance, Chen et al. (2004), analyze specifically the impact of physical
and financial contracts on the bidding strategies of a GenCo. They demonstrate that the GenCo
optimal bidding strategy will be affected differently, depending on which medium-term product
is considered. With another point of view, Guan et al. (2008) present a model that joins the
medium-term product allocation to the DAM bidding process. It also considers classical operation
constraints as well as price risk. The main difference from our approach is that they consider the
possibility of bidding into the medium-term products. One important conclusion is that there is
a capacity for hedging risk through futures and bilateral contracts portfolios. Finally, Mo et al.
(2001) present a dynamic stochastic optimization model that permits a dynamic change of the
medium-term portfolio while optimizing physical generation. With a focus on the inclusion of the
physical management of BCs, Shrestha et al. (2004) present a stochastic unit commitment problem
with BC and solve it by maximizing the day-ahead market benefit. The uncertainty of the prices
is introduced also through a set of scenarios, giving rise to a two-stage stochastic programming
problem.
As we have pointed out, the greater part of the published works deal, not with the short-term
problem of dispatching these committed BCs, but with the medium-term problem of optimizing
the BC portfolio by taking into account the physical capacity of the GenCo.
5.2 Basic Concepts
Suppose that now the GenCo has, along with the futures contracts portfolio F (see Section 4.2),
a bilateral contracts portfolio B, each one defined by a pair: energy, LBj , and price λ
B
j . Those
are classical BCs, so the GenCo has agreed to physically provide an energy amount equal to the
sum of all the BCs signed for the day under study. We are optimizing on a short-term horizon
and with base load BCs, therefore the quantity LBj is constant for the T intervals under study.
This assumption can be easily avoided by adding subindex t to the parameter LBj , so long as the
electricity market has peak and base load contracts. The incomes function of the BCs portfolio is:
InBt =
∑
j∈B
λBj L
B
j
The BCs are not sent to the DAM and they do not provide incomes from this market; their benefits
have been charged in advance. Therefore, the matched energy incomes function for the DAM is
identical, with or without BCs (4.7).
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Figure 5.1: Optimal bid curve with physical futures and bilateral contracts.
As we have stated, the MIBEL’s regulation indicates that the maximum energy amount that a
generation unit can bid to the DAM is the difference between the maximal operational capacity of
the unit and the quantity of the total BC energy committed to this unit. Let bti be the generation
of thermal i at interval t allocated to settle the bilateral contracts portfolio:∑
i∈Iont
bti =
∑
j∈B
LBj ∀t ∈ T
Summarizing, the energies LFj and L
B
j should be integrated into the DAM bid while observing the
following rules:
• If unit i contributes with a quantity ftij at period t to the coverage of the FC j, then the
energy ftij must be offered to the DAM as an instrumental price bid.
• If unit i contributes with a quantity bti at period t to the coverage of the BCs, then the energy
bti must be excluded from the DAM bid. Unit i must bid its remaining capacity (Pi − bti).
When an amount bti of the total output of a generation unit is engaged with the settlement of the
BC, the MIBEL rules exclude this quantity from the unit’s bid. Then, the bid function is shifted by
an amount bti with respect to the same bid function without a BC. This situation is represented in
Figure 5.1, where the red x and y axes corresponds to the bid function, which is shifted horizontally
by an amount b w.r.t. the black y axis that corresponds to the total output generation of the unit.
The energy quantities on the x axis are the ones associated to the bid energy po. In this chapter
we will show that the analytical expression of the optimal bid function for those generation units
that contribute to the BC is:
λoti(p
o
ti; qti, bti) =
{
0 if poti ≤ qti
2cqi (p
o
ti + bti) + c
l
i if qti < p
o
ti ≤ (P i − bti)
Once again, the value of the matched energy depends on the value of the market clearing price with
respect to the threshold price λ˜oti (4.2), but in this situation we need to define the matched energy
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as a function of the quantity allocated to BCs, bit. First, we define the quantity ρBti (λ
D
t ) as:
ρBti (λ
D
t ) =

[P i − bti]+ if θBti (λDt ) ≤ [P i − bti]+
θBti (λ
D
t ) if [P i − bti]+ ≤ θBti (λDt ) ≤ P i − bti
P i − bti if θBti (λDt ) ≥ P i − bti
(5.1)
where θBti (λ
D
t ) = [(λ
D
t − cli)/2cqi ] − bti and [P i − bti]+ = max{0, (P i − bti)}. Then, analogously to
(4.5), we define the matched generation with futures and bilateral contracts as:
pMti (λ
D
t ) =
{
qti if qti ≥ ρBti (λDt )
ρBti (λ
D
t ) otherwise
In order to be coherent with the stochastic programming model we must define the matched gen-
eration with respect to scenario s with clearing price λD,st :
pM,sti =
{
qti if qti ≥ ρB,sti
ρB,sti otherwise
(5.2)
where,
ρB,sti =

[P i − bti]+ if θB,sti ≤ [P i − bti]+
θB,sti if [P i − bti]+ ≤ θB,sti ≤ P i − bti
P i − bti if θB,sti ≥ P i − bti
and θB,sti = [(λ
D,s
t − cli)/2cqi ]− bti. Again, expression (5.2) does not have to be introduced explicitly
in the model because it will be demonstrated that the optimal value of the decision variable psti
corresponds to pM,sti (see Sec. 5.4).
5.3 Model Description
5.3.1 Variables
For every time period t ∈ T and thermal unit i ∈ I, the first stage variables of the stochastic
programming problem are:
• The unit commitment variables: uti ∈ {0, 1}, cuti, cdti
• The instrumental price offer bid variables: qti.
• The scheduled energy for futures contract j variables: ftij .
• The scheduled energy for bilateral contract variables: bti.
and the second stage variables associated to each scenario s ∈ S are:
• Total generation: gsti
• Matched energy in the day-ahead market: psti
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Note that including BCs in the model implies a new variable that represents the total generation of
the unit, gsti in order to correctly evaluate the production costs. It is important not to confuse this
variable with the one representing the matched energy, psti, i.e., the energy that will be remunerated
at market clearing price.
This model was developed with the second formulation of the unit commitment expressed by
equations (2.13)-(2.20), which formulate the relation of the variables uti, cuti and c
d
ti to the minimum
start-up and shut-down times and initial state of the thermal generation units.
5.3.2 FCs and BCs Covering Constraints
Let bti be the energy allocated to the BC portfolio. The following constraints assure us that the
total committed energy is settled among the available units:∑
i∈I
bti =
∑
j∈B
LBj ∀t ∈ T (5.3)
0 ≤ bti ≤ P iuti ∀i ∈ I, ∀t ∈ T (5.4)
where LBj is the energy that has to be settled for contract j ∈ B.
Obviously, the sets of constraints (4.8), (4.9) and (4.11), which assure us of the settlement of the
futures contracts, must also be included in the model:∑
i∈Ij
ftij = LFj ∀t ∈ T, ∀j ∈ F
qti ≥
∑
∀j∈Fi
ftij ∀i ∈ I, ∀t ∈ T
P iuti ≤ qti ≤ P iuti ∀i ∈ I, ∀t ∈ T
It must be noted that the formulation for futures and bilateral contracts has some similitude but
they are also different in two basic aspects. First, the load coverage constraint (4.8) can be satisfied
by any unit of the GenCo in the case of BCs, while each future contract j can only be covered
by a pre-defined subset Ij of units. Second, and more important, the energy involved in the BC
contracts must be excluded from the day-ahead bid. This mean that constraints (4.9)-(4.10), which
state the relation between the energy committed to the FCs and the instrumental price offer, would
not appear in the case of BCs. In this case the operational limits and the relation between the first
stage variables are defined by the following set of constraints (see Figure 5.1):
qti ≥ P iuti − bti ∀i ∈ I, ∀t ∈ T (5.5)
which guarantee that the instrumental price bid plus the energy committed to the BC will be no
less than the minimum generation output of the unit. Notice that when uti = 0, these constraints
ensure that qti ≥ 0.
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5.3.3 Matched Energy and Total Generation Constraints
The operational limits and the relationship between the variables representing the unit’s generation,
following MIBEL’s rules, are modeled through the following sets of constraints:
psti ≤ P iuti − bti ∀i ∈ I, ∀t ∈ T, ∀s ∈ S (5.6)
psti ≥ qti ∀i ∈ I, ∀t ∈ T, ∀s ∈ S (5.7)
gsti = bti + p
s
ti ∀i ∈ I, ∀t ∈ T, ∀s ∈ S (5.8)
where (5.6) and (5.7) ensure that the matched energy psti will be between the instrumental price
bid qti and the total available energy not allocated to the BC. Equation (5.8) defines the total
generation of the unit.
5.3.4 Objective Function
For all thermal units i at time interval t, the quadratic costs are associated to total generation
(5.8). Those costs taking into account the start-up and shut-down costs are:
Cti = cuti + c
d
ti + c
b
tuti + c
l
tgti + c
q
t (g
2
ti)
As we have pointed out, the BCs are not sent to the DAM, so their inclusion in the short-term
strategies do not change the DAM incomes (4.7). Therefore, the expression of the overall day-
ahead, futures and bilateral benefit function for scenario s (4.15) only changes with respect to the
benefit functio with only futures contracts in the terms related with the costs. Thus, the quadratic
function that represents the expected benefits of the GenCo after participation in the DAM is:
EλD
[
B(pM , g, u, cu, cd)
]
=
=
∑
t∈T
∑
j∈F
(λFj − λDi )LFj +
∑
j∈B
λBj L
B
j
− (5.9)
−
∑
t∈T
∑
i∈I
[cuti + c
d
ti + c
b
iuti]+ (5.10)
+
∑
t∈T
∑
i∈I
∑
s∈S
P s
[
λD,st p
M,s
ti − (cligsti + cqi (gsti)2)
]
(5.11)
where, as in the previous model:
(5.9) corresponds to the incomes of the FCs and the BCs and it is a constant term, equivalent to
(4.16).
(5.10) is the on/off fixed cost of the unit commitment of the thermal units, deterministic and inde-
pendent of the realization of the random variable λDt , equivalent to (4.17).
(5.11) represents the expected value of the benefits from the DAM. The first term, λD,st p
M,s
ti , com-
putes the incomes from the DAM due to a value pM,sti of the matched energy, while the term
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between brackets corresponds to the expression of the quadratic generation costs with respect
to the total generation of the unit gsti.
Then, the objective function f(x) to be minimized in our model is:
f(p, u, cu, cd) =
∑
i∈I
∑
t∈T
(
cuti + c
d
ti + c
b
iuti +
∑
s∈S
P s
[
clig
s
ti + c
q
i (g
s
ti)
2 − (λD,st psti)
])
(5.12)
5.3.5 Day-Ahead Bidding with Futures and Bilateral Contracts Problem
The final day-ahead market bidding with bilateral and futures contracts model (DAMB-FBC) de-
veloped in the previous sections is:
(DAMB-FBC)

min f(p, g, u, cu, cd)
s.t.
Eq. (4.8)− (4.10) FC covering
Eq. (5.3)− (5.5) BC covering
Eq. (5.6)− (5.8) Total generation
Eq. (2.13)− (2.20) Unit commitment
(5.13)
This program corresponds to a mixed linearly constrained minimization problem with convex
quadratic objective function and with a well defined global optimal solution.
5.4 Optimal Bid
The preceding model (5.13) is built on Assumption 2.3, which presumes the existence of a bid
function λbti with a matched energy function that is consistent with the optimal solution of the
(DAMB-FBC) problem, i.e.:
pMti (λ
D,s
t )
def= pM,sti = p
s∗
ti ∀s ∈ S
where pM,sti = max{qti, ρB,sti } (5.2) The objective of this section is to develop such a bid function,
called the optimal bid function λb∗ti (p
b
ti). In order to derive this optimal bid function, the properties
of the optimal solutions of the problem (5.13) will be studied in the next section and used to derive
the expression of the optimal matched energy ps∗ti in terms of the instrumental energy bid q
∗
ti and
the committed energy b∗ti of the bilateral contracts.
5.4.1 Optimal Matched Energy
Let x∗′ = [u∗, cu∗, cd∗, g∗, p∗, q∗, f∗, b∗]′ represent the optimal solution of the (DAMB-FBC) problem.
Fixing the unit commitment variables to its optimal value u∗, cu∗ and cd∗ in the formulation of the
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(DAMB-FBC) problem, we obtain the following continuous convex quadratic problem:
(DAMB-FBC∗) :
min
∑
∀t∈T
∑
∀i∈I∗ont
∑
s∈S
P s
[
(cli − λD,st )gsti + cqi (gsti)2
]
s.t.
∑
i|i∈Ij∩I∗ont
ftij = LFj ∀t ∈ T, ∀j ∈ F
qti ≥
∑
j∈Fi
ftij ∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ I∗ont∑
i|i∈I∗ont
bti =
∑
j∈B
LBj ∀t ∈ T
gsti = bti + p
s
ti ∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ I∗ont , ∀s ∈ S
psti ≤ P i − bti ∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ I∗ont , ∀s ∈ S
psti ≥ qti ∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ I∗ont , ∀s ∈ S
qti ≥ P i − bti ∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ I∗ont
bti ≤ P i ∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ I∗ont
bti ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ I∗ont
ftij ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ I∗ont , ∀j ∈ F
with I∗ont := {i ∈ I | u∗ti = 1}, the set of thermal units committed at time t. As in the case
without bilateral contracts, the optimal solution of this continuous problem should coincide with
the optimal value of the continuous variables of the original (DAMB-FBC) problem, g∗, p∗, q∗, b∗
and f∗. The (DAMB-FBC∗) problem is separable by intervals, being the problem associated with
the tth time interval in standard form (Luenberger, 2004):
(DAMB-FBC∗t ) :
min
∑
∀i∈I∗ont
∑
s∈S
P s
[
(cli − λD,st )gsti + cqi (gsti)2
]
s.t.
∑
i|i∈Ij∩I∗ont
ftij − LFj = 0 ∀j ∈ F (pi1tj) (5.14)
∑
j∈Fi
ftij − qti ≤ 0 ∀i ∈ I∗ont (µ1ti) (5.15)∑
i|i∈I∗ont
bti −
∑
j∈B
LBj = 0 (pi
2
t ) (5.16)
gsti − bti − psti = 0 ∀i ∈ I∗ont , ∀s ∈ S (pi3,stj ) (5.17)
psti − P i + bti ≤ 0 ∀i ∈ I∗ont , ∀s ∈ S (µ2,sti ) (5.18)
qti − psti ≤ 0 ∀i ∈ I∗ont , ∀s ∈ S (µ3,sti ) (5.19)
P i − bti − qti ≤ 0 ∀i ∈ I∗ont (µ4ti) (5.20)
− qti ≤ 0 ∀i ∈ I∗ont (µ5ti) (5.21)
bti − P i ≤ 0 ∀i ∈ I∗ont (µ6ti) (5.22)
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− bti ≤ 0 ∀i ∈ I∗ont (µ7ti) (5.23)
− ftij ≤ 0 ∀i ∈ I∗ont , ∀j ∈ F (µ8tij) (5.24)
where pi1, pi2, µ1, pi3, µ2, µ3, µ4, µ5, µ6, µ7 and µ8 represent the Lagrange multipliers associated
with each constraint. The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions of the (DAMB-FBC∗t ) problem can be
expressed as:
gs∗ti = −
(
pi2,sti
2cqiP s
)
−
(
cli
2cqi
)
∀i ∈ I∗ont , ∀s ∈ S (5.25)
pi2,sti = µ
2,s
ti − µ4ti − P sλD,st ∀i ∈ I∗ont , ∀s ∈ S (5.26)
µ3,sti = µ
1
ti + µ
4
ti + µ
5
ti ∀i ∈ I∗ont , ∀s ∈ S (5.27)
µ8tij =
∑
j∈F |i∈I∗ont
pi1j +
∑
i∈I∗ont |j∈Fi
µ1ti ∀i ∈ I∗ont , ∀j ∈ F (5.28)∑
s∈S
(µ2,sti − pi3,sti ) + |I∗ont |pi2ti + µ4ti + µ6ti − µ7ti = 0 ∀i ∈ I∗ont (5.29)
µ1ti(
∑
j∈Fi
f∗tij − q∗ti) = 0 ∀i ∈ I∗ont (5.30)
µ2,sti (p
s∗
ti + b
∗
ti − P i) = 0 ∀i ∈ I∗ont , ∀s ∈ S (5.31)
µ3,sti (q
∗
ti − psti) = 0 ∀i ∈ I∗ont , ∀s ∈ S (5.32)
µ4ti(P i − b∗ti − q∗ti) = 0 ∀i ∈ I∗ont (5.33)
µ5tiq
∗
ti = 0 ∀i ∈ I∗ont (5.34)
µ6ti(b
∗
ti − P i) = 0 ∀i ∈ I∗ont (5.35)
µ7tib
∗
ti = 0 ∀i ∈ I∗ont (5.36)
µ8tijf
∗
tij = 0 ∀i ∈ I∗ont , ∀j ∈ F (5.37)
µ1ti, µ
4
ti, µ
5
ti, µ
6
ti, µ
7
ti ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I∗ont (5.38)
µ2,sti , µ
3,s
ti ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I∗ont , ∀s ∈ S (5.39)
µ8tij ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I∗ont , ∀j ∈ F (5.40)
Analogously as in 4.4.1, one proposition an tow lemmas are introduced and demonstrated in order
to state the correct definition of the optimal matched energy.
Proposition 5.1. Let x∗′ = [u∗, cu∗, cd∗, g∗, p∗, q∗, f∗, b∗]′ be an optimal solution of the (DAMB-
FBC) problem. Then, for any x∗ there exist Lagrange multipliers pi1, pi2, pi3, µ1, µ2, µ3, µ4,
µ5, µ6, µ7 and µ8, such that the value of variables g∗, p∗, q∗, f∗ and b∗ satisfy the KKT system
(5.25)-(5.40). Conversely, for any solution g∗, p∗, q∗, f∗ and b∗ of the KKT system (5.25)-(5.40)
associated with I∗ont, the correspondent solution x
∗ is optimal for the (DAMB-FC) problem.
As we have done in the case of the problem with futures contracts, we will exploit the fact that
any solution of the (DAMB-FCB) problem must satisfy the system (5.25)-(5.40) to derive the
expressions of the optimal matched energy.
Lemma 5.1 (Optimal matched energy, quadratic costs). Let x∗ be an optimal solution of the
(DAMB-FBC) problem. Then, for any unit i with quadratic convex generation costs (i.e. cqi > 0)
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committed at period t (i.e. i ∈ I∗ont), the optimal value of the matched energy ps∗ti can be expressed
as:
ps∗ti = max{q∗ti, ρB,sti } (5.41)
where ρB,sti is the constant parameter
ρB,sti =

[P i − bti]+ if θB,sti ≤ [P i − bti]+
θB,sti if [P i − bti]+ < θB,sti < (P i − bti)
(P i − bti) if θB,sti ≥ (P i − bti)
(5.42)
with
θB,sti =
(
λd,st − cli
)
2cqi
− bti (5.43)
and
[P i − bti]+ = max{0, P i − bti}
Proof. As Proposition 5.1 establishes, any optimal solution of the (DAMB-FBC) problem must
satisfy the KKT system (5.25)-(5.40). Additionally, equations (5.17)-(5.19) establish that any
optimal solution x∗ of the (DAMB-FBC) problem must satisfy that:
P i − bti ≤ q∗ti ≤ ps∗ti ≤ P i − bti (5.44)
As we want to see that the optimal value of the matched energy ps∗ti is equivalent to expression
(5.41), we need to distinguish whether [P i − bti]+ is equal to (P i − bti) or 0, i.e., whether bti < P i
or not. Thus, to derive the relationships (5.41), the solution of the KKT system will be analyzed in
the these two situations. For each one, we will analyze five cases among which any optimal solution
of the (DAMB-FBC) problem could be classified according to (5.44):
(a) bti < P i ⇒ [P i − bti]+ = (P i − bti)
(a.1) (P i − bti) < q∗ti = ps∗ti = (P i − bti) : This is a trivial case, because, by definition (5.42)
ρB,sti ≤ (P i − bit) and, ps∗ti = max{q∗ti = (P i − bti), ρB,sti ≤ (P i − bti)} = (P i − bti).
(a.2) (P i − bti) ≤ q∗ti < ps∗ti = (P i − bti) : Condition (5.32) gives µ3,sti = 0 that, together with
(5.27) and the non-negativity of the lagrange multipliers µ gives µ1ti = µ
4
ti = µ
5
ti = 0
and then (5.26) gives pi2,sti = µ
2,s
ti − P sλD,st . This result, combined with the definition
gs∗ti = p
s∗
ti + b
∗
ti and together with (5.25), gives that:
ps∗ti =
[
λD,st − cli
2cqi
− b∗ti
]
− µ
2,s
ti
2cqiP s
≤ θB,sti .
Then, as it is assumed that ps∗ti = (P i − bti) and we have concluded that θB,sti ≥ ps∗ti , by
definition (5.42) ρB,sti = (P i− bti). So, ps∗ti = max{q∗ti < (P i− bti), ρB, sti = (P i− bti)} =
(P i − bti).
(a.3) (P i − bti) ≤ q∗ti < ps∗ti < (P i − bti) : On the one hand, conditions (5.27), (5.32) and the
non-negativity of the lagrange multipliers give µ3,sti = µ
1
ti = µ
4
ti = µ
5
ti = 0. On the other
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hand, it is assumed that ps∗ti < (P i− bti) and thus condition (5.31) gives µ2,sti = 0. These
two results, combined with condition (5.26), give pi2,sti = −P sλD,st , which together with
(5.25) and (5.17) give:
ps∗ti =
[
λD,st − cli
2cqi
− b∗ti
]
= θB,sti .
Then, as it is assumed that (P i − bti) < ps∗ti < (P i − bti), so is θB,sti and, by definition
(5.42) ρB,sti = θ
B,s
ti . Therefore p
s∗
ti = max{q∗ti < θB,sti s, ρB,sti = θB,sti } = θB,sti .
(a.4) (P i − bti) < q∗ti = ps∗ti < (P i − bti) : In this case the assumptions, together with (5.26),
(5.31) and (5.33), force µ2,sti = µ
4
ti = 0 and pi
2,s
ti = −P sλD,st . Analogous to case (a.3),
ps∗ti = θ
B,s
ti = ρ
B,s
ti and, as it is assumed that q
∗
ti = p
s∗
ti , then p
s∗
ti = max{q∗ti = θB,sti , ρB,sti =
θB,sti } = θB,sti .
(a.5) (P i − bti) = q∗ti = ps∗ti < (P i − bti) : Condition (5.31) sets µ2,sti = 0 which, by taking into
account condition (5.26), provides pi2,sti = −µ4,sti − P sλD,st . This result, combined with
the definition gs∗ti = p
s∗
ti + b
∗
ti, and together with (5.25), gives that:
ps∗ti =
[(
λD,st − cli
2cqi
− b∗ti
)
+
µ4,sti
2cqiP s
]
≥ θB,sti .
Then, as it is assumed that ps∗ti = (P i − bti) and then θB,sti ≤ (P i − bti), by definition
(5.42) ρB,sti = (P i−bti). So, ps∗ti = max{q∗ti = (P i−bti), ρB,sti = (P i−bti)} = (P i−bti).
(b) bti ≥ P i ⇒ [P i − bti]+ = 0
(b.1) 0 < q∗ti = p
s∗
ti = (P i − bti) : In this case, assumptions qti > 0 and qti > (P i − bti)
together with conditions (5.33) and (5.34) force µ4ti = µ
5
ti = 0. Then, (5.26) gives pi
2,s
ti =
µ2,sti −P sλD,st that, analogously to case (a.2) gives θB,sti ≥ ps∗, and then θB,sti ≥ (P i− bti).
Therefore, by definition (5.42) ρB,sti = (P i − bti) and ps∗ = max{q∗ti = (P i − bti), ρB,sti =
(P i − bti)} = (P i − bti).
(b.2) 0 ≤ q∗ti < ps∗ti = (P i − bti) : This case is equivalent to (a.2) because the key is the
assumption q∗ti < p
s∗
ti = (P i − bti). Consequently, ps∗ti = max{q∗ti < (P i − bti), ρB,sti =
(P i − bti)} = (P i − bti).
(b.3) 0 ≤ q∗ti < ps∗ti < (P i−bti) : The reasoning for this case is equivalent to (a.3) until the result
ps∗ti = θ
B,s
ti . Then as it is assumed that 0 < p
s∗
ti < (P i − bti), so is 0 < θB,sti < (P i − bti)
and then, by definition (5.42) ρB,sti = θ
B,s
ti . Therefore, p
s∗
ti = max{q∗ti < θB,sti , pB,sti =
θB,sti } = θB,sti .
(b.4) 0 < q∗ti = p
s∗
ti < (P i − bti) : Analogously to (a.4), it is concluded that ps∗ti = θB,sti and,
as it is assumed that 0 < ps∗ti < (P i − bti), the situation is analogous to case (b.3) and
therefore ps∗ti = max{q∗ti < θB,sti , ρB,sti = θB,sti } = θB,sti .
(b.5) 0 = q∗ti = p
s∗
ti < (P i−bti): In this case, the assumption ps∗ti < (P i−bti), together with con-
dition (5.31), gives that µ2,sti = 0 and then condition (5.26) gives pi
2,s
ti = −µ4,sti − P sλD,st .
Following the same reasoning as in (a.5), this result, combined with the definition
gs∗ti = p
s∗
ti + b
∗
ti and expression (5.25), gives that p
s∗
ti ≥ θsti. Then θB,sti ≤ 0 and, by
definition (5.42) ρB,sti = 0. Therefore, p
s∗
ti = max{qti = 0, ρB,sti = 0} = 0.
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λ bti
λ ti
pbti
θ stiq
∗
tib∗ti
λ D,st
λ ti
Pi−b∗tiPi−b∗ti
(a)
λ bti
λ ti
pbti
θ stiq∗tib∗ti
λ D,st
λ ti
Pi−b∗tiPi
(b)
Figure 5.2: Optimal bid function λb∗ti (p
b
ti) when (a) b
∗
ti < Pi (b) b
∗
ti > Pi.
Lemma 5.2 (Optimal matched energy, linear costs). Let x∗ be an optimal solution of the (DAMB-
FBC) problem. Then, for any unit i with linear generation costs (i.e. cqi = 0) committed at period
t (i.e. i ∈ I∗ont), the optimal value of the matched energy ps∗ti can be expressed as:
ps∗ti =
q∗ti if λ
D,s
t ≤ cli
P i − b∗ti if λD,st > cli
(5.45)
As in Lemma 5.1, any optimal solution of the (DAMB-FBC) problem must satisfy the KKT system
(5.25)-(5.40). The demonstration is then analogous to the one presented for Lemma 4.2.
5.4.2 Optimal Bid Function
As it was described in Chapter 4 for the model (DAMB-FC), Assumption 2.3 supposes the existence
of a bid function that in this case must be coherent with the model (DAMB-FBC) as it is expressed
in the following definition, equivalent to Definition 4.1:
Definition 5.1 (Bid functions’s optimality conditions). Let x∗′ = [u∗, cu∗, cd∗, g∗, p∗, q∗, f∗, b∗]′
be an optimal solution of the (DAMB-FBC) problem. The bid function λb∗ti of a thermal unit i
committed at period t (i.e. i ∈ I∗ont) is said to be optimal w.r.t. the (DAMB-FBC) problem and
solution x∗, if the value of the matched energy function associated with any scenario’s clearing price
λD,st , p
M,s∗
ti , coincides with the optimal matched energy p
s∗
ti given by expressions (5.41) and (5.45).
Once again, the equivalence pM,s∗ti ≡ ps∗ti ensures that if a GenCo submits optimal bid functions,
the expected value of the benefits will be maximized. The next theorem develops the expression of
the optimal bid function associated with the (DAMB-FBC) problem.
Theorem 5.1 (Optimal bid function). Let x∗′ = [u∗, cu∗, cd∗, g∗, p∗, q∗, f∗, b∗]′ be an optimal so-
lution of the (DAMB-FBC) problem and i any thermal unit committed in period t of the optimal
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q∗ti
Pi−b∗ti
pMti
θ lti
θ kti
θ rti
λ D,kt λ ti λ
D,l
t λ ti λ D,rt
λ D,st
Case (a) Case (b) Case (c)
Figure 5.3: Associated matched energy function pM,s∗ti .
solution (i.e. i ∈ I∗ont). Then, for a unit i with quadratic convex generation costs, the bid function:
λb∗ti (p
b
ti, q
∗
ti, b
∗
ti) =
0 if pbti ≤ q∗ti2cqi (pbti + b∗ti) + cli if q∗ti < pbti ≤ (P i − b∗ti) (5.46)
is optimal w.r.t. the (DAMB-FBC) problem and the optimum x∗.
Proof. First, we consider the case where cqi > 0. To illustrate this proof, the expression (5.46)
has been represented graphically in Figure 5.2 for two cases: the first one, when b∗ti < P i (Figure
5.2(a)) and therefore q∗ti ≥ P i− b∗ti and the second one, when b∗ti > P i (Figure 5.2(b)) and therefore
q∗ti ≥ 0. It is easy to see that the matched energy function associated with the bid function λb∗ti at
scenario s (i.e λDt = λ
D,s
t ) is for both cases (Figure 5.3):
pM,s∗ti (λ
D,s
t ) =

q∗ti if λ
D,s
t ≤ λti
θB,sti if λti < λ
D,s
t ≤ λti
P i − b∗ti if λD,st > λti
(5.47)
where the threshold prices λti and λti are defined as:
λti = 2c
q
i (q
∗
ti + b
∗
ti) + c
l
i ; λti = 2c
q
iP i + c
l
i (5.48)
and θB,sti is the parameter defined in equation (5.43). Thus, to demonstrate the optimality if bid
function (5.47), it is sufficient to prove that pM,s∗ti ≡ ps∗ti = max{q∗ti, ρB,sti }. We verify this equivalence
for the three cases of expression (5.47) (Figure (5.3):
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(a) If, for some k ∈ S, λD,kt ≤ λti then θB,kti ≤ q∗ti ≤ P i − bti and, by definition (5.42), ρB,kti =
max{θB,kti , [P i− b∗ti]+}, which will always be less than or equal to q∗ti. Then, we can write that
pk∗ti = max{q∗ti, ρB,kti } = q∗ti and, as expression 5.47 gives pM,k∗ti = q∗ti, we can conclude that
pM,k∗ti = p
k∗
ti .
(b) If, for some l ∈ S, λti < λD,lt ≤ λti then [P i− bti]+ ≤ q∗ti < θB,lti ≤ (P i− b∗ti) and, by definition
(5.42) ρB,lti = θ
B,l
ti . Then, p
l∗
ti = max{q∗ti, ρb,lti = θB,lti ≥ q∗ti} = θB,lti . As expression 5.47 gives
pM,l∗ti = θ
B,l
ti , we can conclude that p
M,l∗
ti = p
l∗
ti .
(c) If, for some r ∈ S, λD,rt > λti then θB,rti > (P i−b∗ti) which, together with definition (5.42), sets
ρB,rti = (P i − b∗ti) and thus pr∗ti = max{q∗ti, ρB,rti = (P i − b∗ti) > q∗ti} = (P i − b∗ti). As expression
5.47 gives pM,r∗ti = (P i − b∗ti), we can conclude that pM,l∗ti = pr∗ti .
Now the case with linear generation costs will be considered. If cqi = 0, the bid function 5.46
reduces to:
λb∗ti (p
b
ti, q
∗
ti, b
∗
ti) =
0 if pbti ≤ q∗ticli if q∗ti < pbti ≤ (P i − b∗ti)
and the optimal matched energy function associated with this optimal bid function is:
pM∗ti (λ
D
t ) =
q∗ti if λDt ≤ cliP i − b∗ti if λDt > cli (5.49)
it is straightforward to see that this expression (5.49) is equivalent to expression (5.45) and then
pM,s∗ti ≡ ps∗ti .
5.5 Computational Results
In this section the set of computational tests that have been performed in order to validate the
described model and its results are presented. The instances used in the test have a pool of bilateral
contracts with 300MWh committed for each interval, a set of 3 futures contracts with 700MWh
committed, 9 thermal units (see Table A.1) and 24 hourly intervals.
As it has been explained, this model is a mixed-integer quadratic program which is difficult to
solve efficiently, especially for large-scale instances. It is possible to approximate the quadratic
objective function by means of perspective cuts, so that this problem can be approximated by a
mixed-integer linear program (MILP) and the available efficient general-purpose MILP solvers can
be applied, leading to good quality solutions in a relatively short amount of time (Frangioni and
Gentile, 2006).
The model has been implemented and solved in CPLEX with 12.0 (2008) using the ad-hoc imple-
mentation of the perspective cuts algorithm (Mijangos et al., 2010). It has been solved using a
SunFire X2200 with 32 Gb of RAM memory and two dual core processors AMD Opteron 2222 at
3 GHz.
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|S| c.v. b.v. CPU(s) Objective function ‖xs−x200‖‖x200‖
25 13680 240 168 103371000 1.008
50 25680 240 730 102203000 0.940
75 37680 240 1575 102053000 0.365
100 49680 240 3664 102014000 0.365
125 61680 240 5960 101992000 0.365
150 73680 240 10205 101912000 0.365
175 85680 240 11357 101887000 0.365
200 97680 240 15141 101803000
|T | = 24; |I| = 9
Table 5.1: Optimization characteristics of the study cases and results for different number of scenarios.
Objective function
RP 10205300 e
EEV 10318400 e
VSS 113100 e
Table 5.2: Stochastic Programming Indicators
5.5.1 Scenario Set
For this model we use the set of scenarios created from the TSFA based model (Section 3.4.2).
As we have done in Chapter 4, we will increase the number of scenarios until the stabilization of
the objective function optimal value. The original tree has 300 scenarios that have been reduced
to sets of 200, 175, 150, 100, 75, 50 and 25 scenarios. In Table 5.1 the main parameters of each
test are summarized: number of scenarios (S), number of continuous variables (c.v.), number of
binary variables (b.v.), CPU time in seconds (CPU(s)), the value of the objective function (e)),
and the difference in the first stage variables value between the reduced set and the one with 200
scenarios, given as a fraction of unit (‖x
s−x200‖
‖x200‖ where x
s = [q∗, u∗]′ ∀s ∈ S). The value of the
objective function only considers the benefit from the day-ahead market (terms (5.10) and (5.11)),
ignoring the constant FC and BC incomes (5.9). As in Chapter 4, it is observed how the CPU
time increases with the number of scenarios and that the value of the objective function stabilizes
when the number of scenarios grows (Figure 5.4(a)). There is also a convergence of the difference
in the optimal value of the first stage decision variables between each reduced set and the largest
one (Figure 5.4(b)). Both values converge from approximately 75 scenarios and the computational
time is acceptable. Once again, an increase in the number of scenarios from 75 to 100 does not
improve the optimal solution accuracy enough to justify the increase in CPU time. Therefore 75
will be the selected number of scenarios for the computational tests.
5.5.2 Case Study
In the computational tests, the status of the units before the first interval is fixed as all open,
allowing them to be closed or remain opened at hour 1; this is done in order to give more freedom
to the unit commitment.
In Table 5.2 there are the stochastic programming indicators (see Section 7.2) and it is shown the
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Figure 5.6: Settlement of the bilateral contracts (b∗ti).
benefits obtained by using stochastic programming. In an equivalent way to Figure 4.6, Figure
5.5(a) shows the optimal value of variable f∗tij , thus the optimal economic dispatch of each FC.
In this case study, the three physical contracts considered are: 200MWh in a weekly contract,
250MWh in a monthly contract and 250MWh in a yearly contract. The main difference with the
model from only FCs is that in this case it is essential to study both the FCs and the BCs together
because their economic dispatch is closely related (Figure 5.6). Notice that the main difference
between the FCs and the BCs is in their inclusion in the DAM bid but not in their economic
dispatch. In this aspect, there is a slight difference in the fact that the economic dispatch requires
FCs to be settled by a determined set of variables, in contrast to the BCs, which could be settled
by any committed unit. Therefore, in the valley hours, each contract is covered by the cheapest
unit in the UCP but, at the same time, those units will also try to cover the portfolio of BCs.
See, for instance unit 3, where nearly half of the yearly FC contracts are settled by the unit in the
exclusively FC model, in this model, however, the unit also participates in covering BCs, which
makes it necessary for unit 7 to participate covering the FCs. As in the previous case study, the
peak hours cause more variability of units behaviors. This is caused because of GenCo’s interest
in sending its maximum capacity to the DAM in order to maximize its benefits.
Figure 5.5(b) shows variables q∗ti and b
∗
ti: the instrumental price bid energy and the quantity
committed to bilateral contracts for each unit and interval. It is interesting to see how the units
change the quantity committed to BCs (orange area), depending on the hour and the unit cost.
It is important to remember that the quantity committed to BCs changes the maximum capacity
that the unit can bid to the market and therefore the benefits that it can obtain. In this figure the
unit commitment is also represented. If the unit does not bid its minimum capacity to the market,
it means that the unit is shut down in this interval.
Finally, to illustrate different situations concerning the bid strategy, two bid curves are represented
in Figure 5.7. In Figure 5.7(a), the optimal bid curve is shown for thermal unit 1 at interval 23. It
can be seen that, in this case, b∗23,1 = 80 is lower than the minimum capacity. Thus, the instrumental
price bid must be at least the minimum capacity minus this quantity that is committed to BCs.
In this case, the instrumental price bid quantity q∗23,1 = 179. In the other case, Figure 5.7(b),
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Figure 5.7: Bidding curve for (a) unit 1 at interval 23 and (b) unit 6 at interval 18.
the optimal bid curve of unit 6 at interval 18 is represented. Contrary to the previous case, the
quantity committed to bilateral contracts is more than the minimum capacity (b∗18,6 = 86); so, the
instrumental price bid quantity is forced, by the coverage of the FCs, to be greater than 0.
5.6 Conclusions
This chapter has presented a mixed-integer stochastic programming model for the integration of the
physical futures and classical bilateral contracts into the day-ahead bidding problem of a GenCo
operating in the MIBEL.
The rules for the integration of the BCs in the DAM process have been described and their rela-
tionship with FC coverage and the optimal bid curve, together with the matched energy function,
are derived. The optimal solution of our model determines not only the operation of the units (unit
commitment), but the quantity that must be used to cover the BCs and the quantity that must be
sent to the DAM at zero price. The model explicitly follows the MIBEL regulation.
It has been shown through KKT conditions that the optimal value of the decision variables corre-
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sponds to the theoretical optimal bidding curve for a price-taker producer.
The computational tests were performed using real data on the thermal units of a price-taker
producer operating in the MIBEL. They have validated the model and provide suitable results.
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CHAPTER 6
DAMB: Multimarket Problem
Introduction
This chapter presents the final considered approach to the day-ahead short-term strategies of a
GenCo. The models that coordinate the futures and bilateral contracts with the day-ahead mar-
ket bidding process are have been presented, but as we mentioned in Section 2.1 the short-term
electricity market is made up of a sequence of markets, that is, it is a multimarket enviroment. In
this chapter, in order to improve the DAM bidding strategies, the possibilities that this framework
provides are developed.
As was presented in Section 2.1, the case of the MIBEL sequence of short-term electricity mar-
kets includes, among others: a day-ahead market, an ancillary service market or secondary reserve
market (henceforth reserve market), and a set of six intraday markets. The other smaller mech-
anisms, as real time operation or primary and tertiary reserve market are not taken into account
because they are not related directly with the DAM bidding process; thus, its optimization can be
considered as a real-time optimization matter.
It is supposed that the GenCos that participate in the electricity market could increase their benefits
by jointly optimizing their participation in this sequence of electricity markets. Specifically, the
DAM bidding strategies cannot be independent of the expected benefits obtained from the next
markets, as the decisions taken in the DAM affect the results of the remaining short-term markets.
Thus, the GenCos’ objective of the generators in the short-term framework is to maximize their
expected profits from participation in the day-ahead market, the reserve market and the intraday
market. Moreover, the GenCo has to continue taking into account its bilateral contracts and the
result of its participation in the derivatives physical markets.
The main objective of this chapter is to build a model that gives the GenCo the optimal bidding
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strategy for the DAM, which considers the benefits and costs of participating in the next markets
and which includes both physical futures contracts and bilateral contracts.
This chapter is organized as follows: in Section 6.1, the main works published in this area are
analyzed. Sections 6.2 and 6.3 present the stochastic programming model for the optimization of
the day-ahead market bidding, taking into account the short-term market sequence. Finally, in
Section 6.4 the first computational experiments done are presented and in Section 6.5 the first
conclusions are presented.
6.1 Literature Review
The optimal multimarket bidding problem has not been studied as much as the day-ahead bidding
problem and there are few research groups that have confronted this problem with stochastic
techniques. The work of Plazas et al. (2005) is one of the first works that defines a bidding strategy
for a GenCo participating in a sequence of three short-term markets. In this strategy, the unit
commitment is considered known, but it is possible to engage a unit in the automatic generation
control market. Notice that this is not possible in the MIBEL. They build three models that
are solved successively for obtaining bidding strategies for each market, considering the expected
benefits of the next markets. The work of Triki et al. (2005) considers a multistage stochastic model
to decide the unit commitment and the capacity allocation in each market but without any bidding
strategy. Furthermore, Ugedo et al. (2006) propose a stochastic model for obtaining the bid curve
to be submitted in each market. The bidding strategies are obtained based on residual-demand
curves, which represents the influence of generation offers on the clearing price. The most recent
contribution, Musmanno et al. (2009), can be consider as an extension of Triki et al. (2005), where
a risk aversion tool is added together with the satisfaction of the committed bilateral contracts.
This work has many points in common with our approach, such as defining the economic dispatch
for the BCs and considering how to include the dispatch into the DAM bid. It also includes the
possibility of buying energy on the intraday markets. But there are also some differences. On the
one hand, we modeled the markets according to the specific characteristics of MIBEL regulation, for
example, the order in which the markets are cleared is different. On the other hand, our approach
takes into account two medium-term products, BCs and FCs. A preliminary version of the model
presented in the next sections has been published in Corchero and Heredia (2010).
6.2 Basic Concepts
Section 2.1 presented the sequence structure of short-term markets existing in the MIBEL. As we
have introduced, in this model only the secondary reserve and the intraday markets are included.
They are cleared sequentially after the DAM, as is shown in Figure 6.1. To summarize, the main
characteristics of these two market processes are the following (for a detailed explanation see Sec.
2.1.6 and 2.1.5):
• Reserve market: takes place after the DAM matching process. It is an ancillary service
market where the participants send bids to increase or decrease the matched energy of the
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Figure 6.1: Sequence of bidding process and market application.
units in the DAM. If a bid is matched in the RM then the unit must be available to change
its generation level in a given time interval during real-time operation. For this reason, the
units that participate in this market must have some specific operational characteristics that
allows them to increase or decrease the generation level in a given time interval.
• Intraday market: takes place just before and during the delivery day. It is composed of 6
consecutive markets. In these markets the GenCos can either send or buy electricity, that is,
they can participate as buyers or sellers of energy. It works exactly as the DAM does and is
used by the GenCos to change the DAM, resulting in generation scheduling. It is important
to remark that at a given session and hour a unit can only submit buy or sell offers, not both;
but at different hours this role can change. One unit can participate in these markets either
if its bids have been matched in the DAM or if it is producing energy to settle BCs.
This set of markets that are sequentially cleared leads to a multistage stochastic programming
situation (see Section 2.2.2). The multistage stochastic programming models are characterized by
a set of temporary consecutive decisions each one depending on the realization of a random variable.
In our case, the random variables are the price of each of the markets involved in the model. In
the following sections these prices are analyzed and a set of scenarios is built.
Thus, both the decision variables and the data have to be defined depending on the stage where
they take place and it is very important to carefully model the relationship between these variables
and stages. Specifically, the reserve decision variables must be fixed depending on the DAM price
scenario, because in the real market, the GenCo decides the reserve quantity bid once the DAM
price is known. The same occurs in the case of the intraday market. When the GenCo has to
decide the energy that will be bid to the intraday market, it knows the quantity and price cleared
in the DAM and the RM. Thus, in the model, the IM decision variables must be fixed depending
on the DAM and RM scenario. This situation is traditionally modeled through a scenario tree
as is represented in Figure 6.2, where λD = {λD1..λDSd} is the set of Sd DAM scenario prices,
λR = {λR1..λDSr} is the set of Sr RM scenario prices and λI = {λI1..λDSi} is the set of Si IM
scenario prices. There will be one set of decision variables for each branch of the tree. For this first
approach we will assume some hypothesis about the RM and IM. First, we suppose that all the
units in our model are capable of changing their production according to the requirements of the
ISO, which means all the available units can participate in the RM. Second, we also suppose that if
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Figure 6.2: Representation of an scenario tree for the sequence of DAM, RM and IM.
the GenCo participates in the RM, then it will always bid the automatic generation control (AGC)
capacity of the unit. The AGC capacity is an operational characteristic of each unit that indicates
the quantity that the unit is able to increase or decrease in a given time. Thus, in our model the
quantity submitted to the reserve market is not optimized but is always equal to the AGC capacity.
We will optimize whether or not to participate in the RM. This hypothesis follows the real behavior
of some GenCos observed in the MIBEL. Moreover, we work only with the first IM session. This is
the session in which the greater part of the energy is negotiated and, therefore, the one that most
affects the GenCo’s generation scheduling. Finally, we suppose that all the energy that is bid to
the RM or the IM will be matched. This can be easily forced by some bidding strategies, but this
point is not dealt with in this work. These hypotheses do not limit the correct representation of
the MIBEL’s market sequence and they can be easily changed or adapted to different situations.
6.3 Model Description
As in previous chapters, the model is built for a price-taker GenCo owning a set of thermal gener-
ation units I (see Appendix A Table A.1).
6.3.1 Variables
For every time period t ∈ T and thermal unit i ∈ I, the first stage variables of the stochastic
programming problem are:
• The unit commitment variables: uti ∈ {0, 1}, cuti, cdti
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• The instrumental price offer bid variables: qti.
• The scheduled energy for futures contract j variables: ftij .
• The scheduled energy for bilateral contract variables: bti.
and the second and third stage variables associated with each scenario s ∈ S are:
• Total generation: gsti
• Matched energy in the day-ahead market: psti
• Reserve market related variables: rsti
• Intraday market related variable: msti
Note that including the markets sequence and the BCs in the model implies, once again, that we
have to introduce the total generation of the unit, gsti in order to correctly value the production
costs. It is important not to confuse this variable with the one representing the matched energy,
psti, i.e., the energy that will be remunerated at market clearing price.
The model presented in this chapter was developed with the second formulation of the unit com-
mitment expressed by equations (2.13)-(2.20), which formulate the relation of the variables uti, cuti
and cdti with the minimum start-up and shut-down times and initial state of the thermal generation
units.
6.3.2 FCs and BCs Covering Constraints
The bilateral and futures contracts have the same characteristics and follow the same rules as in
the previous chapters (see, for instance, Sec. 2.1.2, 2.1.3 and 2.1.4).
Both the physical future and bilateral contracts coverage must be guaranteed (see Sec. 5.3.2):∑
i∈Ij
ftij = LFj ∀j ∈ F, ∀t ∈ T (6.1)∑
i∈I
bti =
∑
j∈B
LBj ∀t ∈ T (6.2)
ftij ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ F, ∀i ∈ I, ∀t ∈ T (6.3)
0 ≤ bti ≤ P iuti ∀i ∈ I, ∀t ∈ T (6.4)
6.3.3 Reserve Market Constraints
As has been explained previously, our model for the RM assumes that if the unit bids to the RM,
it will bid its fixed AGC capacity, %i(MW). In this framework, the only decision to be optimized is
whether the unit participates in the RM or not.
It is known that a unit can only use its AGC capacity if its generation level is constant; in other
words, the unit is not increasing or decreasing its production in the corresponding interval or,
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equivalently, that the production level gsti has not changed between two consecutive intervals. For
all intents and purposes, the GenCo delegates its ramping capacity to the ISO.
The binary variable rsti is introduced to trace this situation, being that r
s
ti = 1 whenever g
s
ti = g
s
(t−1),i
and rsti = 0 otherwise.
gsti − gs(t−1),i ≤ (1− rsti)R ∀i ∈ I, ∀t ∈ T, ∀s ∈ S (6.5)
gsti − gs(t−1),i ≥ (1− rsti)(−R) ∀i ∈ I, ∀t ∈ T, ∀s ∈ S (6.6)
6.3.4 Matched Energy Constraints
The MIBEL’s rules affecting the day-ahead market establishes a given relation between the variables
representing the energy of the bilateral contracts bti, the energy of the future contracts ftij , the
instrumental price offer bid qti and the matched energy psti. This relation can be formulated by
means of the following set of constraints:
psti ≤ P iuti − bti ∀i ∈ I, ∀t ∈ T, ∀s ∈ S (6.7)
psti ≥ qti ∀i ∈ Ut, ∀t ∈ T, ∀s ∈ S (6.8)
qti ≥ P iuti − bti ∀i ∈ I, ∀t ∈ T (6.9)
qti ≥
∑
j|i∈Ij
ftij ∀i ∈ I, ∀t ∈ T (6.10)
where:
• (6.7) and (6.8) ensures that if a unit is on, the matched energy psti will be between the
instrumental price bid qti and the total available energy not allocated to a BC.
• (6.9) and (6.10) guarantee respectively that the instrumental price bid will be not less than
the minimum generation output of the unit if it is on, and that the contribution of the unit
to the FC coverage will be included in the instrumental price bid.
6.3.5 Total Generation and Intraday Market Constraints
Finally, the total generation level of a given unit i, gsti, is defined as the addition of the allocated
energy to the BC, plus the matched energy of all the markets considered (DAM, RM and IM).
As we have introduced, our model considers the possibility of either selling or buying energy in
the IM. The free variable msti represents, if positive, the energy of a sell offer while, if negative
corresponds to the energy of a buy bid. The model ensures that msti is equal from 0 if the unit
i is off and that it can be different to 0 if the unit i bids to the DAM or commits its generation
to BCs (6.11). Notice that the variable msti will be positive if we produce the energy to sell it to
the IM, and then will be added to the total generation level; the opposite will be the case and it
will be negative if we buy the energy in the IM, where the quantity will be subtracted to the total
generation level.
gsti = bti + p
s
ti +m
s
ti ∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ I, ∀s ∈ S (6.11)
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The total generation must remain between the operational limits P i and P i. But if we participate
in the RM, the total generation limits change because of the energy that we must reserve in order
to be able to produce it at the moment that the ISO requests:
P iuti + %ir
s
it ≤ gsti ≤ P iuti − %irsit ∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ I, ∀s ∈ S (6.12)
And finally, if unit i is off, it cannot be offered to the reserve market:
rsti ≤ uti ∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ I, ∀s ∈ S (6.13)
6.3.6 Nonanticipativity Constraints
As we have mentioned, it is necessary to control the variables through the scenario tree and this
is classically done by the so called nonanticipativity constraints (see Section 2.2.2). The first stage
variables are replicated for each of the s scenarios and those constraints ensure that if we approach
it from the same previous stage scenario, the value of the decision variables will be identical. Those
constraints are as follows:
gsti = g
sˆ
ti ∀s, sˆ : (λDs = λDsˆ), ∀t ∈ T (6.14)
rsti = r
sˆ
ti ∀s, sˆ : ((λDs, λRs) = (λDsˆ, λRsˆ)), ∀t ∈ T (6.15)
where (6.14) models the nonanticipativity constraints for the DAM and (6.15) models the nonan-
ticipativity constraints for the RM.
6.3.7 Objective Function
For each thermal unit i at time interval t the quadratic costs are associated to the total generation.
Taking into account the start-up and shut-down costs, the quadratic costs are:
Cti = cuti + c
d
ti + c
b
tuti + c
l
tgti + c
q
t (g
2
ti)
And the quadratic function for scenario s that represents the expected benefits of the GenCo
after participation in the DAM, taking into account the overall multimarket, futures and bilateral
contracts expected benefits are:
EλD,R,I
[
B(g, p,m, r, u, cu, cd)
]
=
=
∑
t∈T
∑
j∈F
(λFj − λDi )LFj +
∑
j∈B
λBj L
B
j
− (6.16)
−
∑
t∈T
∑
i∈I
[cuti + c
d
ti + c
b
iuti]+ (6.17)
+
∑
t∈T
∑
i∈I
∑
s∈S
P s
[
λD,st p
s
ti + λ
R,s
t %ir
s
ti + λ
I,s
t m
s
ti−
−(cligsti + cqi (gsit)2)
]
(6.18)
94 CHAPTER 6. DAMB: MULTIMARKET PROBLEM
where, equivalently to the previous models:
(6.16) corresponds to the incomes of the FCs and the BCs and is a constant term.
(6.17) is the on/off fixed cost of the unit commitment of the thermal units, deterministic and inde-
pendent of the realization of the random variable λDt .
(6.18) represents the expected value of the benefits from the DAM, the RM and the IM. The first
term, λD,st p
s
ti, computes the incomes from the DAM based on a value p
s
ti of the matched
energy. The second term, λR,st %ir
s
ti computes the incomes from bidding the AGC capacity
to the RM. The third term, λI,st m
s
ti computes the incomes or costs from the IM, depending
on the sign of msti. Finally, the term between brackets corresponds to the expression of the
quadratic generation costs with respect to the total generation of the unit, gsti.
Then, the objective function f(x) to be minimized in our model is:
f(g, p, r,m, u, cu, cd) =
∑
i∈I
∑
t∈T
(
cuti + c
d
ti + c
b
iuti+
∑
s∈S
P s
[
clig
s
ti + c
q
i (g
s
ti)
2 − (λD,st psti)− (λR,st rsti%i)− (λI,st msti)
])
(6.19)
where λD,st , λ
R,s
t , λ
I,s
t are the price scenarios for the t
th day-ahead, reserve or intraday market
respectively.
6.3.8 Day-Ahead Market Bidding with Futures and Bilateral Contracts in a
Multimarket Environment
The final day-ahead market bidding with bilateral and futures contracts in a multimarket environ-
ment model (DAMB-FBC-M) developed in the previous sections is:
(DAMB-FBC-M)

min f(g, p, r,m, u, cu, cd)
s.t.
Eq. (6.1)− (6.4) BC and FC covering
Eq. (6.5)− (6.6) Reserve market constraints
Eq. (6.7)− (6.10) Day-ahead market constraints
Eq. (6.11)− (6.13) Total generation
Eq. (2.13)− (2.20) Unit commitment
(6.20)
This program corresponds to a mixed linearly constrained minimization problem with a convex
quadratic objective function that includes a well-defined global optimal solution.
6.4 Numerical Examples
In this section, the descriptive statistics of the RM and IM hourly prices are presented along with
the scenarios set generation and, finally, the case study for the DAMB-FBC-M problem.
6.4. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES 95
The model has been implemented and solved in CPLEX with 12.0 (2008) using the ad-hoc imple-
mentation of the perspective cuts algorithm (Frangioni and Gentile, 2006) described in Mijangos
et al. (2010). It has been solved using a SunFire X2200 with 32 Gb of RAM memory and two dual
core processors AMD Opteron 2222 at 3 GHz.
6.4.1 Reserve and Intraday Electricity Market Prices
Chapter 3 presented a deep study of the Spanish DAM prices. However for the validation of the
DAMB-FBC-M problem, it is necessary to also study the reserve and intraday electricity market
prices. Those two prices have very different behaviors and must be analyzed independently.
6.4.1.1 Reserve Market Electricity Prices
As has been explained (see Section 2.1.6), the RM prices are not the price at which the energy
production is paid but the price at which the reservation of a given level of energy is paid. In
other words, the market pays the GenCo for delegating its ramping capacity to the ISO. Daily,
the quantity of ramping capacity that the system needs is published. This quantity is known in
advance and it can be used by the GenCos to decide how to manage their RM bid. Thus, the RM
clearing price is related more to this required energy than to the expected load or the DAM prices.
Figure 6.3 shows the hourly reserve market price for the first three years of the MIBEL. Some
extreme outliers have been eliminated from the sample (λR > 10). In those figures, it is not easy to
see how they differ from the DAM price; but if we zoom in to a week, we can see in Figure 6.4(a)
that the RM prices over a week do not have any particular pattern. The same is observed in Figure
6.4(b): the hourly prices over a day do not follow a determined pattern. It can also be observed
that the variability of the RM prices is lower than that of the DAM prices. These conclusions are
corroborated by the low correlation existing between DAM and RM prices (ρ2008 = 0.138).
6.4.1.2 Intraday Electricity Prices
Contrary to the case of the RM, the intraday market has the same structure and clearing process
as the DAM and the price corresponds to the quantity that the market pays to the GenCo for its
production. The main difference between this market and the DAM is that the GenCos can partic-
ipate as purchase or sell agents but not both simultaneously. Figure 6.5 shows the hourly clearing
price for the first intraday market. If those figures are compared to Figure 3.1, the relationship
is obvious; in fact, they seem to be identical. The IM prices are highly correlated with the DAM
prices (ρ2008 = 0.957) and they have the same daily and weekly pattern.
6.4.2 Scenario Set
As we have introduced in Section 3.4, the generation of a multistage tree is a problem that has
been widely studied (see, for instance, Heitsch and Ro¨misch (2009)). For this first approach,
all the available historical data of the sequence of market prices has been reduced in order to
obtain suitable scenario sets. Initially, all the instances are equiprobable and, after applying the
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Figure 6.3: RM hourly prices.
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Figure 6.4: (a) MIBEL RM price over one week. (b) Hourly RM price for the working days of a week.
|S| c.v. b.v. CPU(s) Objective function ‖xs−x180‖‖x180‖
25 19680 6240 612 89230500 1,000
50 37680 12240 3093 88268300 0,001
75 55680 18240 12316 88624200 0,002
100 73680 24240 25728 88177400 0,001
120 88080 29040 32570 88209200 0,001
140 102480 33840 60030 88318100 0,002
160 116880 38640 74865 88298800 0,002
180 131280 43440 93532 88209200
|T | = 24; |I| = 9
Table 6.1: Optimization characteristics of the cases studies and results for different number of scenarios.
reduction algorithm (Gro¨we-Kuska et al., 2003), the different subsets of scenarios and the respective
probabilities are obtained. The main computational characteristics for each reduced set of scenarios
are in Table 6.1. It can be observed (see Figure 6.6) that the objective function is nearly stable
after 50 scenarios. Considering the computational burden introduced by the increase of second
stage binary variables as the number of scenarios grows, we conclude that 50 scenarios retain
enough information to obtain suitable results.
6.4.3 Case Study
As in previous chapters, a set of computational tests has been performed in order to validate the
proposed model. The instances used in the test have 9 thermal units (see Table A.1, Appendix A).
One of the objectives of the tests is to study the influence of the sequence of markets in the DAM
bid. As it has been explained, the DAM bid of the GenCo will be fixed by the quantity committed
to bilateral contracts, that will be excluded from the DAM bid, and the quantity committed to
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Figure 6.5: IM hourly prices.
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Figure 6.6: (a) Expected benefits for each reduced set of scenarios. (b) First-stage variable convergence
evaluated as ‖x
s−x180‖
‖x180‖ .
futures contracts, which must be bid at the instrumental price. Thus, we focus on the two variables
that represent these quantities in order to study its optimal value when taking into account, or not,
the sequence of markets.
The economic dispatch of each physical futures contract among the units that participate in it is
represented in Figure 6.7. Differences can be observed between the optimal values by taking into
account the sequence of markets (Figure 6.7(a)) or not (Figure 6.7(b)). In the monthly contract,
for example, unit 4 settles the greater part of the contract in some intervals when the sequence of
markets is included. On the other hand, in the case of the optimal value without the sequence of
markets included, the settlement of the monthly contract is distributed among the four units that
participate in it during the same intervals.
The other important variable is one that represents the energy submitted to bilateral contracts,
because this energy will be excluded from the market bidding process. Figure 6.8 represents the
economic dispatch of the bilateral contracts, i.e., the quantity each unit commits to the bilateral
contracts for each interval t, and the quantity to cover the futures contracts. It can be also observed
the big differences among the optimal economic dispatch if we include the RM and the IM in the
optimization model (Figure 6.8(a)) or not (Figure 6.8(b)). On the one hand, if a unit participates
into the RM market, it must reserve a part of its participation and thus cannot use it to cover
the medium-term products (see, for instance, Unit 2 at intervals 3, 7 or 8). On the other hand,
they could buy or sell energy into the IM, and this can change the settlement of the medium-term
products. Those differences will lead to different offer curves for each unit and interval.
At last, we will study the behavior of the GenCo in the IM. As has been introduced, the GenCo
can submit either purchase or sell bids. This is controlled by the decision variable msti. m
s
ti > 0
means that the GenCo sells this energy and msti < 0 the GenCo buys energy in the IM. During one
fixed hour the GenCo can act only as a selling or buying agent, but not both. However, throughout
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Figure 6.7: Economic dispatch of each futures contracts, ftij . (a) Taking into account market sequence (b)
With the DAM only.
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Figure 6.8: Economic dispatch of bilateral and futures contract, bti and qti . (a) Taking into account
market sequence (b) With the DAM only.
6.5. CONCLUSION 101
(a)
Hour
En
er
gy
(x1
00
0k
W
h)
5 10 15 20
−
40
0
40
(b)
Hour
En
er
gy
(x1
00
0k
W
h)
5 10 15 20
−
40
0
40
Figure 6.9: Energy send to the IM by (a) Unit 1 and (b) Unit 3 in two different scenarios.
one day it can change as many times as necessary. Figure 6.9 represents the bidding energy for
two units throughout one day at two different scenarios. It can be observed that, depending on the
hour, the GenCo either buys or sells energy, or it does not participate in the IM, these decisions
are related with both the intraday and the day-ahead prices.
6.5 Conclusion
This work has developed a new linear mixed-integer stochastic programming model, to assist to
the optimization of the day-ahead bid with futures and bilateral contracts taking into account the
reserve and the intraday market.
The optimal solution of our model determines the optimal instrumental price bidding strategy and
the optimal economic dispatch for the BCs and the committed FCs for each hour. The model
maximizes the expected benefits of the sequence of electric markets while satisfying the thermal
operational constraints and the MIBEL’s rules. The results of the computational tests validate the
model and show the influence of market sequence on the optimal bidding strategy of the GenCo, as
well as the short-sight effect of optimizing the DAM bid without taking into account the possibilities
of the next markets.
Our approach does not cover important topics which are included in our future research, such as
the modeling of the sequence of market prices and and a more elaborated construction of a scenario
tree that correctly reflects the three random variables involved in the three prices (DAM,RM and
IM). Moreover, our aim will be to obtain a bidding curve for each unit, as the OM requires. This
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point has not been achieved in this first approximation of the model, but it is one of the main
subjects for future research in this field.
CHAPTER 7
DAMB: Other Extensions
Introduction
In this chapter, two new approaches to the Day-Ahead Market bidding problem are presented. It is
important to remark that, despite the fact they are presented last, they were built at the beginning
of this work. At this time, we had not yet studied yet the optimal conditions of the models and
their relationship with the theoretical definitions of the matched energy; therefore and our models
contained a set of constraints that explicitly forced the optimal value of the decision variables to
be equal to the theoretical definition.
We include the description of these two models because, despite its previous approaches, they
exemplify two applications of our price-taker bidding strategies in other important and interesting
cases, such as combined cycle units or generic programming units.
As we have indicated in the introduction, the models presented in this chapter were made in
collaboration with Marcos J. Rider. The material presented in this chapter is based on the papers
Heredia et al. (2010) and Heredia et al. (2009).
This chapter is organized as follows: in Section 7.1 the DAMB problem for thermal and combined
cycle units is presented, taking into account a portfolio of bilateral contracts. Section 7.2 describes
the DAMB problem for a price-taker GenCo that has VPP rights (see 2.1.4.1). The optimal bidding
strategies for the generic programming units are presented as well.
7.1 DAMB: Thermal and Combined Cycle Units
In this section, a stochastic mixed-integer quadratic programming model for a price-taker GenCo
with BC obligations is developed for for determining as optimal bidding strategy in the DAM for
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2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Hydro 22.598 38.874 29.777 19.170 24.761 26.381 21.428 23.862
Nuclear 63.016 61.875 63.606 57.539 60.184 55.046 58.973 52.761
Coal 78.768 72.249 76.358 77.393 66.143 71.846 46.275 33.862
Fuel 16.474 8.027 7.697 10.013 5.841 2.384 2.378 2.082
CC 5.308 14.991 28.974 48.840 63.561 68.304 91.286 78.279
Subtotal 186.164 196.016 206.412 212.955 220.490 223.962 220341 190.845
Self-consumption -8.420 -8.162 -8.649 -9.080 -8.719 -8.655 -8.338 -7.122
Cogeneration
and renewables 35.401 41.412 45.868 50.365 49.904 55.754 66.298 80.888
Total 213.145 229.266 243.631 254.240 261.675 271.061 278.301 264.612
Table 7.1: Generation of electricity in the Spanish electricity system (GWh).
thermal and combined cycle (CC) units while observing the MIBEL regulation.
There are many reasons to study the inclusion of the combined cycle units in the short-term bidding
strategies of a GenCo. One important reason is that the CC units represent the majority of the
new generating unit installations across the globe. Their main advantages are:
• High efficiency (can reach 60%, which is a 20–30% improvement over that of the traditional
single-cycle thermal plants).
• Fast response (can be quite instrumental in facing rapid fluctuations in power markets), very
useful nowadays for complementing renewable energies such as wind power.
• Environmental friendliness (the CO2 production of a natural gas fueled CC plant is much
lower than that of other fossil-fueled turbine technologies).
• Compact and shorter installation time.
In the Spanish Peninsular Electricity System, the first combined cycle units started generating
in 2002. On December 31, 2009, the total installed capacity was 93.729 MW. This capacity has
increased by 33.910 MW since 2002. The increase is chiefly attributed to the commissioning of
new CCs, cogeneration, and renewable power plants, most of which comprised the wind power.
Currently, the installed capacity of CC units represents 25% of the total installed capacity. Also,
the total net generation in the Spanish Peninsular Electricity System is 264 TWh, with 13% from
coal plants, 30% from CC plants, 31% from cogeneration and renewable plants, 20% from nuclear
plants, 9% from hydro plants and 1% from fuel plants (Table 7.1). Notice that the last year both
coal and CC plants presents a decrease in the total generation percentage. This is because of the
increase in the renewable plants, specifically wind power, which mostly affect these two technologies.
It is necessary to emphasize that, aside from this decrease, CC units have became an important key
for the operating system because of their fast response; i.e. the renewable technologies introduce
a large factor of uncertainty into the stability of the electricity system, so fast response units are
essential for maintaining the generation levels on a very short horizon.
So, a GenCo operating in such a complex market can no longer optimize its medium- and short-
term generation planning decisions without considering the relation between those markets and the
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increasing importance of the emission-free (wind power and hydro-generation) and low-emission
technologies (combined cycle).
Thus, the model developed in this section allows the price-taker GenCo to decide the unit com-
mitment of its thermal and CC programming units, the economic dispatch of the BC among the
programming units, and the optimal bid for thermal and CC units.
7.1.1 Literature Review
In previous chapters there has been a review of the literature related to DAMB and bilateral
contracts (see Sections 2.3.1 and 5.1). So, in this section is a review of literature related to the
combined cycle units and their integration into short-term strategies.
One of the earlier studies (Bjelogrlic, 2000) considered CC units in short-term resource scheduling.
The proposed formulation was based on the assumption that the thermal subsystem of a CC is
modeled through input-output curves that are defined for all configurations and all steam load
ranges. Lu and Shahidehpour (2004) presented a model for calculating the unit commitment of CC
units using dynamic programming and lagrangian relaxation applied to the security-constrained
short-term scheduling problem. Furthermore, Li and Shahidehpour (2005) also presented the price-
based unit commitment problem based on the mixed-integer programming method for a generating
company with thermal, CC, cascaded-hydro, and pumped-storage units.
To our knowledge, none of the earlier publications presented an explicit formulation of the optimal
sale bid of the CC units to the DAM or any considerations about the BC.
7.1.2 Basic Concepts
Consider a price-taker GenCo possessing the set I of thermal units and a set C of CC units (a
combustion turbine and a steam turbine). The set B represents the portfolio of BC duties, with
known energy (LBj ) and price (λ
B
j ) for each BC contract j ∈ B, that must be dispatched at each
time period t ∈ T between the thermal and CC units.
As it was explained in Section 2.1.2 and applied in Chapter 5, the MIBEL’s rules state that
each GenCo must notify the scheduling of the BCs to the market operator. Subsequently, in this
situation, the problem that the GenCo faces is that of maximizing its DAM’s benefits for a given
BC’s committed energy. The objective of this section is to develop the optimal bid function, λoti(p
o
ti),
which gives the price at which the capacity generation must be bid to maximize the benefit from
the pool for a given BC’s committed energy.
As it has been introduced, to respect the MIBEL rules, the total contribution of unit i to the
covering BC must be excluded from the bid. This implies that the bid energy must be upper
bounded by (P i − bti). By assuming the quadratic thermal generation costs, the benefits obtained
from the DAM as a function of the matched energy pM,sti for a given committed BC energy bti,
under scenario s will be:
Bs = λD,st p
M,s
ti −
[
C(pM,sti + bti)
]
(7.1)
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Then, if the GenCo is a price taker and the total contribution of unit i to the covering BC is
excluded from the bid, we will see that the expression:
λoti(p
o
ti, bti) =
 0 if 0 ≤ p
o
ti ≤ [P i − bti]+
2cqi (p
o
ti + bti) + c
l
i if [P i − bti]+ < poti ≤ P i − bti
∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ U (7.2)
with [P i−bti]+ = max{0, P i−bti}, is the optimal bid function of unit i for the DAM at interval t in
the sense that, for any given value bti, if function (7.2) is bid, the matched energy p
M,s
ti corresponding
to any scenario s with market price λD,st , maximizes the DAM benefit function (7.1).
Moreover, the expression of pM,sti will prove to be:
pM,sti =

[P i − bti]+ if θsti ≤ max{P i, bti}
θsti − bti if max{P i, bti} ≤ θsti ≤ P i
P i − bti if θsti ≥ P i
∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ U (7.3)
where θsti =
(
λD,st − cli
)
/2cqi .
Contrary to the previous models presented, in this case the expression of the matched energy (7.3)
will be explicitly introduced through a set of constraints (see Sec. 7.1.3.4).
7.1.3 Model Description
7.1.3.1 Variables
For every time period t ∈ T and programming unit i ∈ U where U is the set of thermal and
combined cycle units, the first stage variables of the stochastic programming problem are:
• The unit commitment binary variables: uti, ati, eti.
• The scheduled energy for bilaterals contract variables: bti.
and the second stage variables associated to each scenario s ∈ S are:
• Matched energy in the day-ahead market: psti.
• Total physical production: gsti.
Aside from these sets of variables, there are a group of auxiliary variables that are needed to model
the correct inclusion of the matched energy into the model. These variables are described in Section
7.1.3.4.
This model was developed with the first formulation approach of the unit commitment for the
thermal units; thus equations (2.10)-(2.12) formulate the inclusion of the variables uti, ati and
eti∀i ∈ I into the model.
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Figure 7.1: Combined cycle unit.
7.1.3.2 Thermal and Combined Cycle Units’ Operation Constraints
With traditional thermal units (single-cycle thermal plants), the fuel (natural gas) and the com-
pressed air are mixed and burnt in a combustion chamber. The energy released during combustion
is used to turn a combustion turbine that drives an electric generator (G1), which produces electric-
ity (Figure 7.1). Air is a relatively non-problematic and inexpensive medium, which can be used in
modern gas turbines. With CC units, the heat (which would otherwise be wasted) is captured from
the exhaust gas of a single-cycle combustion turbine (CT). The hot gas stream is used in the heat
recovery steam generator (HRSG) that is used to turn a steam turbine (ST), which consequently
drives an electric generator (G2) to produce additional electricity.
The CC units represent a combination of combustion and steam turbines within a power plant.
Typically, a CC unit consists of several CTs and an HRSG/ST set. Based on the different com-
binations of CTs and HRSG/ST, a CC unit can operate in multiple states or configurations. The
first two columns of Table 7.2 show the states of a CC unit with a CT and an HRSG/ST considered
in this study. The operational rules of a typical CC unit were formulated by Lu and Shahidehpour
(2004) with the help of the so-called pseudo units (PUs). As the thermal units, the PUs of each
CC unit have their own unique cost characteristics, real power generation limits, minimum on-time
limits, etc., and can be viewed as a special set of non-independent or coupling single thermal units.
Contrary to the model proposed earlier (Lu and Shahidehpour, 2004), where each one of the three
states of the CC unit had its own PU, our formulation only considered two PUs, each associated
with states 1 and 2 of the CC. The on/off state of these two PUs uniquely determined the state of
the CC (see columns 3 and 5 of Table 7.2), and allowed (as will be seen later) a correct model of
the operation for the state 0 without the need of an additional PU.
Let us define Pc, the set of PUs of the CC unit c ∈ C, and P = ∪c∈CPc, the complete set of PUs.
By Pc(j), we denote the PU associated with the state j ∈ {1, 2} of the CC unit c. Thus, U = T ∪P
represents the complete set of units (thermal and pseudo). The on/off state of each thermal and
pseudo units at period t can be represented by the first-stage binary variables uti, i ∈ U . Columns
4 and 6 of Table 7.2 illustrate the relation of the commitment binary variables of the PUs, utPc(1)
and utPc(2), with the state of the associated CC unit.
We can model, analogously to the operational constraints of the thermal units ((2.10)-(2.12)), the
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CC unit with a CT and HRSG/ST
State Composition Pseudounit 1 utPc(1) Pseudounit 2 utPc(2)
0 0CT+0HRSG/ST off 0 off 0
1 1CT+0HRSG/ST on 1 off 0
2 1CT+1HRSG/ST off 0 on 1
Table 7.2: States of the CC unit and its associated pseudo units.
t t+ 1
State 0State 0
State 1State 1
State 2State 2
(0CT+0HRSG/ST)(0CT+0HRSG/ST)
(1CT+0HRSG/ST)(1CT+0HRSG/ST)
(1CT+1HRSG/ST)(1CT+1HRSG/ST)
Figure 7.2: Feasible transitions of the CC unit with a CT and HRSG/ST.
start-up and shut-down process for each PU i ∈ P that has its own minimum up time, toni :
uti − u(t−1)i − eti + ati = 0 ∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ P (7.4)
eti +
min{t+toni ,|T |}∑
j=t
aji ≤ 1 ∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ P (7.5)
uti, eti, ati ∈ {0, 1} ∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ P (7.6)
Each CC unit also has a minimum down time, i.e., once shut down, the CC unit cannot be started
up before tCc periods. Thus, we introduced the auxiliary variables u
C
tc, a
C
tc and e
C
tc to represent the
on/off, shut-down, and start-up state, respectively, of the CC unit c ∈ C. As in the case of the
thermal and pseudo units, the following constraints formulate the minimum down time condition
for the CC units:
uCtc − uC(t−1)c − eCtc + aCtc = 0 ∀t ∈ T, ∀c ∈ C (7.7)
aCtc +
min{t+tCc ,|T |}∑
j=t
eCjc ≤ 1 ∀t ∈ T, ∀c ∈ C (7.8)
uCtc, a
C
tc, e
C
tc ∈ {0, 1} ∀t ∈ T, ∀c ∈ C (7.9)
In fact, variables uCtc, a
C
tc and e
C
tc are not necessary, because they can be expressed in terms of the
binary variables of the PU of Pc with the aid of the feasible transition rules defined in Figure 7.2:
uCtc = utPc(1) + utPc(2) ; e
C
tc = etPc(1) − atPc(2) ; aCtc = atPc(1) − etPc(2)
and, the constraints (7.7) and (7.8) can be re-expressed in terms of the PU variables as:
(utPc(1) + utPc(2))− (u(t−1)Pc(1) + u(t−1)Pc(2))+
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+(atPc(1) − etPC(1))− (etPc(2) − atPC(2)) = 0 ∀i ∈ I, ∀c ∈ C (7.10)
(atPc(1) − etPc(2)) +
min{t+tCc ,|I|}∑
j=t
ejPc(1) − ajPc(2) ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ I, ∀c ∈ C (7.11)
The feasible transition rules (Figure 7.2) impose additional constraints on the operation of the PUs
associated to the same CC unit, c ∈ C. First, the PUs in Pc are mutually exclusive (7.12), i.e., only
one of them can be committed at a given period (a CC can only be in one state simultaneously).
Second, the change of the commitment of the PUs in Pc between periods t and t + 1 are limited
to the feasible transitions depicted in Figure 7.2. These feasible transitions impose that, if the
CC unit c is in state 0 at period t (utPc(1) + utPc(2) = 0), it cannot be in state 2 at period t + 1
(u(t+1)Pc(2) = 0) (7.13). Conversely, if utPc(2) = 1, then u(t+1)Pc(1) + u(t+1)Pc(2) ≥ 1 (7.14). The
following set of constraints formulates the specific operation rules of the CC units:∑
m∈Pc
utm ≤ 1 ∀t ∈ T, ∀c ∈ C (7.12)
u(t+1)Pc(2) ≤ utPc(1) + utPc(2) ∀t ∈ T, ∀c ∈ C (7.13)
utPc(2) ≤ u(t+1)Pc(1) + u(t+1)Pc(2) ∀t ∈ T, ∀c ∈ C (7.14)
7.1.3.3 BCs Covering Constraints
As already has been stated, here we consider that the GenCo has agreed to physically provide the
energy amounts LBj each settlement hour. This energy L
B
j can be provided by any programming
unit U , both thermal and PUs:∑
i∈U
bti =
∑
j∈B
LBj ∀t ∈ T (7.15)
0 ≤ bti ≤ P iuti ∀i ∈ U, ∀t ∈ T (7.16)
where, as in the previous models, the total contribution of the committed unit i to the BC covering
at period t is represented by the variable bti.
7.1.3.4 Matched Energy Constraints
As we have already stated, in this model the matched energy is included in the optimization model
explicitly through a set of constraints. Moreover, it is necessary first to present two results: the
first is the expression of the optimal bid function together with its corresponding matched energy;
the second is an alternative formulation of the matched energy that will ease its modeling.
Theorem 7.1. For a price-taker GenCo with a set of committed BCs operating in the MIBEL, the
expression:
λoti(p
o
ti, bti) =
 0 if 0 ≤ p
o
ti ≤ [P i − bti]+
2cqi (p
o
ti + bti) + c
l
i if [P i − bti]+ < poti ≤ P i − bti
∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ U (7.17)
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with [P i− bti]+ = max{0, P i− bti}, is the optimal bid function of unit i for the DAM at interval t.
Proof. The first block of the optimal bid function λoti(p
o
ti, bti) = 0 for p
o
it ≤ [P i − bti]+ is the
instrumental bid needed to guarantee the covering of the BC contracts and the minimum operation
level.
To observe the optimality of the second part of the bid function, we must maximize the DAM
function (7.1) with respect to the matched energy pM,sti when:
[P i − bti]+ < pM,sti ≤ P i − bti.
The matched energy (7.3) that maximizes the DAM benefit function for scenario s is defined as:
pM,sti = argsuppM,sti
{
Bs | [P i − bti]+ < pM,sti ≤ P i − bti
}
and its value can be obtained using:
pM,sti =

[P i − bti]+ if θsti ≤ max{P i, bti} (a)
θsti − bti if max{P i, bti} ≤ θsti ≤ P i (b)
P i − bti if θsti ≥ P i (c)
i ∈ I, t ∈ T, s ∈ S (7.18)
where θsti =
(
λD,st − cli
)
/2cqi .
Let us now analyze the expression of the matched energy associated with the bid (7.17) for all the
possible values of the clearing market price λD,st . The following three cases can be distinguished:
(a) λD,st ≤ λti; (b) λit ≤ λD,st ≤ λti; (c) λD,st ≥ λti
where λti and λti are the threshold prices:
λti = 2c
q
i
(
[P i − bti]+ + bti
)
+ cli ; λit = 2c
q
iP i + c
l
i
It can be easily observed that these three cases of possible values of the clearing market price
are equivalent to cases (7.18a), (b), and (c), respectively. Regarding these three cases, let us now
observe the expression of the matched energy, which coincides with the optimal matched energy,
pM,sti . For the three cases of equation (7.18):
(a) λD,st ≤ λti: If the market clearing price λD,st is below the minimum non-instrumental bid price
λti, then only the instrumental part of the bid (7.17) is accepted and the matched energy will
be [P i − bti]+,i.e, the same amount as in case (7.18(a)).
(b) λit ≤ λD,st ≤ λti: When the market clearing price λD,st is strictly between the threshold prices,
only the bid energy with a bid price less than or equal to this clearing price will be accepted
(matched). The matched energy obtained from the expression of the optimal bid function in
this case is
[(
λD,st − cli
)
/2cqi
]
− bti, which is the same expression as in case (7.18(b)).
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(c) λD,st ≥ λti: If the market clearing price λD,st is above the maximum bid price λit then the
maximum generation bid (P i−bti) is matched, which is the same amount as in case (7.18(c)).
Subsequently, it has been proved that if the proposed function (7.17) is bid to the day-ahead market,
then the resulting matched energy will maximize the day-ahead benefit function (7.1).
In order to develop a simplified expression of the optimal matched energy pM,sti , we define the
parameter ρsti as:
ρsti =

P i if θsti ≤ P i
θsti if P i < θ
s
ti < P i
P i if θsti ≥ P i
∀i ∈ I, ∀t ∈ T, ∀s ∈ S (7.19)
and can be used to .
Proposition 7.1. The optimal matched energy function (7.3) can be expressed as:
pM,sti = [ρ
s
ti − bti]+ ∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ U (7.20)
with the constant parameter ρsti defined in (7.19).
Proof To observe the equivalence of (7.3) and (7.20), the three cases (7.3) can be analyzed:
(a) θsti ≤ max{P i, bti}: If max{P i, bti} = P i then, θsti ≤ P i ⇒ ρsti = P i ⇒ [ρsti − bti]+ =
[P i − bti]+ = pM,sti . Conversely, if max{P i, bti} = bti, then either θsti ≤ P i, which has just
been analyzed, or P i < θsti ≤ bti. In this last case, as bti ≤ P i, (7.19) sets ρsti = θsti, and both
[ρsti − bti]+ and [P i − bti]+ take the value of zero.
(b) max{P i, bti} ≤ θsti ≤ P i: Through (7.19), ρsti = θsti. Then, the matched energy is [ρsti − bti]+ =
[θsti − bti]+ = |θsti > bti| = θsti − bti = pM,sti .
(c) θsti ≥ P i: Expression (7.19) sets ρsti = P i, and consequently, [ρsti − bti]+ =
[
P i − bti
]+ = |bti ≤
P i| = P i − bti = pM,sti .
Proposition 7.1 establishes that for a committed unit i that bids the function (7.2) to the DAM,
the matched energy at scenario s will be [ρsti − bti]+. However, if the unit is uncommitted, then
the bid does not exist and the matched energy becomes zero. The matched energy can then be
expressed through the matched energy function as a function of variables bti and uti:
pM,sti (uti) =
 [ρ
s
ti − bti]+ if uti = 1
0 if uti = 0
∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ U, ∀s ∈ S (7.21)
For the sake of simplicity, as in previous models, the matched energy pM,sti will be represented by
the variable psti. However, this non-differentiable expression cannot be included in the optimization
model as it is. To formulate an equivalent mixed-integer linear formulation, we introduced the
auxiliary binary zsti and continuous v
s
ti variables. In this formulation, z
s
ti = 1 whenever bti ≥ ρsti
and zsti = 0 otherwise, v
s
ti will always be defined as v
s
ti = [bti − ρsti]+.
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With the help of these auxiliary variables, expression (7.21) can be transformed into the following
equivalent mixed-integer linear system:
psti = ρ
s
tiuti + v
s
ti − bti (a)
ρsti(z
s
ti + uti − 1) ≤ bti (b)
bti ≤ ρsti(1− zsti) + P i(zsti + uti − 1) (c)
ρsti(1− zsti) ≥ psti (d)
ρsti(1− zsti) ≤ ρstiuti (e)
vsti ≤ (P i − ρsti)(zsti + uti − 1) (f)
psti ∈ [0, ρsti] (g)
vsti ∈ [0, P i − ρsti] (h)
zsti ∈ {0, 1} (i)

∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ U, ∀s ∈ S (7.22)
The following proposition establishes the equivalence between the function (7.21) and the system
(7.22) over the set of all feasible unit commitments and BC-dispatching solutions:
Proposition 7.2. The system (7.22) and the function (7.21) are equivalent in value for the matched
energy variable psti for every feasible solution of the system (7.22) that satisfies function (7.21).
Proof First, let us consider the solution of system (7.22) for all the feasible solutions in Ω with
uti = 0. As the parameter ρsti is always non-negative, (7.22e), z
s
ti = 1, and (7.22d), together with
the bounds of (7.22g) sets psti = 0. Analogously, (7.22c) and (7.22f), together with the bounds
(7.42) and (7.22h) zeroes the values of bti and vsti, respectively. The remaining equations, (7.22a)
and (7.22b), result in the redundant relations psti = 0 and bti ≥ 0, respectively.
Second, let us analyze system (7.22) for all the feasible solutions with uti = 1. For all these
solutions, system (7.21) is reduced to:
psti = ρ
s
ti + v
s
ti − bti (a)
ρstiz
s
ti ≤ bti (b)
bti ≤ ρsti(1− zsti) + P izsti (c)
ρsti(1− zsti) ≥ psti (d)
ρsti(1− zsti) ≤ ρsti (e)
vsti ≤ (P i − ρsti)zsti (f)
psti ∈ [0, ρsti] (g)
vsti ∈ [0, P i − ρsti] (h)
zsti ∈ {0, 1} (i)

∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ U, ∀s ∈ S (7.23)
The set of the feasible solutions with uti = 1 can be partitioned, depending on the value of variable
bti:
(a) For those solutions with uti = 1 and bti ≤ ρsti, (7.23b) sets zsti = 0. Subsequently, (7.23f)
together with the bounds (7.23h) sets vsti ≤ 0, and by (7.23a), psti = ρsti − bti, which coincides
with the value given by the function (7.21) for uti = 1 and bti ≤ ρsti. Equations (7.23c),
(7.23d), and (7.23e) derive redundant expressions.
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(b) Conversely, for those solutions with uti = 1 and bti > ρsti, (7.23c) sets z
s
ti = 1. Subsequently,
(7.23d), together with the lower bound defined in (7.23g), sets psti = 0, accordingly with the
value of the matched energy defined by function (7.21). The remaining equations (7.23a),
(7.23b), (7.23e), and (7.23f) provide redundant constraints.
In summary, Proposition 7.2 ensures that:
(i) Every feasible solution satisfies the equivalent matched-energy constraints (7.22)
(ii) The value of variable psti represents the true value of the matched energy function (7.21).
Finally, the model of the thermal units and PUs must include the following set of constraints that
define the total generation output of thermal unit i at each interval t and scenario s:
gsti = p
s
ti + bti ∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ U, ∀s ∈ S (7.24)
7.1.3.5 Objective Function
The expected value of the benefit function B (7.1) can be expressed as:
EλD [B(u, a, e, p, g)] =∑
∀t∈T
∑
∀j∈B
λBj L
B
j − (7.25)∑
∀t∈T
∑
∀i∈T
[
coni eti + c
off
i ati + c
b
iuti
]
− (7.26)
∑
∀t∈T
∑
∀c∈C
conPc(1) (etPc(1) − atPc(2))+ conPc(2)etPc(2) + ∑
∀i∈Pc
cbiuti
 (7.27)
+
∑
∀t∈T
∑
∀i∈U
∑
∀s∈S
P s
[
λD,st p
M,s
ti − clipsti − cqi (psti)2
]
(7.28)
where, as in the previous models:
(7.25) is a constant term and corresponds to the BC profit.
(7.26) is the cost of the thermal units’ unit commitment. It is deterministic and independent of the
realization of the random variable λDt .
(7.27) corresponds to the CC’s start-up. Fixed generation costs are formulated. In this formulation,
as in Lu and Shahidehpour (2004), only start-up costs are associated to the PU, and no cost
is associated to the transition from state 2 to state 1. This is also a deterministic term (as
(7.26)), so does not depend on the realization of the random variable.
(7.28) represents the expected value of the benefit from the DAM for thermal and CC units. Usually,
the generation cost functions of the PUs are represented as piece-wise linear functions, but
in this study, they were modeled as quadratic functions as done in a couple of earlier studies
(Lu and Shahidehpour, 2004; Li and Shahidehpour, 2005).
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j LBCj=1...24 λ
BC
j=1...24
MW e/MWh
1 200 75
2 150 73
3 250 78
Table 7.3: Characteristics of the bilateral contracts.
All the functions appearing in (7.26) and (7.28) are linear except for the generation costs in (7.28),
which are concave quadratic (cqi ≥ 0, see Tables A.1 and A.2).
7.1.3.6 Final Model
The final model developed in the previous sections is as follows:
max EλD [B(u, a, e, p, g)]
s.t. :
Eq.(2.10)− (2.12) Thermal unit commitment constraints
Eq.(7.4)− (7.6), (7.10)− (7.14) Combined cycle unit commitment const.
Eq.(7.15)− (7.16) Bilateral contracts dispatching const.
Eq.(7.22) Optimal matched energy equivalent const.
Eq.(7.24) Definition of the total unit’s generation gsti
(7.29)
The deterministic equivalent of the two-stage stochastic problem (7.29) is a mixed, continuous-
binary concave quadratic maximization problem with linear constraints that can be solved with
the help of standard optimization software, as illustrated in the following section.
7.1.4 Computational Results
Model (7.29) has been tested and the results are reported in this section. 3 bilateral contracts, 4
thermal units, 2 combined cycle units with a CT and a HRSG/ST and 24 hours of study were used
in the tests. The characteristics of the thermal and CC units and BCs are shown in Tables A.1,
A.2 Appendix A and Table 7.3, respectively. The thermal units were all set on, allowing them to
be shut down or continue producing during the first interval. The minimum off time for both CC
units was set to 3 hours Both CC units were also considered shut-down for 3 hours previous to the
first optimization period. In this case study, previous to the models presented in Chapter 3, a set
of 25 scenarios has been used. It has been obtained as the result of the application of the scenario
reduction algorithm (Gro¨we-Kuska et al., 2003) to the complete set of available historic data from
June 2007 to the day under study.
A summary of the characteristics of the optimization problem and its solution is shown in Table 7.4.
In Table 7.5 the usual stochastic programming indicators needed to evaluate the goodness of the
stochastic approximation are reported. VSS (2.4), which is the measure of the advantage of using
the stochastic programming model instead of the deterministic one, shows that it is possible to
increase the expected benefits by 19.363e (2.33%) through use of the stochastic optimal solution.
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Constraints Real Binary E(Benefits) CPU
variables variables e s
31927 9915 5240 850.058 893
Table 7.4: Optimization characteristics of the study case.
RP 850.058e
EEV 830.695e
VSS 19.363e
Table 7.5: Stochastic programming indicators.
The optimal unit commitment of thermal and CC units is shown in Figure 7.3. The three states or
configurations of the CC units are represented as white (state 0), gray (state 1, Pc(1)) and black
(state 2, Pc(2)), in hourly blocks. Notice how the operation of the CC units obey both the minimum
up-time as well as the feasible transition rules expressed by (7.4-7.6) and (7.12-7.14) respectively.
When started up, both CC units stay in state 1 longer than the minimum on time toni = 2 before
switching to the state 2, where they remain for the rest of the optimization period.
Figure 7.4 shows the aggregated economic dispatch of the three BCs (600MWh) by the thermal
(white bars) and the CC (black bars) units. It can be observed that, depending on the period,
the BC portfolio is covered exclusively by the thermal units (periods 1,2,10,15,19 and 24), or by a
combination of thermal and CC units (the rest of the periods).
The optimal bid functions (7.2) for the thermal and CC units are represented in Figure 7.5 re-
spectively, where bt...k represents the value of bti at different periods t, and b∗ corresponds to the
remaining periods that are not explicitly indicated. To help in understanding of these graphics, let
us analyze the most simple case; thermal unit T4, which is committed throughout all the periods
except for the first one. First, observe the piecewise discontinuous thick line, with a first block
going from 0 to the minimum output P , and a second block between P and P , with a slope equal
to the marginal cost of the thermal unit 2cq4. Both blocks correspond, respectively, to the two
blocks defining the optimal bid function (7.2). We know that this thick line represents the optimal
bid function only in those periods where bti = 0, (periods t ∈ {2, 9, 11− 14, 16, 18, 20− 23} for the
thermal unit T4). Moreover, for those periods where bti > 0, the optimal bid function corresponds
to the part of the thick line between the auxiliary second vertical axis shown in Figure 7.5, located
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Figure 7.3: The unit commitment of thermal and CC units.
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at bti, and P i. In the case of thermal unit T4, bi,4 = P 4 = 160MW for periods t ∈ {3 − 8, 15},
bt,4 = 130MW for period t = 17 and bt,4 = 30MW for periods t ∈ {10, 19, 24}. Although bt,4 ≤ P 4
∀t in the case of thermal unit T4, this could not be the case for other thermal units: see for
instance the optimal bid function of thermal unit I3, where bt,3 = 190MW ∀t ∈ {2 − 5, 15} and
b22,3 = 221.5MW, in which case both values are above the minimum generation P 3 = 160MW. The
optimal bid functions of the remaining thermal units in Figure 7.5 can be interpreted in a similar
way.
Let us now focus our attention on the optimal bid functions of the CC units (Figure 7.5). First
observe how each CC has two different sets of optimal bid functions, depending on the state of
the CC unit at each period t. The CC unit 1 would send the optimal bid functions CC1-P1(1) to
periods 5, 6 and 7, where this CC unit is in state 1 (gray blocks of Figure 7.3), and the optimal
bid functions CC1-P1(2) to the rest of the periods (black blocks of Figure 7.3). The same happens
with the second CC unit, CC2. Please notice that the optimal bid function of each state of the
same CC unit has its own slope, which corresponds to the marginal cost of each PU.
7.1.5 Conclusions
This section has a procedure for a price-taker GenCo, operating in the MIBEL, to optimally manage
a pool of thermal and combined cycle units. A two-stage stochastic mixed-quadratic programming
problem, which observes the MIBEL regulation has been proposed for help in deciding the optimal
unit commitment and sale bid to the DAM, and the optimal economic dispatch of the bilateral
contracts for all the thermal and combined cycle units. The objective of the producer is to maximize
the expected profit from its involvement in the spot market.
The most relevant contribution of this study is to include the integration of a new model for the
combined cycle units with the thermal units and the bilateral contracts settlement and a new
model of the optimal sale bid for combined cycle units with respect to the dispatched energy of the
bilateral contracts.
The model was tested with real data on market prices and programming units from a GenCo
operating in the Spanish electricity market. Suitable results were provided.
7.2 DAMB: Thermal and Generic Programming Units
In this section, a stochastic programming model is presented, one that integrates the DAM optimal
bidding problem with the BC rules of the MIBEL, giving special consideration to the mechanism for
balancing production market: the virtual power plants (VPP) auctions. By observing the MIBEL
regulation, the model allows the GenCo to decide on the unit commitment of the thermal units,
the economic dispatch of the BCs between the thermal units and the generic programming unit,
and the optimal sale/purchase bids for all units. The objective of this model has been to find the
optimal bidding strategy of both the thermal production units and the generic programming units
(GPU) in the DAM regarding the BC rules.
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As was introduced in Section 2.1.4.1, the VPP capacity indicates that the buyer of this product
will have the capacity to generate MWh at his disposal. The buyer, in this case our GenCo under
study, can exercise the right to produce against an exercise price, set in advance, by paying an
option premium. Hence, although Endesa and Iberdrola still own the power plants, part of their
production capacity will be at the disposal of the VPP buyers, who are the subjects of our study.
There will be base-load and peak-load contracts with different strike prices that are defined a month
before the auction. In each case, contracts with a duration of 3, 6, and 12 months will be offered.
Furthermore, all the products will be offered simultaneously using an electronic auction.
The energy resulting from the exercise of the VPP options can be used by the buyers both as a
contribution for covering the national and international BCs before the DAM as well as to sell it to
the DAM. In this latter case, the unmatched VPP energy, if any, can be sold through national BCs
after the DAM. These BCs after the DAM are negotiated between the agents prior to DAM gate
closure, and must not be confused with other subsequent markets such as the reserve or balancing
markets.
The GPU and VPP are new elements in the MIBEL, whose utilities need to be integrated into its
daily optimal bid strategy. To our knowledge, these elements have not been considered previously in
the literature. The model presented is the first attempt at both using and analyzing these elements
with an aim toward encouraging competition in the MIBEL, and it can be of great economic interest
for any GenCo operating a GPU. Regarding the VPP, the model provides the GenCo with tool for
deciding wether the energy rights of the VPP should be nominated or not. Regarding the GPU,
the model’s output determines its optimal bid to the market and the participation in the BCs.
Finally, it must be mentioned that another novelty is the consideration, for the first time to our
knowledge, of the BCs after the day-ahead market, which is another characteristic of the MIBEL.
The model presented in this study has been tuned to incorporate the specificities of the MIBEL
energy production system. Nevertheless, the proposed model could also be of interest for other
electricity markets with VPP, such as the Belgian and German markets.
7.2.1 Literature Review
In Sections 2.3.1 and 5.1 we have presented a review of the literature in general about the DAM
bidding strategies and specifically about the inclusion of BC. As we have stated, in this chapter the
model includes two mechanisms that are new into the DAM bidding process: the VPP capacity
auctions with their associated GPU, and the bilateral contracts after the DAM. To our knowledge,
there are no publications that consider either of them.
7.2.2 Basic Concepts
Suppose that the GenCo now has, aside from the set of I thermal units, a GPU associated with
a VPP with known capacity (pV MWh) and an exercise price (λV e/MWh). There is also the
portfolio B of BCs before the DAM with known energy (LBj MWh) and price (λ
B
j e/MWh).
The energy LBj can be delivered at time period t both by the GPU (variables b
G
t ) and by any
combination of the thermal units (variables bti). Finally, consider that there is an agreement for
7.2. DAMB: THERMAL AND GENERIC PROGRAMMING UNITS 119
Day-ahead
market
λD,si
Thermal
units
Generic
programming
unit
MIBEL
agents
GenCo
pVt , p
V, λV
LBj , λ
B
j
b
P
, λP
b
S
, λS
pM,sti
pS,st
pP ,st , p
R,s
t
bti
bGt
bS,st
bP ,st
uti
Bid to the D-a market
BC before D-a market
BC after D-a market
Figure 7.6: Case study.
selling (purchasing) BCs after the DAM up to a quantity bS MWh (bP MWh) at a price λS e/MWh
(λP e/MWh). We assume that it is not possible to obtain net gain from those contracts (λP > λS).
Figure 7.6 represents the part of the whole MIBEL energy production system considered in this
study.
In the next two sections we will describe the optimal bidding function. In this case, there are two
definitions, one for the thermal units and one for the generic programming unit.
7.2.2.1 Optimal Thermal Bidding Function
In the previous Section 7.1.3 the expression of the optimal bid function for a thermal unit that
contributes to the BC’s portfolio was proven to be:
λoti(p
o
ti, bti) =
{
0 if 0 ≤ pti ≤ [P i − bti]+
2cqi (p
o
ti + bti) + c
l
i if [P i − bti]+ < poti ≤ P i − bti
∀i ∈ I, ∀t ∈ T (7.30)
where [P i − bti]+ = max{0, P i − bti}, and the variable bti is the total energy production of unit i
assigned to the whole portfolio of BCs. This expression is analogous to equation 7.2.
Consequently, the thermal matched energy function under scenario s, pM,sti , associated with the
optimal thermal bidding function (7.30) is the analogous to expression (7.21)):
pM,sti (uti) =
{
[ρsti − bti]+ if uti = 1
0 if uti = 0
∀i ∈ I, ∀t ∈ T, ∀s ∈ S (7.31)
with the constant parameter ρsti defined in (7.19).
As in the previous model, this discontinuous and non differentiable function can be alternatively
formulated as the system of linear constraints (7.22) and introduced into the optimization model.
For sake of simplicity, as in previous models, the matched energy pM,sti will be represented by the
variable psti.
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7.2.2.2 Optimal Generic Programming Unit Bidding Model
In this section, the optimal bidding and the matched energy functions for a GPU will be derived.
First, variable bGt represents the total contribution of the GPU to the coverage of the BCs before
the day-ahead market. Second, we assume that pVt , the exercised energy of the VPP, depends on
the value of the binary variable xVt , a binary variable that indicates if the VPP rights are exercised
(xVt = 1) as follows:
pVt = P
V
xVt ∀t ∈ T (7.32)
Under this assumption, the expression of the optimal GPU bid function can be developed by
analyzing the two cases, xVt = 0 and x
V
t = 1:
(a) xVt = 0: VPP rights are not exercised and the energy b
G
t must be either acquired from the
pool or provided by the BCs after the DAM at an agreed price λP , which is the maximum
price that we were willing to pay to the pool for that amount of energy. Therefore, the
optimal purchase bid (energy, price) pair is:
(bGt , λ
P ) if xVt = 0 (7.33)
(b) xVt = 1 : the VPP rights are exercised and the exercise price is paid. Subsequently, two
different situations must be considered:
(i) bGt ≤ P Vt : After covering the energy bGt with the VPP, there is an energy surplus of
[P Vt − bGt ] that can be sold either to the pool, at unknown spot price λDt , or to the BCs
after the DAM, at known sale price λS . Subsequently, the energy surplus should be
offered to the DAM at a price not less than λS , which is the optimal sale bid:
([P Vt − bGt ], λS) if xVt = 1 and bGt ≤ P Vt (7.34)
(ii) bGt > P
V
t : analogously to the case x
V
t = 0, to fulfill the uncovered part of the BC’s
duty, the following optimal purchase bid must be submitted:
([bGt − P Vt ], λP ) if xVt = 1 and bGt > P Vt (7.35)
As a result of the preceding analysis, the optimal sale and purchase bid for the GPU (7.33)-(7.35)
can be expressed in the following compact form:
OSBt =
(
[pVt − bGt ]+, λS
)
(7.36)
OPBt =
(
[bGt − P V ]+ + min{bGt , P V − pVt }, λP
)
(7.37)
It can be easily verified that for any given value of the first stage variables bGt and p
V
t , (7.36)-(7.37)
correspond to the optimal bidding rules developed in (7.33)-(7.35). Equations (7.36)-(7.37) can be
used to derive the expressions of the matched energy at each scenario s ∈ S, as functions of the
first stage variables pVt and b
G
t . For the sake of clarify the notation, we define the two following
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sets of scenarios:
MSt :=
{
s ∈ S | λD,st ≥ λS
}
MPt :=
{
s ∈ S | λD,st < λP
} ∀t ∈ T
The set MSt includes those scenarios where, at the t
th DAM auction, the optimal sale bid (7.36), if
any, will be accepted. Then, with respect to (7.36), the matched sale energy function will be:
pS,st =
{
[pVt − bGt ]+ if s ∈MSt (a)
0 if s 6∈MSt (b)
∀t ∈ T, ∀s ∈ S (7.38)
Analogously, the set MPt includes those scenarios where, at the t-th day-ahead auction, the optimal
purchase bid (7.37), if any, will be accepted. For the clarity of the exposition, the two terms of the
total matched purchase energy of (7.37) will be represented by two separate matched functions, the
matched purchase energy function:
pP,st =
{
min{bGt , P V − pVt } if s ∈MPt (a)
0 if s 6∈MPt (b)
∀t ∈ T, ∀s ∈ S (7.39)
and the residual matched residual energy function:
pR,st =
{
[bGt − P V ]+ if s ∈MPt (a)
0 if s 6∈MPt (b)
∀t ∈ T, ∀s ∈ S (7.40)
On observing (7.38),(7.39) and (7.40), it becomes evident that actually, the value of the matched
sale energy will be the same for any scenario in MSt , and the same happens with the matched
purchase energies and the scenarios in MPt . Nevertheless, the superscript s will be conserved for
the sake of clarity and to strengthen the fact that these are actually second-stage variables, as
there will be scenarios with nonzero matched energies, while in others, those energies will be zero.
Another issue to mention is that, as we have assumed that λS < λP , the intersection set:
MSt ∩MPt = {s ∈ S | λD,st ∈ [λS , λP ]}
could be nonempty. This fact does not reveal any inconsistency of the model, because (7.38),
(7.39) and (7.40) are formulated in a way that, for any s ∈ MSt ∩ MPt , only the matched sale
energy pS,st or the total matched purchase energy p
P,s
t + p
R,s
t can be greater than zero, but never
simultaneously. Hence, for those scenarios in MSt ∩MPt , only a sale bid or a purchase bid will be
submitted, depending on the value of the variables bGt and p
V
t . Each one of the three nondifferential
functions ( 7.38), (7.39) and (7.40) will be conveniently incorporated into the optimization model
through an associated system of equivalent generic matched energy constraints.
7.2.3 Model Description
7.2.3.1 Variables
This problem has been modeled as a mixed integer quadratic two-stage stochastic optimization
problem. The main first stage variables of the model for each period t ∈ T which corresponds to
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quantities that the GenCo has to decide on before the DAM clearing, are:
• The on/off state of the thermal units: uti, ati, eti.
• The BC energy allocated to each thermal unit: bti.
• The decision whether or not exercise the VPP rights: xVt ∈ {0, 1}.
• The exercised VPP energy for the GPU: pVt .
• The BC energy allocated to the GPU before the DAM: bGt .
The second stage variables for each scenario s ∈ S, are:
• The matched energy for the thermal selling bids: psti.
• The matched energy for the GPU sale/purchase bids: pS,st and pP,st respectively.
• The energy allocated to the sale/purchase bilateral contracts after the DAM: bS,st and bP,st
respectively.
• Total physical production: gsti.
Aside from these sets of variables, there are a group of auxiliary variables that are needed. These
auxiliary variables must be included into the model throughout the four expressions of the matched
energy (presented in the previous section) (7.22), (7.38)-(7.40).
This model follows the first formulation approach of the unit commitment constraints for the
thermal units. Thus equations (2.10)-(2.12) formulate the inclusion of the variables uti, ati and eti
into the model.
7.2.3.2 Bilateral Contracts Constraints
The GenCo has agreed to physically provide the energy amounts LBj at every interval of the
settlement day for each one of the j ∈ B BCs. This energy LBj can be provided both by the real
thermal units I and the virtual GPU:∑
i∈I
bti + bGt =
∑
j∈B
LBj ∀t ∈ T (7.41)
bti ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ I (7.42)
bGt ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ I (7.43)
7.2.3.3 Matched Energy Constraints
Although function pM,sti is discontinuous and nondifferentiable, it can be formulated as a system of
linear constraints. With the help of the auxiliary variables zsti (binary) and v
s
ti (continuous), the
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nondifferentiable expression (7.31) can be shown (Proposition 7.2) to be equivalent to the following
mixed-integer linear system:
psti = ρ
s
tiuti + v
s
ti − bti
ρsti(z
s
ti + uti − 1) ≤ bti
bti ≤ ρsti(1− zsti) + P i(zsti + uti − 1)
0 ≤ psti ≤ ρsti(1− zsti) ≤ ρstiuti
0 ≤ vsti ≤ (P i − ρsti)(zsti + uti − 1)
bti ∈ [0, P i]
zsti ∈ {0, 1}

∀i ∈ I ∀t ∈ T ∀s ∈ S (7.44)
The equivalence between (7.31) and (7.44) indicates that, for every possible value of uti and bti,
there is a unique feasible value of the matched energy psti with respect to (7.44), and that this value
satisfies (7.31).
In a similar fashion, the matched sale energy function pS,st (7.38), matched purchase energy function
pP,st (7.39) and residual matched purchase energy function p
R,s
t (7.40) associated with the GPU must
be conveniently incorporated into the optimization model through an equivalent mixed-linear mod-
eling. First, consider (7.38), which expresses the matched sale energy pS,st as a function of variables
bGt and p
V
t . This non-differential expression can be included into the optimization model through
the following equivalent set of linear constraints, using the auxiliary variables wSt (continuous) and
ySt (binary):
pS,st = 0 ∀s 6∈MSt (a)
pS,st = p
V
t + w
S
t − bGt ∀s ∈MSt (b)
0 ≤ pS,st ≤ P V (1− ySt ) ≤ pVt ∀s ∈MSt (c)
P
V (ySt − 1) + pVt ≤ bGt (d)
bGt ≤ P V (1− ySt ) +
∑
∀j∈B L
B
j y
S
t (e)
0 ≤ wSt ≤ (LBt − P V )ySt + P V − pVt (f)
ySt ∈ {0, 1}

∀t ∈ T (7.45)
and where the constant
∑
∀j∈B L
B
j is used as a trivial upper bound of the variable b
G
t . The
equivalence between (7.45) and (7.38) can be easily observed, in the sense that for every possible
combination of the values of variables bGt and p
V
t , the value uniquely assigned by (7.38) to the
matched sale energy variable pS,sti satisfies (7.45). First, it can be observed that for those s 6∈MSt ,
both (7.38) and (7.45) zero pS,sti . We analyzed the equivalency for the remaining scenarios s ∈MSt :
(a) pVt = 0: (7.45c) sets y
s
t = 1 and p
S,s
t = 0, which coincides with the value of the matched
sale energy function associated with (7.38). The rest of the system (7.45) is reduced to the
redundant condition 0 ≤ wst = bGt ≤ LBt .
(b) pVt = P
V : if bGt ≤ pVt , the value of the matched sale energy function (7.38) will be pS,st (bGt , P V ) =
pVt − bGt . It is easy to verify that when bGt ≤ pVt , (7.45d) and (7.45f) set ySt = 0 and wSt = 0.
Consequently, through (7.45b), pS,sti = p
V
t − bGt , which is the same value given by the function
(7.38). The remaining equations of system (7.45) provide redundant bounds.
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(c) pVt = P
V and bGt > p
V
t : expression (7.38) gives p
S,s
t (b
G
t , P
V ) = 0. By assuming bGt > p
V
t ,
the only feasible value of ySt permitted by (7.45e) is y
S
t = 1, which, together with (7.45c),
determines pS,sti = 0. The rest of system (7.45) derives redundant expressions.
By applying a similar analysis to the expression of the matched purchase energy function (7.39), it
is possible to verify the equivalence between expression (7.39) and the system of linear constraints
(7.46):
pP,st = 0 ∀s 6∈MPt
pP,st = b
G
t − wPt ∀s ∈MPt
P
V
yPt ≤ pP,st ≤ P V − pVt ∀s ∈MPt
P
V
yPt ≤ bGt
bGt ≤ P V (1− yPt ) + LBt (yPt + xVt )− pVt )
0 ≤ wPt ≤ (LBt − P V )yPt + LBt xVt
yPt ∈ {0, 1}

∀t ∈ T (7.46)
where again, the auxiliary variables wPt (continuous) and y
P
t (binary) were introduced. Finally,
proceeding in a similar way, the residual matched-purchase energy function (7.40), is introduced in
the model through the following set of equivalent linear constraints:
pR,st = 0 ∀s 6∈MPt
pR,st = b
G
t + w
R
t − P V ∀s ∈MPt
0 ≤ pR,st ≤ LBt yRt ∀s ∈MPt
P
V
yRt ≤ bGt
bGt ≤ P V (1− yRt ) + LBt yRt
0 ≤ wRt ≤ P V (1− yRt )
yRt ∈ {0, 1}

∀t ∈ T (7.47)
Again, wRt (continuous) and y
R
t (binary) represent auxiliary variables.
Finally, we can define the second-stage variables gsti that represent the total generation of the
thermal unit i at period t conditioned to scenario s, expressed as:
gsti = p
s
ti + bti
P iuti ≤ gsti ≤ P iuti
}
∀i ∈ I, ∀t ∈ T, ∀s ∈ S (7.48)
7.2.3.4 Generic Programming Unit’s Net Energy Balance
At every hour, any GPU operating in the MIBEL must ensure that the net energy balance of the
GPU be zero, with the help, if necessary, of the BCs after the DAM. Following this rule, we assume
that, for each scenario s ∈ S, the energies bP,st and bS,st are purchased and sold through these new
BCs up to a given maximum quantity at known prices λP and λS respectively (note that λS < λP ).
Thus, the GPU’s net energy balance constraints for each hour t and scenario s are:
pVt + p
P,s
t + p
R,s
t + b
P,s
t = p
S,s
t + b
S,s
t + b
G
t
0 ≤ bP,st ≤ b
P
0 ≤ bS,st ≤ b
S
 ∀s ∈ S, ∀t ∈ T (7.49)
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7.2.3.5 Objective Function
The expected value of the benefit function B can be expressed as:
EλD
[
B(u, a, e, g, p, pV , pS , pP , pR, bS , bP )
]
=∑
t∈T
∑
j∈BC
λBtjL
B
tj (7.50)
−
∑
t∈T
∑
i∈I
[
coni eti + c
off
i ati + c
b
iuti
]
−
∑
t∈T
λV pVt (7.51)
+
∑
t∈T
∑
i∈I
∑
s∈S
P s
[
λD,st p
s
ti − cligsti − cqi (gsti)2
]
(7.52)
+
∑
t∈T
∑
s∈S
P s
[
λD,st (p
S,s
t − pP,st − pR,st )
]
(7.53)
+
∑
t∈T
∑
s∈S
P s
[
λSbS,st − λP bP,st
]
(7.54)
where
(7.50) represents the total income of the BCs before the DAM (constant) and can be ignored in the
optimization.
(7.51) corresponds to the on/off fixed cost of the unit commitment and the exercise cost of the VPP
energy and does not depend on the realization of the random variable λD,st .
(7.52) is the expected value of the benefit coming from the DAM of the thermal units.
(7.53) is the expected value of the benefit coming from the DAM of the GPU.
(7.54) is the expected value of the benefit coming from the DAM of the BCs after the DAM.
All the functions in (7.51)-(7.54) are linear, except for the generation costs of the thermal units
(7.52), which are concave quadratic (cqi ≥ 0).
7.2.3.6 Final Model
The final model developed in the previous sections is:
max EλD
[
B(u, a, e, g, p, pV , pS , pP , pR, bS , bP )
]
s.t.:
Eq.(2.10)− (2.12) Unit commitment constraints
Eq.(7.41)− (7.43) BCs covering constraints
Eq.(7.44) Thermal’s matched energy constraints
Eq.(7.48) Thermal’s total generation definition
Eq.(7.32) VPP’s energy nomination pVt def.
Eq.(7.45)− (7.47) GPU’s matched energy constraints
Eq.(7.49) GPU’s net energy balance const.
(7.55)
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Figure 7.7: Expected benefit value and difference between the expected benefit of the complete set and
each reduced set, as function of the number of scenarios.
RP 901.164e
EEV 848.528e
VSS 52.636e
Table 7.6: Stochastic programming indicators.
7.2.4 Computational Results
In this section the set of computational tests that have been performed in order to validate the
described model and its results are presented.
7.2.4.1 Scenario Set
The scenario set used in this chapter is previous to the study presented in Chapter 3. The creation
of new BCs and the application of VPP auctions started in June 2007 and this study was done in
May 2008. Thus, the complete available set of equiprobable scenarios has been obtained using all
the available market prices from June 2007.
The reduction algorithm was applied, resulting in subsets of 10, 25, 50, 75, 100, 150, 200, and
250 scenarios. Figure 7.7 shows how the optimal objective function value changes as the number
of scenarios increases. It also contains (right axis) the difference in the percentage between the
expected benefits of the complete group of scenarios and each reduced set (∆E[Benefits](%)). It
can be observed that any increase above 75 scenarios improved the expected benefits by less than
0.09%, while the CPU time increased by almost 14 times (from 442 s with 75 scenarios to 6554 s
with 100 scenarios). As a consequence, (7.55) was tested by a fan with 75 scenarios, for which the
objective function value became stable and the computational time cost remained acceptable. In
Table 7.6 the stochastic programming indicators needed to evaluate the advantage of the stochastic
approximation are reported. VSS shows that it is possible to increase the expected benefits by
52.636e, by using the stochastic optimal solution. Therefore, we can conclude that the solution
obtained through the stochastic programming model increases our expected profits by 6.02% with
over the deterministic model.
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j LB1...24 λ
B
1...24
MWh e/MWh
1 1100 52
2 400 63
Table 7.7: Characteristics of the bilateral contracts.
P
V
λV λS b
S
λB b
B
MWh e/MWh e/MWh MWh e/MWh MWh
800 38 20 200 100 200
Table 7.8: Characteristic of the VPP capacity and the BC after DAM.
7.2.4.2 Case Study
The characteristics of the thermal units, BCs, and VPP capacity are shown in Tables A.1 Appendix
A, 7.7, and 7.8, respectively. A set of computational tests were performed to evaluate the influence
of the GPU and VPP in the GenCo’s optimal bidding strategy in the MIBEL. For this reason, the
proposed stochastic programming model was tested for three different cases (see Table 7.9 for a
summary of the optimization problem’s dimensions and solutions):
(a) a GenCo with GPU and VPP capacity;
(b) a GenCo with GPU but without VPP capacity; and
(c) a GenCo without GPU.
The worst expected profit was obtained in case (c), where the thermal units were the only ones
responsible for fulfilling the BCs before the day-ahead market. Case (b) obtained a greater expected
profit than case (c), due to the possibility of being able to buy cheaper energy from the pool to
cover the BC and to avoid the use of expensive thermal units. The greatest expected profit was
obtained in case (a), where the VPP capacity was used to sell in the day-ahead market and to cover
part of the BC, using the same advantages in case (b).
The optimal management of the GPU in case (a) can be analyzed with the help of Figures 7.8 and
7.9. Figure 7.8 shows the aggregated economic dispatch of the two BCs (1.500 MWh) in thermal
units (bTt , white bars) and GPUs (b
G
t , black bars), together with the exercised VPP energy p
V
t
(small circles). Figure 7.9 shows the optimal GPU’s sale bid (OSBt, positive values) and purchase
bid (OPBt, negative values) for both cases (a) and (b) (black and white bars respectively). On
Case Constraints Real Binary E(Benefits) CPU
variables variables e s
(a) 134034 56002 18816 901.164 442
(b) 128503 52364 18792 665.530 214
(c) 119399 46895 18720 610.264 142
Table 7.9: Optimization characteristics of the study cases.
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Figure 7.8: Aggregated economic dispatch of the two BCs between the thermal units and the GPU for the
study case (a). Exercised VPP energy is also shown.
observing both of the graphs within the whole 24-hour optimization horizon, it is clear that the
GPU exhibits a differentiated behavior, depending on the time period considered:
(i) t ∈ {5, 6, 7}: the GenCo does not exercise its VPP rights (pVt = 0). For those time periods,
all the energy bGt allocated to the BC must be purchased in the day-ahead market (purchase
bids, black negative bars in Figure 7.9) or from the BC after the day-ahead market. For the
rest of the time periods, the GenCo does exercise its VPP rights completely (pVt = P
V
t ).
(ii) t = 16: where the exercised energy coincides with the energy allocated to the BC (bG16 = p
V
16).
(iii) t ∈ {3, 4, 8, 21} the allocated energy exceeds the exercised energy (bGt > pVt ). The surplus
energy, bGt − pVt , must be obtained either from the day-ahead market (see the purchase bids
for those time periods, black negative bars in Figure 7.9) or from the BC after the day-ahead
market.
(iv) t ∈ {1, 2, 9−15, 17−20, 22−24}: only part of the exercised VPP energy is used to satisfy the
BC, and the rest is submitted to the DAM (sale bids for those time periods, black positive
bars in Figure 7.9)
Case (b) corresponds to those GenCos operating in the MIBEL, which are not allowed to acquire
any VPP capacity rights. These GenCos are not allowed in order to prevent from becoming price-
makers. Under the assumptions of model (7.55), such a GenCo can use the GPU to purchase energy
from the DAM in the most convenient manner, resulting in an optimal purchase bid pattern that
is depicted by the white bars in Figure 7.9. The energy of the optimal purchase bid coincides in
this case with the contribution of the GPU to the BC at each time period, bGt .
Finally, the optimal thermal unit’s bidding is analyzed. The thick line in Figure 7.10 shows the
optimal thermal bid function λ∗ti(pti, bti) of the three thermal units (3, 4, and 6) for all the case
studies at each hour. It must be noted that bt is the energy allocated to the BC in such a way
that the submitted bidding comprises energies between bt and P i. The symbol b∗ is used to point
out the BC contribution for the remaining hours not shown explicitly in each sub-figure. From
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Figure 7.9: Sold and bought optimal bidding of the GPU for the study cases (a) and (b).
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Figure 7.10: Bidding curve of thermal production units 3, 4, and 6 for all the case studies. Shadowed
zones are regions with a high concentration of values of bt.
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Figure 7.10, it is clear that the presence of the GPU and VPP capacity allows the thermal units to
submit more energy to the pool. For instance, consider the extreme case of thermal unit 3: without
GPU (case (c)), the generation of this unit is exclusively dedicated to the BC (bt,3 = P 3 ∀t); while
with GPU and VPP capacity (case (a)), all the production output within the operation limits are
submitted to the pool (bt,3 = P 3 ∀t). The rest of the thermal units exhibit a similar behavior. It
can also be observed how the availability of the GPU allows the bidding of thermal unit 6 to adapt
itself to the different periods, which is in contrast to case (c), where the bidding is almost identical
in all the time periods. In general, Figure 7.10 shows that the optimal thermal unit’s bidding is
affected significantly when a GPU is considered, which drastically changes the optimal bidding in
a nontrivial way that increases the opportunity of the GenCo to take benefits from the pool.
Finally, based on an estimate of the additional profit expected from the VPP holding, we have
presented a comment on the unsuitability of the proposed model to assess the optimal bid of the
GenCo in the VPP auction. It must be noted that, although a GenCo can use the proposed model
to evaluate the expected increase in profits over a 1-day period (compare case studies (a) and (b)
in Table 7.9), the products auctioned in the VPP market are energy delivered over 6 months and
1 year. In other words, in order to evaluate the overall expected increase in benefits, it would be
necessary to use mid-term optimization models and not a short-term optimization model such as
the one presented.
7.2.5 Conclusions
This section provides a procedure for optimally managing a pool of thermal production units and a
GPU. A two-stage stochastic mixed quadratic programming problem has been proposed for deciding
on: the optimal unit commitment of the thermal units; the optimal economic dispatch of the BCs
from thermal production units to a GPU; and the optimal bid for thermal production units and
a GPU. In all of these cases, the programming problem observes the MIBEL regulation. The
objective of the producers is to maximize the expected profit from their involvement in the spot
market, BCs and VPP capacity.
The results of the computational experiments illustrate that the optimal bid policy furnished by
the proposed model can increase the DAM benefits of a GenCo that operates a GPU of at least
10% (case study (b) of Table 7.9) or even more, and that holds a VPP capacity (case study (a) of
Table 7.9).
The main contributions of this model are the mathematical modeling of the GPU and the VPP,
the modeling of the optimal bid functions and matched energy of the GPU, and the inclusion of
BCs after the day-ahead market into the optimization model.
CHAPTER 8
Conclusions and Further Research
8.1 Conclusions
The objectives proposed for this thesis have been fulfilled. Throughout the chapters, an exhaustive
study of the Iberian Market legislation has been conducted and models were created for the optimal
bid strategies of a price-taker GenCo. Further, the Iberian Electricity Market rules have been taken
into account. The models presented have been formulated, computationally implemented and tested
with real data from the Iberian Electricity Market. Although each chapter contains in its discussion
section the main contributions of the different models presented so far, here we will summarize the
general contributions of the whole thesis following the five objectives proposed in Chapter 1:
(i) Market regulations:
– The MIBEL regulation has been deeply studied (see Section 2.1). The day-ahead, deriva-
tives and sequence of short-term markets are modeled following the MIBEL rules. The
regulation of the bidding process and physical generation in the MIBEL has been taken
into account when building the models presented throughout this thesis.
– A rigorous study of the optimal bid function is presented, one which corresponds to the
various developed models that follow the MIBEL regulation. The analytical expression
of the optimal bid functions associated to the different DAM stochastic programming
models has been obtained and analyzed (see Theorems 4.1 and 5.1).
(ii) Forecast modeling for Spanish market prices:
– One of the contributions of this thesis is the design of a new factor model procedure for
the Spanish day-ahead market prices (see Section 3.3). This procedure gives equivalent
results to those obtained through a more classical approach using ARIMA models. The
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main advantage of this proposed procedure is its simplicity in being implemented and
interpreted. What is more, it does not lose its capacity for obtaining a suitable forecast.
This factor model procedure has also been tested satisfactorily also on the Italian day-
ahead market prices (see Appendix D).
(iii) Model for the inclusion of physical derivatives products:
– A new and detailed formulation is presented for integrating futures contracts into DAM
bidding strategies following the MIBEL rules(see Section 4.3). This formulation is com-
bined with the classical operation management of the units.
– The influence of the FC’s economic dispatch on the unit commitment and on the so
called instrumental price bid has been illustrated (see Section 4.5).
(iv) Model for the inclusion of bilateral contracts:
– A detailed formulation for the integration in the DAM bidding strategies of the bilateral
contracts, together with the physical derivatives products following MIBEL rules, is
presented. This formulation is again combined with the classical operation management
of the units (see Section 5.3).
– The relationship between BC and FC coverage and their influence in the operational
behavior of the units is illustrated (see Section 5.5).
(v) Model which integrates the short-term sequence of markets:
– A model for the joint optimization of the medium-term products, futures and bilateral
contracts, taking into account the very short-term mechanisms of the market, intraday
and ancillary services markets, is developed. This model is optimized jointly with the
classical operation constraints of the thermal units (see Section 6.3).
– The results obtained show that the DAM bidding strategies of the GenCo change when
the market sequence is considered. It can also be observed that, in order to change its
total physical production level, the GenCo takes advantage of the possibility of acting
as a selling or buying agent in the intraday market (see Section 6.4).
Aside from the initial objectives, the proposed optimal bid model has been applied in some
joint works, in order to include it in: (a) a formulation for the combined cycle units (see
Section 7.1.3); (b) a model for the management of the generic programming units and the
integration of the bilateral contracts after the DAM is proposed (see Section 7.2.3); and (c)
a model for an Italian GenCo with hydro and thermal units (see Appendix E).
8.2 Topics for Further Research
There are some avenues for further research, if we follow the objectives stated in Chapter 1:
(ii) Forecast modeling for Spanish market prices:
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– Exhaustive study of the intraday and ancillary services prices and their modeling by
means of factor models, if possible. Given the strong relationship between day-ahead
and intraday market prices, factor models are expected to perform satisfactorily with
the two time series. It has to be analyzed how to introduce the reserve prices, which are
apparently independent.
– To generate a multistage scenarios based on the adjusted models for the three market
prices involved in the models. The literature in this area has been deeply studied and
some of the published techniques can be implemented (Heitsch and Ro¨misch, 2009).
(ii-iii) Model for the inclusion of physical derivatives products and bilateral products:
– To build a DAM bidding problem with futures and bilateral contracts for a GenCo
that owns a hydrothermal and combined cycle set of units, together with a generic
programming unit. This is a natural step because it will bring together the different
models presented in this thesis.
– To study other decision-makers behaviors, such as risk aversion, or the introduction of
some risk measurements. All the presented models are based on mean-risk approaches,
but changing this point of view will change both the objective function, the bidding
strategies and optimal bidding functions of the GenCo.
(v) Model which integrates the short-term sequence of markets:
– Improvements are needed in the modeling of the markets sequence, in particular, in the
modeling of the reserve market.
– To include other kinds of units, especially hydro units. Their participation in bilateral
contracts management is well known and it could be interesting to see how the optimal
bid strategies change when introducing into the models a low cost technology, such as
hydro units.
– It could also be very interesting to introduce wind power into an optimization model
jointly with a combined cycle and ancillary services market. The quick response of
combined cycle units is being studied as a useful tool for controlling the uncertainty
inherent in wind power plant generation.
Regarding the resolution of the models, it is necessary to introduce specific optimization
algorithms in order to reduce computational time. Otherwise, including new mechanisms in
the models produces prohibitive results in regard to computational time, due mostly to the
increasing number of binary variables. A first step towards this objective was the solution
of the DAMB-FBC and DAMB-FBC-M models presented in Chapters 5 and 6 respectively,
with the Perspective-Cut method (Mijangos et al., 2010); it produced very satisfactory results.
Our intention is to try Branch-and-Fix-Coordination (Alonso-Ayuso et al., 2003) and proximal
Bundle methods (Hiriart-Urruty and Lemare´chal, 1993) as an alternative to the Perspective-
Cut methodology.
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8.3 Publications and presentations generated by this thesis
Published:
• F.J. Heredia, M. Rider, C. Corchero (2009). Optimal Bidding Strategies for Thermal and
Combined Cycle Units in the Day-ahead Electricity Market with Bilateral Contracts. IEEE
Proceedings of the 2009 Power Engineering Society General Meeting, vol. 1, pp. 1-6. The
contents of this paper are partially reproduced in Chapter 7.
• F.J. Heredia, M. Rider, C. Corchero (2010). Optimal Bidding Strategies for Thermal and
Generic Programming Units in the Day-Ahead Electricity Market. IEEE Transactions on
Power Systems, vol. 25 (3), pp. 1504 - 1518. The contents of this paper are partially
reproduced in Chapter 7.
• C. Corchero, F.J. Heredia (2010). Optimal Day-Ahead Bidding in the MIBEL’s Multimarket
Energy Production System. IEEE Proceedings of the 7th Conference on European Energy
Market EEM10, vol. 1, pp. 1-6. The contents of this paper are partially reproduced in
Chapter 6.
Accepted:
• M.P. Mun˜oz, C. Corchero and F.J. Heredia (2010). Improving Electricity Market Price Sce-
narios by Means of Forecasting Factor Models. Accepted in International Statistical Review.
The contents of this paper are partially reproduced in Chapter 3.
Submitted:
• F.J. Heredia, M. Rider, C. Corchero. A stochastic programming model for the optimal elec-
tricity market bid problem with bilateral contracts for thermal and combined cycle units. Sub-
mitted in April 2009 to Annals of Operations Research. Third revision in progress. The
contents of this paper are partially reproduced in Chapter 7.
• C. Corchero and F.J. Heredia. A Stochastic Programming Model for the Thermal Optimal
Day-Ahead Bid Problem with Physical Futures Contracts. Submitted in March 2010 to Com-
puters & Operations Research. Second revision in progress. The contents of this paper are
partially reproduced in Chapter 4.
• E. Mijangos , C. Corchero and F.J. Heredia. Perspective Cuts for Some Class of Electricity
Market Optimization Problems. Submitted in November 2010 to Engineering Optimization.
Presentations:
• C. Corchero and F.J. Heredia. Optimal Short-Term Strategies for a Generation Company in
the MIBEL. APMOD 2006 Conference (Madrid, June 2006).
• C. Corchero and F.J. Heredia. A mixed-integer stochastic programming model for the day-
ahead and futures energy markets coordination. EURO 2008 Conference (Prague, July 2007).
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• M.Rider, F.J. Heredia and C. Corchero. Optimal thermal and virtual power plants operation
in the day-ahead electricity market. APMOD 2008 Conference (Bratislava, May 2008).
• C. Corchero and F.J. Heredia. Stochastic programming model for the day-ahead bid and
bilateral contracts settlement problem. IWOR 2008 Workshop (Madrid, June 2008).
• M.Rider, F.J. Heredia and C. Corchero. Optimal thermal and virtual power plants operation
in the day-ahead electricity market. IWOR 2008 Workshop (Madrid, June 2008).
• F.J. Heredia and C. Corchero. Stochastic programming models for optimal bid strategies in
the Iberian Electricity Market. 20th ISMP Symposium (Chicago, June 2009).
• M.P. Mun˜oz, C. Corchero and F.J. Heredia. Improving electricity market price scenarios
by means of forecasting factor models. 57th Session of the International Statistical Institute
(Durban, August 2009).
• C. Corchero and F.J. Heredia. Optimal Day-Ahead Bidding Strategy in the MIBEL’s Mul-
timarket Energy Production System. 7th International Conference on the European Energy
Market (Madrid, June 2010).
• C. Corchero, F.J. Heredia, M.P. Mun˜oz. Optimal Day-Ahead Bidding Strategy with futures
and bilateral contracts. Scenario generation by means of factor models. 24th EURO Confer-
ence (Lisbon, July 2010).
• F.J. Heredia, C. Corchero, M.P. Mun˜oz and E. Mijangos. Electricity Market Optimization:
finding the best bid through stochastic programming. Conference on Numerical Optimization
and Applications in Engineering 2010 (Barcelona, October 2010).
During the research stay in the Department of Mathematics, Statistics, Computing and Applica-
tions of the Universita` degli studi di Bergamo (Italy) some of the modeling concepts presented in
this thesis were applied to the Italian Market with data from an Italian GenCo. This collaboration
has also generated the scientific production that follows:
• M.T. Vespucci, C. Corchero, F.J. Heredia and M. Innorta (2009). A decision support proce-
dure for the short-term scheduling problem of a generation company operating on day-ahead
and physical derivatives electricity markets. Published at Proceedings of the 11th Interna-
tional Conference on the Modern Information Technology in the Innovation Processes of the
Industrial Enterprisers.
• M.T. Vespucci, C. Corchero, F.J. Heredia and M. Innorta. A Short-term Scheduling Model
for a Generation Company operating on Day-Ahead and Physical Derivatives Electricity Mar-
kets. Presentation in the 3rd FIMA International Conference (Gressoney Saint Jean, January
2009).
• C. Corchero, M.T. Vespucci, F.J. Heredia and M. Innorta. A decision support procedure for
the short-term scheduling problem of a Generation Company operating on Day-Ahead and
Physical Derivatives Electricity Markets. Presentation in the 43rd Euro Working Group on
Financial Modelling Meeting (London, September 2008).
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• C. Corchero, M.T. Vespucci, F.J. Heredia and M. Innorta. A stochastic approach to the
decision support procedure for a Generation Company operating on Day-Ahead and Physical
Derivatives Electricity Market. Presentation in the EURO 2009 conference (Bonn, July 2008).
• M.T. Vespucci, C. Corchero, F.J. Heredia and M. Innorta.A decision support procedure for a
Price-Taker producer operating on Day-Ahead and Physical Derivatives Electricity Markets.
Presentation in the V International Summer School in Risk Measurement and Control (Roma,
July 2008).
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APPENDIX A
Data
A.1 Thermal Units Characteristics
The relevant parameters of a thermal unit are:
• quadratic generation costs with constant, linear and quadratic coefficients, cbi (e), cli (e/MWh)
and cqi (e/MWh)
2 respectively, for unit i.
• P i and P i the upper and lower bound, respectively, on the energy generation (MWh) of a
committed unit i.
• start-up, coni , and shut-down, coffi , costs (e) for unit i.
• minimum operation and minimum idle time, toni and toffi respectively, for unit i, i.e., the
minimum number of hours that the unit must remain in operation once it is started up and
the minimum number of hours that the unit must remain idle once it has been shut down
before being started up again, respectively.
See Table A.1 for characteristics of the units used in this thesis.
A.2 Combined Cycle Units Characteristics
The relevant parameters of a combined cycle units are:
• Pc set of pseudo units of the CC unit c ∈ C.
• quadratic generation costs with constant, linear and quadratic coefficients, cbc (e), clc (e/MWh)
and cqi (e/MWh)
2 respectively, for unit c.
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i cbi c
l
i c
q
i P i P i c
on
i c
off
i t
on/off
i
e e/MWh e/MWh2 MW MW e e h
1 151.08 40.37 0.015 160.0 350.0 412.80 412.80 3
2 554.21 36.50 0.023 250.0 563.2 803.75 803.75 3
3 97.56 43.88 0.000 80.0 284.2 244.80 244.80 3
4 327.02 28.85 0.036 160.0 370.7 438.40 438.40 3
5 64.97 45.80 0.000 30.0 65.0 100.20 100.20 3
6 366.08 -13.72 0.274 60.0 166.4 188.40 188.40 3
7 197.93 36.91 0.020 160.0 364.1 419.20 419.20 3
8 66.46 55.74 0.000 110.0 313.6 1298.88 1298.88 3
9 372.14 105.08 0.000 90.0 350.0 1315.44 1315.44 3
Table A.1: Operational characteristics of the thermal units
c Pc c
b
c c
l
c c
q
c P c P c c
on
c t
on/off
c
e e/MWh e/MWh2 MW MW e hr
1 5 151.08 50.37 0.023 160.0 350.0 803.75 2
1 6 224.21 32.50 0.035 250.0 563.2 412.80 2
2 7 163.11 55.58 0.019 90.0 350.0 320.50 2
2 8 245.32 31.10 0.022 220.0 700.0 510.83 2
Table A.2: Operational Characteristics of the Combined Cycle Units
• P c and P c the upper and lower bound, respectively, on the energy generation (MWh) of a
committed unit c.
• start-up, conc , and shut-down, coffc , costs (e) for unit c.
• minimum operation and minimum idle time, tonc and toffc respectively, for unit c.
See Table A.2 for characteristics of the units used in this thesis.
A.3 Data Sources
The sources for all data used in the case studies are described below. All the data of this thesis is
public and it is either directly available in the web pages indicated or it has been calculated using
some other public data.
• Market data: the day-ahead and intraday market prices are available at OMEL’s site
(www.omel.es) since January 1998 until today. In this work we use the data from January
1st, 2004 to December 31th, 2009. The reserve market prices are available at ESIOS site
(www.esios.ree.es). Generic data about the quantities and clearing prices of the FCs is
available at OMIP’s site (www.omip.pt), this data has been used to define some examples
of FCs.
• Generation Company data: the information about the thermal and combine cycle units
in the study belongs to a GenCo that bids daily in the day-ahead market and also participates
in the derivatives market (Table A.1). Most of the information about the generation units is
available at the CNE’s site (www.cne.es).
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Glossary of symbols
Sets
B Bilateral contract portfolio
C Combined cycle units
F Futures contract portfolio
Fi Futures contracts in which unit i participates
I Thermal units
Iont Committed thermal units at interval t
Ij Thermal units that participate in FC j
MP Scenarios where λD,s < λP
MS Scenarios where λD,s > λS
P Pseudo units
PC Pseudo units of combined cycle unit c
S Scenarios
T Intervals
U Pseudo and thermal units
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Parameters
b
S Maximum quantity for selling BCs after the DAM
b
P Maximum quantity for purchase BCs after the DAM
cbi Base generation cost of unit i
cli Linear generation cost of unit i
cqi Quadratic generation cost of unit i
coni Turn-on cost of unit i
coffi Shut-down cost of unit i
Gi Number of periods that unit i has been on
InDt Day-ahead market incomes on period t
InDFt Day-ahead market and futures contracts incomes on period t
InFt Futures contracts incomes on period t
Hi Number of periods that unit i has been off
λBj Bilateral contract price for contract j
λDt Day-ahead market clearing price on period t
λ
D
t Mean of the day-ahead market price scenarios on period t
λD,st Period t day-ahead market clearing price scenario s
λFj Futures contract price for contract j
λI,st Period t intraday market clearing price scenario s
λP Purchase price of the BC after the DAM
λR,st Period t reserve market clearing price scenario s
λS Sell price of the BC after the DAM
λV Exercised price for the GPU
λ˜oti Threshold price for unit i on period t
λti Threshold price for unit i on period t
λti Threshold price for unit i on period t
LBj Bilateral contract energy for contract j
LFj Futures contract energy for contract j
µ Lagrange multiplier
P s Probability of scenario s
P i Minimum generation capacity of unit i
P i Maximum generation capacity of unit i
pbti Bid energy for unit i on period t
pMti Matched energy for unit i on period t
poti Bid curve energy for unit i on period t
pV Maximum capacity of the GPU
pi Lagrange multiplier
%i AGC capacity of unit i
ρsti Auxiliary parameter
ρB,sti Auxiliary parameter
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tCc Minimum idle time for unit c
toni Minimum start-up time for unit i
toffi Minimum idle time for unit i
θsti Auxiliary parameter
θB,sti Auxiliary parameter
Functions
B( ) Benefit function
C( ) Generation cost function
λbti( ) Bid function for unit i and period t
λoti( ) Optimal bid function for unit i and period t
pMti ( ) Matched energy function for unit i and period t
pM,sti ( ) Matched energy function for scenario s, unit i and period t
pP,sti ( ) Matched purchase energy function for scenario s, unit i and period t
pR,sti ( ) Matched residual sale energy function for scenario s, unit i and period t
pS,sti ( ) Matched sale energy function for scenario s, unit i and period t
ρti( ) Auxiliary function
ρBti ( ) Auxiliary function
θti( ) Auxiliary function
θBti ( ) Auxiliary function
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Variables
ati Thermal unit i turned on at interval t (binary)
aCtc Combined cycle unit c turned on at interval t (binary)
bti Generation of thermal unit i at interval t allocated to BC
bGti Generation of GPU unit at interval t allocated to BC
bP,st Generation allocated to the purchase BC after the DAM at interval t
bS,st Generation allocated to the sale BC after the DAM at interval t
cuti Start-up cost of unit i at interval t
cdti Shut-down cost of unit i at interval t
eti Thermal unit i turned off at interval t (binary)
eCtc Combined cycle unit c turned off at interval t (binary)
ftij Generation of unit i at interval t allocated to FC j
gsti Total physical production of unit i at interval t and scenario s
msti Matched energy at the IM of unit i at interval t and scenario s
psti Matched energy variable of unit i at interval t and scenario s
pVt Exercised energy of the VPP at interval t
pP,st Matched energy for the GPU purchase bids at scenario s and interval t
pS,st Matched energy for the GPU sale bids at scenario s and interval t
qti Instrumental offer quantity for unit i at interval t
rsti Participation at the RM of unit i at interval t and scenario s (binary)
uti Thermal unit i start-up at interval t (binary)
uCtc Combined cycle unit c start-up at interval t (binary)
wPti Auxiliary variable
wRti Auxiliary variable
wSti Auxiliary variable
vsti Auxiliary variable
xVt VPP rights exercised at interval t (binary)
yPti Auxiliary variable
yRti Auxiliary variable
ySti Auxiliary variable
zSti Auxiliary variable
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Abbreviations
AGC Automatic Generation Control
BC Bilateral contract
CC Combined cycle
CT Combustion turbine
D Day in study
DAM Day-ahead market
DAMB Day-ahead market bidding problem
DAMB-FC Day-ahead market bidding with futures contracts problem
DAMB-FBC Day-ahead market bidding with futures and bilateral contracts problem
DAMB-FC Day-ahead market bidding with futures and bilateral contracts in a
multimarket environment problem
DM Derivatives market
EEV Expected result of using EV solution
EV Expected value problem
FC Futures contract
GenCo Generation company
GPU Generic programming units
HRSG Heat recovery steam generator
IM Intraday market
ISO Independent system operator
MIBEL Iberian Electricity Market
MO Market operator
OMEL Iberian market operator
OMIP Iberian derivatives market operator
PU Pseudo unit
REE Red Ele´ctrica de Espan˜a
RM Ancillary service or reserve market
RP Recourse problem
ST Steam turbine
TSFA Time series factor analysis
UCP Term contract unit
VPP Virtual power plant
VSS Value of the stochastic solution
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APPENDIX C
Coefficients of the Forecasting Models
µ φ12 φ13 φ23 φ96 φ120 φ144 φ168 φ336 θ1 θ2
0.078 -0.038 0.143 0.037 0.132 0.078 0.095 0.525 0.045 0.133 0.170
θ3 θ4 θ5 θ6 θ13 θ24 θ48 θ72 θ168 θ504 θ168
0.147 0.110 0.106 0.085 0.195 -0.222 -0.141 -0.151 0.394 0.010 0.986
Table C.1: ARIMA model significant coefficients.
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Hour Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Communality
1 0.007 0.109 -0.006 0.419
2 -0.020 0.109 0.007 0.669
3 -0.018 0.133 0.015 0.844
4 -0.009 0.156 0.011 0.944
5 0.005 0.164 0.005 0.911
6 0.011 0.121 -0.003 0.818
7 0.030 0.065 -0.006 0.547
8 0.078 0.049 -0.015 0.461
9 0.122 0.013 -0.033 0.585
10 0.142 0.004 -0.048 0.737
11 0.141 -0.006 -0.036 0.903
12 0.137 -0.003 -0.025 0.932
13 0.133 -0.002 -0.008 0.895
14 0.119 -0.002 0.008 0.839
15 0.098 0.012 0.041 0.730
16 0.106 0.001 0.058 0.795
17 0.102 -0.004 0.065 0.822
18 0.096 -0.020 0.068 0.832
19 0.084 -0.021 0.067 0.719
20 0.052 -0.016 0.075 0.633
21 0.015 -0.006 0.094 0.557
22 -0.003 0.004 0.095 0.608
23 -0.025 0.007 0.106 0.561
24 -0.024 0.006 0.084 0.366
CFI 0.347 0.587 0.755
RMSEA 0.289 0.241 0.190
Table C.2: Factors loadings and measures of goodness of fit.
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APPENDIX D
Italian Day-Ahead Market Price
In this appendix, the time series factor analysis is performed for the data of the Italian day-
ahead market price. The data is obtained from the Mercato Elettrico web site (http://www.
mercatoelettrico.org/.
The same steps developed in section 3.3.2 are perform with this set of prices. It can be observed
in Figure D.1(a) that the shape of the prices along one day is slightly different to the Spanish one.
In this case 4 factors are needed, they are shown in Figure D.2 and their interpretation is similar
to the Spanish case. The different to zero loads represents the group of hours that behave similar,
the first factor represents clearly the working hours, notice that this factor ends before than the
Spanish one because of the different habits in each country. The second factor represent the first
hours of the day, the opposite to the third factor which represents the last ones. Finally, the fourth
factor is the most difficult to interpret, but it corresponds to the very peak hours of the day, that
means, the hour with maximum load and variability.
Finally, Figure D.1(b) shows the forecasts, the real prices and the forecast IC for a week. The MSE
for the forecasts in this case is 0.521.
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Figure D.1: (a)Boxplot of Italian hourly prices. (b)One-step-ahead forecast prices with TSFA model for
the Italian prices.
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Figure D.2: Loads of the common factors for the Italian prices.
APPENDIX E
A Stochastic Approach to the Decision Support
Procedure for a GenCo Operating in a Day-Ahead and
Physical Derivatives Electricity Market
Introduction
This appendix presents work performed jointly with professors Maria Teresa Vespucci and Mario
Innorta, from the Universita` degli studi di Bergamo (Italy). The work consists of building the
stochastic version and including physical derivatives products in an existing model (Vespucci et al.,
2008) for the GenCo short-term operation. The motivation for this work arose because the Italian
electricity market was planning the creation of an derivatives market with some similarities to that
which was being created in Spain. Both the model and the data are built on the assumptions of the
Italian Electricity Market (http://www.mercatoelettrico.org/). The only external issue
is the inclusion of the Spanish rules for the physical derivatives products, because the Italian rules
were expected to be very similar to the Spanish ones.
The most significant differences from Chapters 4 and 5 are the inclusion of the hydro units into the
model and the hypothesis for the market participation of a price-taker GenCo. Specifically, instead
of studying the optimal bidding curve, it is supposed that the quantity sent to the DAM bid is
the remaining quantity after covering the bilateral contracts. The rules for the DAM participation
are equal to the ones presented in Section 2.1.4, except for the obligatory nature of participation
in the market. Simultaneous to participation in the DAM, we supposed that participation in the
derivatives market follows the Spanish rules defined in Section 2.1.4.2.
Therefore, in this work a decision support procedure has been developed for the short-term hydro-
thermal resource scheduling problem of a GenCo who operates in the Italian Electricity Market and
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who aims to maximize its own profit. The generation company is supposed to be a price-taker and
the resources owned by the producer are hydroelectric plants and thermal units. On the short-term
horizon, the generation company has to solve the unit commitment problem for the thermal units,
the economic dispatch problem for the available hydro plants and the committed thermal units and
settlement of the futures contracts which controls the quantity that each committed thermal unit
or hydro plant has to produce to fulfill them. Its decisions must be compatible with both technical
constraints and market constraints. The model is a stochastic mixed integer linear programming
model, where the objective function represents the total profit determined on the basis of price
scenarios and the constraints describe the hydro system, the thermal system, the futures contracts
settlement and the market.
Notice that the notation in this chapter is independent to the general notation used in the rest of
this thesis. The original notation of the work has been maintained.
E.1 Model
In this section the mathematical model is introduced. The planning horizon is short-term with
periods of 1 hour. Let T denote the number of periods considered and let t, 0 ≤ t ≤ T , denote the
period index, where t = 0 denotes the last hour of the planning horizon immediately preceding the
one in consideration.
E.2 Model of the Hydroelectric System
The hydro system consists of a number of cascades, i.e. sets of hydraulically interconnected hydro
plants, pumped-storage hydro plants and basins. It is mathematically represented by a directed
graph (see Figure E.1): water storages (basins) correspond to a set J of nodes; water flows corre-
spond to a set I of arcs; and the interconnections are represented by the arc-node incidence matrix,
whose (i, j)-entry is denoted by Ai,j (Ai,j = −1, if arc i leaves node j; Ai,j = 1 if arc i enters node
j and; Ai,j = 0 otherwise). The GenCo has to determine the optimal use of the hydro resources
which are available in the planning period. They are given by the initial storage volumes vj,0(m3)
in all basins j ∈ J and the natural inflows Bj,t(m3/h) in all basins j ∈ J and hours t ∈ T . The
GenCo must schedule the hourly production of each hydro plant, which is expressed as the product
of the hydro plant energy coefficient times the turbine volume in hour t, as well as the hourly
pumped and spilled volumes. The decision variables of the hydro scheduling problem are:
• Water flow: qi,t(m3/h) in arc i along hour t
• Storage volume: vj,t(m3): in basin j at the end of hour t
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Figure 1: an example of cascade
are discussed. In Section 4 a linearized model for thermal production costs is
discussed and in section 5 market constraints and model objective function are
presented. In section 6 some considerations are presented related to the model
validation and in section 7 some lines for further research are discussed.
The planning horizon is short term (typically a week or 10 days) with a
discretization period of 1 hour. Let T denote the number of periods considered
and let t, 0 ≤ t ≤ T , denote the period index, where t = 0 denotes the last hour
of the planning horizon immediately preceeding the one in consideration.
2 Model of the hydroelectric subsystem
The hydroelectric subsystem consists of a number of cascades. A cascade is a
set of hydraulically interconnected hydro plants, pumped-storage hydro plants
and basins. Each cascade is mathematically represented by a directed graph:
each node represents a basin, with a given storage capacity, and each arc may
represent either a hydro plant (power generation) or a hydro pump (power
storage) or a basin spillage (water flow to a downstream basin for keeping water
storage within the storage capacity limit). Let J denote the set of nodes and I
denote the set of arcs. An example of valley and of the corresponding arc-node
incidence matrix A is reported in Figure 1.
The following data describe the hydroelectric system: for i ∈ I and j ∈ J
3
Figure E.1: Multi-graph representing the hydro system.
The mathematical relations that describe the hydro system are the following:
0 ≤ qi,t ≤ qi i ∈ I, 1 ≤ t ≤ T (E.1)
0 ≤ vj,t ≤ vj j ∈ J, 1 ≤ t ≤ T (E.2)
vj,T ≤ vj,T j ∈ J (E.3)
vj,t = vj,t−1 +Bj,t +
∑
i∈I
Ai,jqi,t−ρi j ∈ J, 1 ≤ t ≤ T (E.4)
where (E.1) represents requirements that the water flow in arc i in hour t is nonnegative and
bounded above by the maximum volume qi that can be ither turbined, or pumped, or spilled.
(E.2) requires that the storage volume in basin j at the end of hour t is nonnegative and bounded
above by the maximum storage volume vj . Equation (E.3) imposes that the storage volume in
basin j at the end of hour T is bounded bel w by the mini um storage volume vj,T , determined
by the medium-term resource scheduling, in order to provide the required initial storage volume
at the beginning of the next planning period. Finally, constraint (E.4) imposes that the storage
volume in basin j at the end of h ur t equals the basin storage v lume at the end of hour t−1 plus
inflows in hour t, taking into account the time ρi(h) required by the water flow leaving node i to
reach node j, minus outflows in hour t. A positive energy coefficient ki(MWh/m3) is associated to
every arc i representing generation; the product kiqi,t expresses the energy produced in hour t. A
negative energy coefficient ki is associated to every arc i representing pumping; the product kiqi,t
represents the energy used for pumping in hour t. Zero energy coefficients ki are associated to arcs
representing spillage.
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E.3 Model of the Thermal System
Let K denote the set of thermal units owned by the power producer. For every unit k ∈ K
the producer must decide on the unit commitment, taking into account minimum up-time and
minimum down-time constraints; and the hourly production of each committed unit, taking into
account lower and upper bounds on production levels and ramping constraints. The decision
variables in the thermal system problem are:
• Production level: pk,t(MWh) of unit k in hour t
• Unit commitment binary variables: αk,t representing the start-up; βk,t representing the shut-
down; and γk,t representing that unit is on , for unit k ∈ K in hour t ∈ T
The set of constraints that control the unit commitment taking into account the minimum up- and
minimum down-time are the following:
γk,t−1 + αk,t = γk,t + βk,t k ∈ K, 1 ≤ t ≤ T (E.5)
if γk,0 = 1 then γk,t = 1 1 ≤ t ≤ tak − nhk (E.6)
min(t+tak−1,T )∑
τ=t+1
γk,τ ≥ αk,t min (tak − 1, T − t) k ∈ K, 1 ≤ t ≤ T (E.7)
if γk,0 = 0 then γk,t = 0 1 ≤ t ≤ tsk − nhk (E.8)
min(t+tsk−1,T )∑
τ=t+1
γk,τ ≤ (1− βk,t) min (tsk − 1, T − t) k ∈ K, 1 ≤ t ≤ T (E.9)
where (E.5) fixes the values of the binary variables representing states in hours t − 1 and t and
manoeuvres in hour t so that they are coherent, i.e. no status change can take place without
the corresponding manoeuvre. Information about the status of unit k at the beginning of the
scheduling period are given by the following data γk,0, the state at the last hour of the previous
planning period, and nhk(h), number of hours in which unit k has been in state γk,0 since the last
change in the previous scheduling period. If γk,0 = 1 and nhk 6= 0 indicate that unit k as on at the
beginning of the scheduling period and was started-up in hour T − nhk of the previous scheduling
period, γk,0 = nhk = 0 indicates that unit k is off at the beginning of the scheduling period. The
unit commitment must satisfy minimum up-time constraints and minimum down-time imposed by
constraints (E.6)-(E.8) where tak(h) is the minimum number of hours unit k must be on after
start-up and tsk(h) minimum number of hours unit k must be off after shut-down.
Moreover, the hourly production levels pk,t are subject to the following constraints:
γk,tpk ≤ pk,t ≤ γk,tpk k ∈ K, 1 ≤ t ≤ T (E.10)
pk,t − pk,t−1 ≤ δuk + αk,t (vsuk − δuk) k ∈ K, 1 ≤ t ≤ T (E.11)
pk,t − pk,t−1 ≥ −δdk + βk,t (−vsdk + δdk) k ∈ K, 1 ≤ t ≤ T (E.12)
Those constraints model the decisions that the producer has to made in order to fix the production
level pk,t:
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(E.10) If unit k is on in hour t, the hourly production pk,t must be neither less than the
minimum level p
k
nor greater than the maximum level pk; if unit k is off in hour t, the
hourly production must be zero.
(E.11) Ramp-up constraint: if unit k is started-up in hour t, the hourly production pk,t
cannot be greater than vsuk (maximum production of the unit at start-up); moreover, if
the production levels in two subsequent hours, t − 1 and t, are such that pk,t−1 ≤ pk,t, the
production variation is bounded above by δuk (maximum production increase per hour).
(E.12) Ramp-down constraint: if unit k is shut-down in hour t, the hourly production pk,t
cannot be greater than vsdk (maximum production at shut-down) and if the production levels
in two subsequent hours t − 1 and t are such that pk,t−1 ≥ pk,t, the production variation is
bounded above by δdk (maximum production decrease per hour).
E.4 Futures Contract Dispatch and Market Constraints
Let F denote the set of futures contracts assigned to the GenCo and let If and Kf denote the
subset of hydro plants and the subset of thermal units, respectively, assigned to futures contract
f . Moreover, let Lf denote the constant quantity of electricity to be delivered every hour and let
λf denote the futures contract settlement price. The decision variables of the futures contracts
dispatch problem are:
• Energy to be produced by hydro plant: ghi,t,f (MWh) hydro plant i at hour t for Futures
Contract f
• Energy to be produced by thermal unit: gtk,t,f (MWh) thermal unit k at hour t for Futures
Contract f
And the Futures Contract dispatch problem is subject to the following restrictions:
0 ≤
∑
f∈Fi
ghi,t,f ≤ kiqi,t i ∈ Ig, 1 ≤ t ≤ T (E.13)∑
f∈Fk
gtk,t,f ≤ pk,t k ∈ K, 1 ≤ t ≤ T (E.14)∑
i∈If
ghi,t,f +
∑
k∈Kf
gtk,t,f = Lf f ∈ F, 1 ≤ t ≤ T (E.15)
where, (E.13)-(E.14) assures the nonnegativity of the decision variables while imposing that the
production used for FC covering does not exceed the total hourly production. Note that Fi is
the subset of futures contracts in which hydro plant i participates and Fk is the subset of futures
contracts in which thermal unit k participates. Constraint (E.15) imposes that the energy quantity
Lf is only produced by the unit assigned to futures contract f where If represents the subset
of hydro plants that participate in FC f ; and Kf represents the subset of thermal units that
participate in FC f .
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Moreover, the producer must satisfy in every hour t the commitments derived from bilateral con-
tracts. The energy cart(MWh) to be delivered on the basis of a BC may be either produced or
bought in the DAM. If the total production in hour t exceeds the load from BC, the excess quantity
sellt,s(MWh) is sold on the DAM; if its total production is less than the load from the BC, the
producer has to buy in the DAM the amount of energy buyt,s(MWh) necessary to meet the BC load
demand. These two variables are the only two-stage variables of the model because they are the
ones that depend on the DAM price and, therefore, on the price scenarios. The market constraints
are represented by equations (E.16):
∑
i∈I
kiqi,t +
∑
k∈K
pk,t + buyt,s = cart + sellt,s +
L∑
j=1
Lj 1 ≤ t ≤ T, 1 ≤ s ≤ S (E.16)
E.5 Objective Function
The power producer is assumed to be a price-taker. It is assumed that the hourly sell price
λt(e/MWh) can be represented by a set of scenarios λt,s, s ∈ S, as well as the hourly purchase
price µt,s, µt,s ≥ λt,s.
Two types of costs are associated to thermal production: manoeuvres costs and generation costs.
For every unit k, costs csuk(e) and csdk(e) are associated to every start-up and shut-down manoeu-
vre, respectively. The thermal generation cost Gk,t of unit k in hour t is assumed to be a convex
quadratic function of the production level pk,t.
Gk,t (pk,t) = g2,kp2k,t + g1,kpk,t + g0,k
where g2,k (e/MWh2), g1,k(e/MWh) and g0,k(e) are the quadratic generation cost coefficients for
unit k. In order to obtain a mixed integer linear programming model the generation cost functions
are linearized. For every unit k the interval
[
p
k
, pk
]
is divided in H subintervals of width plk,h, 1 ≤
h ≤ H. Let pk,t,h−1 and pk,t,h denote the extreme points of subinterval h; let glk,h denote the slope
of the straight line segment passing through points (pk,t,h−1, Gk,t (pk,t,h−1)); and (pk,t,h, Gk,t (pk,t,h))
and let plk,t,h denote the real variable associated to subinterval h. The linearized generation costs
of thermal unit k in hour t are then given by
Glink,t (pk,t) =
(
g2,kp
2
k
+ g1,kpk + g0,k
)
γk,t +
H∑
h=1
glk,hplk,t,h
where variables plk,t,h are subject to the constraints
pk,t = pkγk,t +
H∑
h=1
plk,t,h k ∈ K, 1 ≤ t ≤ T (E.17)
0 ≤ plk,t,h ≤ plk,h k ∈ K, 1 ≤ t ≤ T, 1 ≤ h ≤ H (E.18)
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Then, the following objective function represents the power producer’s profits:
f(sell, buy, α, β, p) =
T∑
t=1
[
S∑
s=1
Ps (λt,ssellt,s − µt,sbuyt,s)
−
∑
k∈K
(
csukαk,t + csdkβk,t +Glink,t (pk,t)
)]
E.6 Complete Model
The full model developed in the preceding sections can be formulated as:
max f(sell, buy, α, β, p)
s.t.
Eq. (E.1)− (E.4) Hydro system
Eq. (E.5)− (E.12) Thermal system
Eq. (E.13)− (E.15) FC covering
Eq. (E.16) Market constraint
Eq. (E.17)− (E.18) Linearization constraints
(E.19)
This formulation corresponds to an optimization problem with mixed continuous and binary deci-
sion variables, linear objective function and a set of linear constraints.
E.7 Computational Results
A set of computational tests has been performed in order to validate the described model. The
model has been implemented in GAMS and solved by CPLEX. Real data from an Italian GenCo
generation company, with 17 thermal units and 12 hydro plants was used. The prices have been
modeled through factor models, as has been explained in Appendix D, and a set of 50 scenarios
has been built.
Figure E.2 shows the generation used to cover the bilateral and futures contracts for each thermal
unit and interval. As in previous case studies, it can be seen that there are some units that submit
nearly the maximum generation to these products while others use only a small percentage of their
capacity. It must be noted that the level of production of all units is almost constant; this occurs
because the Italian prices hardly vary throughout the day. Italian DAM prices do not fall at the
midday so much as Spanish prices, and this causes the generation level of the units to be more
constant after 7 a.m., once the prices achieve their daily mean.
Figure E.3 shows the same as Figure E.2, but for the hydro units. It has to be noted that a
hydro system has not production costs, therefore the behavior of hydro units is totally different
from that of thermal units. They do not depend so much on the prices as on the natural inflows
and the expected level at the end of the day. It is also natural to send the hydro capacity to
the market because, although the prices were not high enough to cover thermal production costs,
the hydro units always generate benefits. Figure represents the generation level of two units for
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Figure E.2: Energy committed to bilateral and futures contracts by each thermal unit.
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Figure E.3: Energy committed to bilateral and futures contracts by each hydro unit.
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Figure E.4: Level of production of two units for each hour in the four possible models.
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all the intervals. It shows the difference between the model that takes into account coordination
with the futures contract covering and the one without this coordination, as well as the difference
between the deterministic and the stochastic approach. It can be seen that the pattern present
large differences between the four models which confirms to us the influence of stochasticity and
the inclusion of futures and bilateral contracts in the optimal generation of the units.
E.8 Conclusions
A mixed integer linear programming model has been defined for the profit maximizing short-
term resource scheduling problem of a GenCo operating in the Italian Electricity Market. Energy
delivery commitments derived from bilateral and futures contracts are used to hedge against DAM
price uncertainty. The optimization model allows the producer to determine the optimal resource
schedule, taking into account the operational constraints of hydro and thermal plants. DAM price
stochasticity is represented by through use of a scenario fan.
